Divergent effects of oxytocin on “mind-reading” in healthy males

The neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) has been associated with a broad range of human behaviors, particularly in the domain of social cognition, and is being discussed to play a role in a range of psychiatric disorders. Studies using the Reading The Mind In The Eyes Test (RMET) to investigate the role of OT in mental state recognition reported inconsistent outcomes. The present study applied a randomized, double-blind, cross-over design, and included measures of serum OT. Twenty healthy males received intranasal placebo or OT (24 IU) before performing the RMET. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses showed that contrary to previous studies (Domes et al., 2007; Radke & de Bruijn, 2015), individuals performed worse in the OT condition compared to the placebo condition (p = 0.023, Cohen’s d = 0.55, 95% confidence interval [CI] [0.08, 1.02], BF10 = 6.93). OT effects did not depend on item characteristics (difficulty, valence, intensity, sex) of the RMET. Furthermore, OT serum levels did not change after intranasal OT administration. Given that similar study designs lead to heterogeneous outcomes, our results highlight the complexity of OT effects and support evidence that OT might even interfere with social cognitive abilities. However, the Bayesian analysis approach shows that there is only moderate evidence that OT influences mind-reading, highlighting the need for larger-scale studies considering the discussed aspects that might have led to divergent study results.

Understanding indirect requests for information in high-functioning autism

Few works have addressed the processing of indirect requests in High-Functioning Autism (HFA), and results are conflicting. Some studies report HFA individuals’ difficulties in indirect requests comprehension; others suggest that it might be preserved in HFA. Furthermore, the role of Theory of Mind in understanding indirect requests is an open issue. The goal of this work is twofold: first, assessing whether comprehension of indirect requests for information is preserved in HFA; second, exploring whether mind-reading skills predict this ability. We tested a group of (n = 14; 9–12 years) HFA children and two groups of younger (n = 19; 5–6 years) and older (n = 28; 9–12 years) typically developing (TD) children in a semi-structured task involving direct, indirect and highly indirect requests for information. Results suggested that HFA can understand indirect and highly indirect requests, as well as TD children. Yet, while Theory of Mind skills seem to enhance older TD children understanding, this is not the case for HFA children. Therefore, interestingly, they could rely on different interpretative strategies.

The Surface Revealed

This chapter works out some of the key features of the notion of consciousness usually discussed by Nietzsche (most notably, in aphorism 354 of The Gay Science). Given such features (which include reflexivity, dependence on language and communication, and higher-order nature), it is argued that this notion of consciousness corresponds to reflective consciousness, i.e. the capacity for verbally articulated thought, the emergence of which is ultimately explained as a by-product of linguistic communication. The chapter shows how Nietzsche’s picture of reflective consciousness develops from Daybreak to Gay Science. Finally, it explores the link that Nietzsche draws between the emergence of consciousness and that of mind-reading capacities.

Harmful Thoughts

Private thoughts can lead to public harms in a variety of ways. They can do so by motivating those who harbor them to perform harmful acts, by motivating their own hurtful or destructive communication, and by being unintentionally disclosed by persons who don’t mean to communicate them. In addition, although mind-reading is presently impossible, that may change in the future, and if it does, it will be a further source of mischief. The questions that this chapter addresses are, first, whether a thought’s actually causing harm in one of these ways can make its previous occurrence morally wrong, and, second, whether a thought’s posing the risk of causing harm in one of these ways can make having it now morally wrong. Of these questions, the current chapter answers all versions of the first, and some versions of the second, in the negative. The remaining versions of the second question are carried over to the following chapter.