Mind Reading, Gossip, and Liars

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 10-22
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter discusses mind reading and theory of mind in adults, preparatory to looking at children in many further chapters. It starts by looking at adult gossip. Gossip appeals to people because it gives them a massive arena for learning about the inner workings of far more people than they could ever know individually. Through gossip, one learns about people’s intentions, quirks, likes, beliefs, deeds, and misdeeds. Then the chapter outlines in more detail just what theory of mind is, its components, and its structures. It is an everyday (not a scientific) theory used to understand ourselves and others; ordinary and commonsensical, it is also called commonsense psychology. Despite all its usefulness, people’s theories of mind can fail them. An everyday example is people’s sense of if and when someone is lying. Despite years of being concerned about lying, most adults’ theories about lying are wrong.

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 98-112
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter addresses how animal studies are a crucial way to discover what makes people, and our theories of mind, uniquely human. Chimpanzee social understanding falls far short of human children’s. Nevertheless, people’s human theory of mind reflects beginnings owed to nonhuman ancestors. At the same time, human theory of mind is distinctive. It is broad, impacting almost all of human cognition and social interaction. It is fundamentally developmental, requiring more and more advanced mind-reading insights over an entire human life. It is also helpful and communicative. Even infants deploy their social–cognitive insights to help, communicate with, and learn about others. As such, while people sprang from animal ancestors, it is their advanced, rapidly developing social understanding that makes them uniquely human.


Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 43-49
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter looks at the development of a theory of mind. Compared to computers, humans are poor at data mining. Instead, humans are terrific at creating an overarching theory to explain the facts and then using that theory to make sense of new details that arise. This way of thinking, called everyday theoretical thinking, goes far beyond data mining. People’s basic theory building proceeds from the theory-of-mind skills they learn as babies and young children. If theorizing explains how children accumulate their ideas, then children’s theory-of-mind developments should show three signature features of scientific theory development: Developing theories of mind should unfold in a progression of steps; the changes should grow from evidence, so different experiences can yield different sequences of understanding; and prior knowledge should not only constrain but also facilitate later learning.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Van Reet ◽  
Kathryn F. Green ◽  
David M. Sobel

1971 ◽  
Vol 21 (83) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Michael Clark ◽  
Ervin Laszlo

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 122-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niall McLaren

Theories of psychiatry do not exist an intellectual vacuum. They must mesh at many points with other bodies of knowledge. Biological psychiatry tries to prove that mental disorder and brain disorder are one and the same thing. This has no rational basis in any accepted theory of mind. This article examines two other philosophical theories that biological psychiatrists might use as their rationale: Dennett’s functionalism and Searle’s natural biologism. However, these avowedly antidualist theories fail, as they secretly rely on irreducibly dualist notions to complete their explanatory accounts of mind. Biological psychiatry is thus an ideology, not a scientific theory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Maciej Malicki

The functionalist theory of mind proposes to analyze mental states in terms of internal states of Turing machine, and states of the machine’s tape and head. In the paper, I perform a formal analysis of this approach. I define the concepts of behavioral equivalence of Turing machines, and of behavioral individuation of internal states. I prove a theorem saying that for every Turing machine T there exists a Turing machine T’ which is behaviorally equivalent to T, and all of whose internal states of T’ can be behaviorally individuated. Finally, I discuss some applications of this theorem to computational theories of mind.


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