Changes in the U.S. banking Sector architectureas a Result of 2008-2009 Crisis

2014 ◽  
pp. 84-96
Author(s):  
P. Zakharov

The financial crisis in the USA has led to major changes in the banking sector architecture. Many financial institutions went bankrupt and were absorbed by competitors, while others were compelled to change their business models. That has resulted in consolidation of the banking sector. Significant developments were also imposed by B. Obama’s financial regulation reform and unprecedented interference of the federal government in banking business.

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiltrud Thelen-Pischke

The challenge of perfect regulation! Comments to the debate on reforms of the financial sector. In the light of the recent financial crisis the question was raised, if there is any chance of regulation at all to help prevent future crises. As lessons learned from the financial crisis regulators have already adopted numerous measures that aim to enhance financial regulation. Most prominent is the reform of the well-known Basel II soon to be Basel III framework. The following paper takes a closer look on the most important measures against the background of the economic aspects of financial intermediation. The overall focus of this paper is the question if the reform of Basel II can improve the regulatory environment. This includes an analysis of how the changes in financial regulation will affect financial institutions. As a result the paper will show that most of the discussed and adopted measures actually lead to greater regulatory effectiveness. Nevertheless, the key factor for more effective financial regulation is a deep knowledge with regard to financial institutions and their business models. Only a thourough understanding of each individual bank and the system as a whole puts the regulator in the position to assess risks which might lead to the next financial crisis and to react appropriately.


2019 ◽  
pp. 209-239
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

This chapter begins by explaining that financialization since the financial crisis has continued. The chapter then shows how the real culture of banking has not changed as a result. It examines the business models of the largest Anglo-American banks and the impact of Quantitative Easing to show the disconnect between the banks and their respective economies. It then examines rising household indebtedness, and the lending practices of the banks that exploit the heavily indebted. Finally it explores pay in the financial sector, showing that fixed and variable remuneration remain out of proportion to the value-added of the banking sector, and disproportionately high compared to pay in most other sectors. The conclusion we should draw is that bank culture has actually changed very little.


2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 1635-1662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Norden ◽  
Peter Roosenboom ◽  
Teng Wang

AbstractWe investigate whether and how government interventions in the U.S. banking sector influence the stock market performance of corporate borrowers during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We measure firms’ exposures to government interventions with an intervention score that is based on combined information on the firms’ structure of bank relationships and their banks’ participation in government capital support programs. We find that government capital infusions in banks have a significantly positive impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. The effect is more pronounced for riskier and bank-dependent firms and for those that borrow from banks that are less capitalized and smaller.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-78
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Paulet ◽  
Francesc Relano

As has been argued throughout this paper, the different way in which banks have been affected by the crisis is closely linked to their distinct business model. Consequently, the characteristic structure of the balance sheet in big banks and ethical banks is correlated with their divergent dynamic during the crisis. While the financial turmoil has left the business approach of ethical banks unchanged, as evidenced in the striking stability of their balance sheet from 2007 to 2009, the pattern shown by big banks has substantially changed over this same period. These developments would tend to suggest the need to reform the business model of big banks. There is no clear empirical evidence that a banking system with a large number of small institutions would be any more stable than the system as it currently stands. Besides, financing certain big projects would always require the existence of large international banks. Both types of financial institutions are in fact complementary. How to regulate the banking and financial sector is thus a complex and multifaceted issue. One cannot impose the same requirements on big international-oriented banks and small domestic banks. As this paper has tried to demonstrate, both have a distinct business model.


2013 ◽  
pp. 729-749
Author(s):  
William S. Boddie

The United States (U.S.) Federal Government is in an extreme financial crisis. The U.S. national debt is $14T and the national deficit is $1.3T. The U.S. Government seeks to improve government-wide performance, reduce operating costs, reduce the national debt, and reduce the national deficit. If the U.S. Government continues its current enterprise management approach, the national debt and national deficit could become greater and the Government could default on its debt. The DoD institutionalized a Business Mission Area Enterprise Architecture (EA) and improved performance and reduced operating costs. Leaders in the DoD leveraged an EA-based approach to improve department-wide performance and reduce costs in selected instances. This chapter proposes that the DoD institutionalize an EA-based approach to improve department-wide performance, reduce operating costs, reduce the national debt, and reduce the national deficit.


2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 729-739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick John O’Sullivan

Purpose The aim of the paper is to examine what type of relationship existed between the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Riggs Bank in respect of anti-money laundering (AML) compliance. Different commentators have established certain trends in the interaction between a regulator and a regulated entity, and this paper seeks to apply these findings to the relationship between the OCC and Riggs Bank and ascertain where this example lies in the wider domain of regulatory relationships. The paper then examines whether the relationship between the OCC and HSBC United States was similar to the one between the OCC and Riggs Bank or did the regulator adopt a more aggressive supervisory stance. Throughout this work, there is also a focus on the underlying incentives which may adversely affect how a financial institution interacts with a financial regulator and possible solutions to this problem proposed. Design/methodology/approach Research undertaken by commentators was assessed and their findings as the different regulatory relationships that may develop between a regulator and a regulated entity were applied to the interactions between the OCC and two different financial institutions, namely, Riggs Bank and HSBC United States. Examples from the Senate Subcommittee Reports into the AML failings into these financial institutions were examined through the prism of pre-existing regulatory relationship categories. Findings The paper ultimately concludes that the OCC was far too passive in its interactions with both Riggs Bank and HSBC United States and that the primary underlying motivations for both institutions were profit- rather than compliance-led. Research limitations/implications One of the main limitations to this research was the absence of direct input from either personnel from the banking sector in the USA or of regulators from the same jurisdiction. Practical implications This paper proposes a number of practical solutions to recast the relationship between financial regulators and regulated institutions away from the former deferring to the latter to one where the former dictates to the latter. Originality/value This paper seeks to examine an actual regulatory relationship between a financial regulator and two different institutions that is reported in the public domain by applying pre-existing academic research on question of regulatory relationships and see how the practice differs or corresponds with the theory.


