Testimony

This chapter provides a discussion of the epistemology of testimony as it plays out in classical Buddhist accounts of knowledge. The chapter begins by describing the contrast between the (non-Buddhist) Nyāya School’s account of testimony and Dharmakīrti’s (Buddhist) account of testimony. The chapter then proceeds to illuminate various other differences between the Nyāya and Buddhist accounts, focusing principally on the distinction between reductive and nonreductive theories of testimonial knowledge and on the distinction between speaker conditions and hearer conditions for testimonial knowledge. The chapter concludes with a section on the transmission theory of testimony and investigates whether the transmission theory would be supported by classical Buddhist epistemologists.

Testimony and Assertion

10.1093/oso/9780198713234.003.0010 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

David Owens

Keyword(s):

Speech Acts ◽

Epistemic Norms ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Ethical Norms

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding speech acts like promising and the epistemic norms that govern the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by (intentionally) expressing belief. The expression of belief is distinguished from the communication of belief. The chapter goes on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory, arguing that memory and testimony are mechanisms that can preserve the rationality of the belief they transmit without preserving the evidence on which the belief was originally based.

Believing the Incomprehensible God

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association ◽

10.5840/acpaproc202088101 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 92 ◽

pp. 111-122

Author(s):

James Dominic Rooney ◽

Keyword(s):

Thomas Aquinas ◽

Related Area ◽

Epistemological Problem ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Do So

There has been recent epistemological interest as to whether knowledge is “transmitted” by testimony from the testifier to the hearer, where a hearer acquires knowledge “second-hand.” Yet there is a related area in epistemology of testimony which raises a distinct epistemological problem: the relation of understanding to testimony. In what follows, I am interested in one facet of this relation: whether/how a hearer can receive testimonial knowledge without fully understanding the content of the testimony? I use Thomas Aquinas to motivate a case where, in principle, the content of received testimony cannot be understood but nevertheless constitutes knowledge. Aquinas not only argues that we can receive testimonial knowledge without understanding the content of that testimony, but that we have duties to do so in certain cases.

Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony

Canadian Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1080/00455091.2017.1341781 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 48 (2) ◽

pp. 178-199 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Judith Baker ◽

Philip Clark

Keyword(s):

Essential Role ◽

The Other ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Social Achievement ◽

Buck Passing

AbstractTwo ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and Jennifer Lackey gives both speaker and hearer an essential role in testimonial justification, rejecting both reductionism and anti-reductionism in favor of what she calls dualism. After distinguishing a weaker and a stronger notion of buck-passing, we show how anti-reductionists can use the stronger notion to motivate their position, and to answer Goldberg’s and Lackey’s challenges.

RELIABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2015.26 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 203-208

Author(s):

Jennifer Lackey

Keyword(s):

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Reliable Source ◽

Source Of Information

AbstractWhat is at the center of the epistemology of testimony: reliability or knowledge? This is the key question that Elizabeth Fricker takes up in her “How to Make Invidious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers.” In particular, Fricker argues that there are several important reasons to favor understanding testimonial knowledge in terms of the speaker being a knower rather than merely a reliable source of information. In this short response, I raise problems for Fricker’s view and the arguments put forth to support it. I conclude that contrary to Fricker’s thesis, the epistemology of testimony should focus on speaker reliability rather than knowledge.

Does anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony imply interest relativism about knowledge attributions?

Veritas (Porto Alegre) ◽

10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41472 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 66 (1) ◽

pp. e41472

Author(s):

John Greco

Keyword(s):

Knowledge Attributions ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

Anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the thesis that testimonial knowledge is not reducible to knowledge of some other familiar kind, such as inductive knowledge. Interest relativism about knowledge attributions is the thesis that the standards for knowledge attributions are relative to practical contexts. This paper argues that anti-reductionism implies interest relativism. The notion of “implies” here is a fairly strong one: anti-reductionism, together with plausible assumptions, entails interest relativism. A second thesis of the paper is that anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony creates significant pressure toward attributor contextualism (a version of interest relativism). Even if anti-reductionism does not strictly entail attributor contextualism, the most powerful motivations for anti-reductionism also motivate attributor contextualism over alternative positions.

