scholarly journals Who speaks for Muslims? The role of the press in the creation and reporting of Muslim public opinion polls in the aftermath of London bombings in July 2005

Ethnicities ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 675-695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Sobolewska ◽  
Sundas Ali
Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton

A long intellectual tradition links the different historical experiences in Canada and the United States (U.S.) to continuing contrasts in their political cultures. New evidence from contemporary public opinion polls highlights more cultural similarities between nations than differences. In broad value priorities, Canadians and Americans are more similar to each other than to the citizens in most other advanced industrial democracies. Feelings of national identity and trust in government are also strikingly similar across these two nations. The norms of good citizenship are very comparable. And perhaps most surprising of all, images of the appropriate role of government overlap substantially. In short, the rhetoric of cultural differences is less apparent in the reality of public opinion surveys.


Author(s):  
L. N. Fedotova ◽  

The attitude of the population to other countries is considered, taking into account two tendencies of the last one and a half centuries: globalization, which is based on economic processes with their interdependence of individual players from each other in the international market, and glocalization, as a phenomenon of “rebellious periphery” opposing the dominant culture that refuses such an acculturation strategy. The role of mass information sources in shaping the attitude of the population to different countries is discussed on the example of Russian data from public opinion polls, in particular, to the events in Belarus. The factor of trust in information sources is considered


2013 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 849-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL R. TOMZ ◽  
JESSICA L. P. WEEKS

One of the most striking findings in political science is the democratic peace: the absence of war between democracies. Some authors attempt to explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of public opinion. They observe that democratic leaders are beholden to voters and argue that voters oppose war because of its human and financial costs. This logic predicts that democracies should behave peacefully in general, but history shows that democracies avoid war primarily in their relations with other democracies. In this article we investigate not whether democratic publics are averse to war in general, but whether they are especially reluctant to fight other democracies. We embedded experiments in public opinion polls in the United States and the United Kingdom and found that individuals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. Moreover, our experiments suggest that shared democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure. These findings shed light on a debate of enduring importance to scholars and policy makers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 443-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Griffin ◽  
Amy Pason ◽  
Filip Wiecko ◽  
Brittany Brace

We report the results of a survey of criminology and criminal justice (CCJ) scholars asking their responses to the same questions posed annually to the general public in Gallup public opinion polls. We found CCJ scholars to be more likely to hold more liberal positions on these issues than the general public. The findings indicate a disconnect between popular crime and justice perspectives (and resultant crime policy formation) and the “experts” presumably best trained and informed on how to go about crime policy. We argue for a renewed discussion among CCJ scholars regarding the relevance and role of academic expertise in crime policy formation and offer suggestions for how CCJ scholars might “go public” in influencing policy decisions.


2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Rohrschneider ◽  
Michael R. Wolf

During the summer of campaign year 2002, the election alreadyseemed lost for the SPD/Green government. Public opinion pollssaw the governing coalition trailing by several percentage points,whereas the CDU/CSU, together with the FDP, looked like the surewinner. A central reason for the malaise of the red-green governmentwas the ailing economy. Unemployment rates hovered at the 4million mark and would have been even higher if governmentfundedjobs had been added to the official unemployment rates.Consequently, a substantial majority of citizens considered the creationof jobs Germany’s most important problem.1 This constitutedan especially severe burden for Chancellor Schröder. In 1998 he hadpromised to push unemployment rates below 3.5 million or, hestated, he did not deserve re-election. Thus, many observers andvoters expected the September 2002 election to be a referendum onthe governments’ handling of the economy. Since the chancellor hadnot delivered, voters were about to vote the incumbent governmentout of office.


1950 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 101-103
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Feraru

Author(s):  
William W. Franko ◽  
Christopher Witko

Here the authors present the variation that exists in income inequality across the states, and variation in public awareness or concern about income inequality as measured by public opinion polls. Though politicians may decide to tackle income inequality even in the absence of public concern about inequality, the authors argue that government responses are more likely when and where there is a growing awareness of, and concern about, inequality, which is confirmed in the analyses in this book. To examine this question in subsequent chapters, a novel measure of public awareness of rising state inequality is developed. Using these estimates, this chapter shows that the growth in the public concern about inequality responds in part to objective increases in inequality, but also that state political conditions, particularly mass partisanship, shape perceptions of inequality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022097903
Author(s):  
Alexander P. Landry ◽  
Elliott Ihm ◽  
Jonathan W. Schooler

Metadehumanization, the perception that members of an outgroup dehumanize your group, has been found to exacerbate intergroup conflict by inspiring reciprocal dehumanization of the offending outgroup. Moreover, metadehumanization is distinct from metaprejudice (i.e., the perception that an outgroup hates your group). Given the mutual animosity reported in public opinion polls toward the other side, we believed US–Russia relations would be a worthwhile context in which to extend this model. Therefore, we measured Americans’ levels of metadehumanization and metaprejudice of Russians to determine the association between these perceptions and their hostility toward Russians (Study 1). In this novel intergroup conflict, metadehumanization remained a consequential predictor of outgroup hostility over and above metaprejudice, suggesting that it can exacerbate a broader range of intergroup conflicts than those heretofore examined. Given these findings, we then sought to experimentally differentiate between metadehumanization and metaprejudice. In Study 2, we manipulated both metadehumanization and metaprejudice to (a) determine whether one or both cause greater outgroup hostility and (b) elucidate the underlying mechanisms by which they may produce this effect. Whereas metadehumanization produced greater hostility, metaprejudice did not. Moreover, although both metaperceptions inspired greater prejudice, only metadehumanization led to greater dehumanization. We conclude that metadehumanization may be a particularly potent fomenter of hostility because it inspires reciprocal dehumanization over and above more general negative bias.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Eric Lagenbacher

Although it has not been that long since the articles of the previous special issue devoted to the 2017 Bundestag election and its aftermath have been published, the political situation in Germany appears to have stabilized. After almost six months without a new government, German politics has sunk back into a kind of late-Merkel era normality. Public opinion polls continue to show that the CDU/CSU is slightly above its election outcome, the SPD is still down in the 17–18 percent range, the FDP has lost about 2 percent of its support, while the AfD, Greens and Left Party are up 1–2 percent.


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