UDA AKADEM ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 4-19
Author(s):  
Carlos Cordero-Díaz

La crisis que comprometió al sistema financiero ecuatoriano a fines del siglo XX es de las más fuertes que ha enfrentado nuestro país, comparable, en cuanto a sus implicaciones macroeconómicas y reformas económicas, con la que se desarrolló en los años veinte del siglo pasado; pero más devastadora en términos de los efectos sociales que tuvo. Los testimonios de personas que perdieron sus recursos económicos, primero en el feriado bancario y luego con la liquidación de varios bancos e instituciones financieras, demuestran la magnitud de la crisis.La culminación de la crisis financiera coincide con el cambio del régimen monetario en nuestro país, cambio que también provocó pérdidas a ciudadanos y empresas, ya que el elevado tipo de cambio utilizado, provocó una significativa reducción en el valor de los ahorros. La participación del Estado ecuatoriano en el surgimiento, desarrollo y culminación de la crisis financiera fue sin duda determinante. La nueva normativa para la regulación bancaria y financiera dictada a inicios de los años noventa fue uno de los factores explicativos del origen; la entrega de recursos a las instituciones financieras, a través del Banco Central y a los depositantes a través de la AGD, permitieron que la crisis el sistema financiero se trasladara al ámbito monetario.El Ecuador inauguró el nuevo siglo con un nuevo régimen monetario y sintiendo también las repercusiones de la las crisis financiera.Palabras claves: crisis financiera, dolarización, banco central, macroeoconomíaAbstractThe crisis which compromised the Ecuadorian financial system in the late twentieth century is the strongest our country has faced, comparable in terms of its macroeconomic implications and economic reforms, with the one developed in the twenties of the last century; however, more devastating in terms of its social impact. The testimonies of people who lost their economic resources first during the bank holiday; and then, with the liquidation of several banks and financial institutions, demonstrate the magnitude of the crisis. The culmination of the financial crisis coincides with the change of the monetary regime in our country; change that also caused losses to citizens and businesses, since the high exchange rate caused a significant reduction in savings value.The participation of the Ecuadorian State in the emergence, development and culmination of the financial crisis was certainly crucial. The new rules for the banking and financial regulation enacted in the early nineties was one of the explanatory factors of the origin. The provision of resources to financial institutions by the Central Bank, and to depositors through the AGD (Deposit Guarantee Agency), enabled the crisis of the financial system to move to the monetary field.Ecuador inaugurated the new century with a new monetary system; but at the same time feeling the impact of the financial crisis. Keywords: Financial Crisis, Dollarization, Central Bank, Macro Economy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Kundid Novokmet ◽  
Bruna Bilić

The current financial crisis reaffirmed the relevance of social responsibility and ethics in financial products. Frauds, scandals, collective law suits by organizations for consumer protection, negative reputations as well as increasing anti-corporate activism have not circumvented the banking industry. In a situation of constant emphasis of social costs and operating damages, the banks are expected to embrace social responsibility more significantly, as well as to endure the sizeable burden of the economic crisis. According to the legitimacy theory, the voluntary adoption of the corporate social responsibility concept within the banking business may serve as a method of building up the reputational capital of the banks and regaining the trust of society in banking products, all segments where it is important that socially responsible actions are adequately reported and disclosed. Thanks to the 5/EU on non-financial reporting of large-sized and listed companies as well as public-interest entities, social responsibility reporting will soon become mandatory for the banking sector. By giving an insight into the scale of social responsibility reporting of selected Croatian banks, this paper will address responsibility reporting has increased during the financial crisis, as the legitimacy theory suggests. It will also give an answer how prepared are banks for the new regulatory requirements in the nonfinancial reporting area.


2020 ◽  
pp. 299-334
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

In 2009, the U.S. and other G20 nations agreed on reforms designed to improve the regulation of systemically important financial institutions and markets. However, those reforms did not change the fundamental structure of the financial system, which continues to be dominated by universal banks and large shadow banks. Those giant institutions are too big, too complex, and too opaque to be effectively managed by their executives or adequately disciplined by market participants and regulators. In addition, government officials have failed to hold top executives accountable for widespread misconduct at financial giants during and after the financial crisis. The extensive networks linking capital markets, universal banks, and shadow banks create a strong probability that serious problems arising in one financial sector will spill over into other sectors and trigger a systemic crisis. Consequently, governments face enormous pressures to rescue universal banks and large shadow banks whenever a financial disruption occurs. There are serious doubts whether many governments and central banks will possess the necessary resources in the future to provide comprehensive bailouts similar to those arranged during the last crisis. Accordingly, the next systemic financial crisis might not be contained and could potentially lead to a second Great Depression.


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