Putting the Theory in Theory of Mind

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 43-49
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter looks at the development of a theory of mind. Compared to computers, humans are poor at data mining. Instead, humans are terrific at creating an overarching theory to explain the facts and then using that theory to make sense of new details that arise. This way of thinking, called everyday theoretical thinking, goes far beyond data mining. People’s basic theory building proceeds from the theory-of-mind skills they learn as babies and young children. If theorizing explains how children accumulate their ideas, then children’s theory-of-mind developments should show three signature features of scientific theory development: Developing theories of mind should unfold in a progression of steps; the changes should grow from evidence, so different experiences can yield different sequences of understanding; and prior knowledge should not only constrain but also facilitate later learning.

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 10-22
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter discusses mind reading and theory of mind in adults, preparatory to looking at children in many further chapters. It starts by looking at adult gossip. Gossip appeals to people because it gives them a massive arena for learning about the inner workings of far more people than they could ever know individually. Through gossip, one learns about people’s intentions, quirks, likes, beliefs, deeds, and misdeeds. Then the chapter outlines in more detail just what theory of mind is, its components, and its structures. It is an everyday (not a scientific) theory used to understand ourselves and others; ordinary and commonsensical, it is also called commonsense psychology. Despite all its usefulness, people’s theories of mind can fail them. An everyday example is people’s sense of if and when someone is lying. Despite years of being concerned about lying, most adults’ theories about lying are wrong.


Author(s):  
S.J. Matthew Carnes

The transformation of political science in recent decades opens the door for a new but so far poorly cultivated examination of the common good. Four significant “turns” characterize the modern study of politics and government. Each is rooted in the discipline’s increased emphasis on empirical rigor, with its attendant scientific theory-building, measurement, and hypothesis testing. Together, these new orientations allow political science to enrich our understanding of causality, our basic definitions of the common good, and our view of human nature and society. In particular, the chapter suggests that traditional descriptions of the common good in Catholic theology have been overly irenic and not sufficiently appreciative of the role of contention in daily life, on both a national and international scale.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Slaughter ◽  
Candida C. Peterson ◽  
Chris Moore

2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (12) ◽  
pp. 881-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meizhu Liu ◽  
Lingxiang Wu ◽  
Weijing Wu ◽  
Guangdi Li ◽  
Taisheng Cai ◽  
...  

Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter focuses on children’s ability to separate the imagined from the real and does so through a focus on imaginary companions. Imaginary companions appear in many forms; they can have physical forms (a puppet friend), or they can be purely mental creations. Typically, imaginary companions have ideas, emotions, and desires separate from the child’s, and thus they are saturated in theory-of-mind understandings. Although some authorities and many parents worry that imaginary companions are a particularly good example of children’s inability to separate the imagined from the real, research shows that young children easily distinguish between fantasy and fact, between the mental and the real, between imagined entities and real physical ones. Moreover, children who have imaginary companions not only distinguish between mind and reality, but also show numerous theory-of-mind strengths.


Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 98-112
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter addresses how animal studies are a crucial way to discover what makes people, and our theories of mind, uniquely human. Chimpanzee social understanding falls far short of human children’s. Nevertheless, people’s human theory of mind reflects beginnings owed to nonhuman ancestors. At the same time, human theory of mind is distinctive. It is broad, impacting almost all of human cognition and social interaction. It is fundamentally developmental, requiring more and more advanced mind-reading insights over an entire human life. It is also helpful and communicative. Even infants deploy their social–cognitive insights to help, communicate with, and learn about others. As such, while people sprang from animal ancestors, it is their advanced, rapidly developing social understanding that makes them uniquely human.


Author(s):  
Robert S. Siegler

My children have never looked much like those described in most theories of cognitive development. I don’t mean that they are generally deviant or that they perform abnormally on conservation or class inclusion tasks. They generally seem more or less normal, and on the few occasions when I have presented tasks from the cognitive developmental literature, they have acted pretty much like the children described in the articles. Where my children are altogether different from the theoretical descriptions is in the variability of their thinking. Cognitive developmental theories generally depict age and thought as proceeding in a 1:1 relation. At an early age, children think in one way; at a later age, they think in another way; at a still later age, they think in a third way. Such descriptions are so pervasive that they begin to feel like reality. Young children are said to form thematic concepts; somewhat older ones to form chain concepts; yet older ones to form true concepts. The reasoning of young children is said to be preoperational; that of somewhat older ones concrete operational; that of yet older ones formal operational. Young children are said to have one theory of mind; somewhat older ones a different, more inclusive theory; yet older ones a more advanced theory still. The story is the same with characterizations of performance on specific tasks. In descriptions of the development of the concept of living things, 3- and 4-yearolds are said to think that anything that moves is alive, 5- to 8-year-olds that animals—and only animals—are alive, and older children that plants as well as animals are alive. In descriptions of the development of addition skill, kindergartners are said to count from one; first through third graders to count from the larger addend; fourth graders and older children to retrieve answers from memory. In descriptions of the development of serial recall strategies, 5-year-olds are said not to rehearse; 8-year-olds to rehearse in a simple way; 11-year-olds to rehearse in a more elaborate way. My children’s thinking has never looked as neat and clean as these 1:1 characterizations of the relation between age and thought.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Conte ◽  
Veronica Ornaghi ◽  
Ilaria Grazzani ◽  
Alessandro Pepe ◽  
Valeria Cavioni

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