Political Culture and Values

Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton

A long intellectual tradition links the different historical experiences in Canada and the United States (U.S.) to continuing contrasts in their political cultures. New evidence from contemporary public opinion polls highlights more cultural similarities between nations than differences. In broad value priorities, Canadians and Americans are more similar to each other than to the citizens in most other advanced industrial democracies. Feelings of national identity and trust in government are also strikingly similar across these two nations. The norms of good citizenship are very comparable. And perhaps most surprising of all, images of the appropriate role of government overlap substantially. In short, the rhetoric of cultural differences is less apparent in the reality of public opinion surveys.

2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 849-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL R. TOMZ ◽  
JESSICA L. P. WEEKS

One of the most striking findings in political science is the democratic peace: the absence of war between democracies. Some authors attempt to explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of public opinion. They observe that democratic leaders are beholden to voters and argue that voters oppose war because of its human and financial costs. This logic predicts that democracies should behave peacefully in general, but history shows that democracies avoid war primarily in their relations with other democracies. In this article we investigate not whether democratic publics are averse to war in general, but whether they are especially reluctant to fight other democracies. We embedded experiments in public opinion polls in the United States and the United Kingdom and found that individuals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. Moreover, our experiments suggest that shared democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure. These findings shed light on a debate of enduring importance to scholars and policy makers.


Author(s):  
L. N. Fedotova ◽  

The attitude of the population to other countries is considered, taking into account two tendencies of the last one and a half centuries: globalization, which is based on economic processes with their interdependence of individual players from each other in the international market, and glocalization, as a phenomenon of “rebellious periphery” opposing the dominant culture that refuses such an acculturation strategy. The role of mass information sources in shaping the attitude of the population to different countries is discussed on the example of Russian data from public opinion polls, in particular, to the events in Belarus. The factor of trust in information sources is considered


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 443-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Griffin ◽  
Amy Pason ◽  
Filip Wiecko ◽  
Brittany Brace

We report the results of a survey of criminology and criminal justice (CCJ) scholars asking their responses to the same questions posed annually to the general public in Gallup public opinion polls. We found CCJ scholars to be more likely to hold more liberal positions on these issues than the general public. The findings indicate a disconnect between popular crime and justice perspectives (and resultant crime policy formation) and the “experts” presumably best trained and informed on how to go about crime policy. We argue for a renewed discussion among CCJ scholars regarding the relevance and role of academic expertise in crime policy formation and offer suggestions for how CCJ scholars might “go public” in influencing policy decisions.


Author(s):  
Valerie Neal

According to public opinion polls, Americans are rather fickle about space exploration. In open-ended questions—“Do you think the United States should explore space?”—most eagerly say yes. To more focused questions—“Do you think the United States should explore space or tackle [insert any social issue here]?”—many supporters defect. This suggests that people generally do not have a firm commitment to the meaning or value of space exploration, and particularly not to its higher-risk, higher-cost mode: human spaceflight. Yet most do carry around some kind of mental construct—a metaphor, a meme, a cliché—that gives spaceflight meaning in their own intellectual domains....


Daedalus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 145 (4) ◽  
pp. 127-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Valentino

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has refrained from the widespread, intentional targeting of civilian populations in times of war. Public opinion polls seem to reflect a marked decline in American support for targeting foreign civilians since that time. Drawing on original public opinion surveys, as well as other historical material, this essay explores several explanations for these changes. Although there is some evidence that the public's views about the morality of civilian targeting have shifted, I argue that two other explanations also play an important role in the changes in the conduct of American wars. First, a mounting skepticism, especially within the U.S. military, about the efficacy of killing civilians, has undercut the primary motivation to even consider such tactics. Indeed, many U.S. military leaders now perceive that killing adversary civilians in large numbers – intentionally or unintentionally – usually backfires, making the adversary fight harder or driving more civilians to join or support the adversary's forces. Second, due to the lower stakes, and especially the dramatically lower fatality rates suffered by American troops in recent wars, the temptation to attempt to end wars quickly with a “death blow” against adversary cities has become less potent. Under certain conditions, however, a majority of Americans would still support today the kind of population bombing last practiced during World War II.


1950 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 101-103
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Feraru

Author(s):  
William W. Franko ◽  
Christopher Witko

Here the authors present the variation that exists in income inequality across the states, and variation in public awareness or concern about income inequality as measured by public opinion polls. Though politicians may decide to tackle income inequality even in the absence of public concern about inequality, the authors argue that government responses are more likely when and where there is a growing awareness of, and concern about, inequality, which is confirmed in the analyses in this book. To examine this question in subsequent chapters, a novel measure of public awareness of rising state inequality is developed. Using these estimates, this chapter shows that the growth in the public concern about inequality responds in part to objective increases in inequality, but also that state political conditions, particularly mass partisanship, shape perceptions of inequality.


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