The Epistemology of Testimony and Religious Belief

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662241.013.28 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Jennifer Lackey

Keyword(s):

Religious Belief ◽

Religious Beliefs ◽

Final Section ◽

Epistemic Status ◽

Testimonial Knowledge ◽

This chapter presents and evaluates the central issues and views in the epistemology of testimony, with a particular focus on the following: the nature of testimony and testimony-based belief; the question of whether testimonial knowledge is acquired via transmission or generation; the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony; and the extent to which interpersonal features of testimonial exchanges are relevant to the epistemic status of testimonial beliefs. The final section then considers two central concerns that arise specifically with respect to religious beliefs formed on the basis of testimony: the Argument from Luck and the Argument from Authority.

Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony

10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Peter J. Graham

Keyword(s):

A Priori ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Tyler Burge ◽

P Content ◽

Content Preservation

“Content Preservation” by Tyler Burge is one of the most influential articles in the epistemology of testimony. Burge argues for three theses: (1) That we enjoy a prima facie entitlement to take testimony (presentations-as-true) at face value, (2) That this entitlement has an a priori basis, based in the nature of reason, and (3) That in some cases testimony-based beliefs are warranted a priori. Most of the debate in the testimony literature is over the truth of (1). Most of the criticism of Burge’s paper focuses on (3). Burge has since abandoned (3). What about (2)? Burge’s argument for (2) is compressed; the underlying nuts and bolts are difficult to understand. This chapter reconstructs Burge’s overall teleo-functional reliabilist framework and then reconstructs Burge’s overall argument for (2) in some detail. Three criticisms are then offered of the argument. Even granting (1), Burge’s argument does not establish (2).

A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2020.48 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-13

Author(s):

Matt Weiner

Keyword(s):

Abstract I propose that testimony is subject to a norm that is backed by a credibility sanction: whenever the norm is violated, it is appropriate for the testifier to lose some credibility for their future testimony. This is one of a family of sanction-based norms, where violation of the norm makes it appropriate to lose some power; in this case, the power to induce belief through testimony. The applicability of the credibility norm to testimony follows from the epistemology of testimony, in that false or unjustified testimony weakens the reason for belief that is provided by the speaker's future testimony.

Beyond The ‘Null Setting’

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science ◽

10.5840/eps201956230 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 56 (2) ◽

pp. 60-76

Author(s):

Axel Gelfert ◽

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Justification ◽

Contextual Information ◽

The Other ◽

Other Hand ◽

The One ◽

Informal Settings ◽

Remedial Strategies

Epistemologists of testimony have tended to construct highly stylized (so-called “null setting”) examples in support of their respective philosophical positions, the paradigmatic case being the casual request for directions from a random stranger. The present paper analyzes the use of such examples in the early controversy between reductionists and anti-reductionists about testimonial justification. The controversy concerned, on the one hand, the source of whatever epistemic justification our testimony-based beliefs might have, and, on the other hand, the phenomenology of testimonial acceptance and rejection. As it turns out, appeal to “null setting” cases did not resolve, but instead deepened, the theoretical disputes between reductionists and anti-reductionists. This, it is suggested, is because interpreters ‘fill in’ missing details in ways that reflect their own peculiarities in perspective, experience, upbringing, and philosophical outlook. In response, two remedial strategies have been pursued in recent years: First, we could invert the usual strategy and turn to formal contexts, rather than informal settings, as the paradigmatic scenarios for any prospective epistemology of testimony. Second, instead of “null setting” scenarios, we can focus on richly described cases that either include, or are embedded into, sufficient contextual information to allow for educated judgments concerning the reliability and trustworthiness of the testimony and testifiers involved. The prospects of both of these approaches are then discussed and evaluated.

TESTIMONY, RECOVERY AND PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY: A RESPONSE TO PEET

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2017.15 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 18-38

Author(s):

Alex Davies

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Language ◽

Context Sensitivity ◽

Linguistic Communication ◽

Context Sensitive ◽

Public Responsibility

ABSTRACTAccording to telling based views of testimony (TBVs), B has reason to believe that p when A tells B that p because A thereby takes public responsibility for B's subsequent belief that p. Andrew Peet presents a new argument against TBVs. He argues that insofar as A uses context-sensitive expressions to express p, A doesn't take public responsibility for B's belief that p. Since context-sensitivity is widespread, the kind of reason TBVs say we have to believe what we're told, is not widespread. Peet doesn't identify any problem with his own argument though he does attempt to limit its sceptical potential by identifying special contexts in which TBVs stand a chance of success. A more general defence of TBVs can be provided by showing Peet's argument to be unsound. I argue that Peet's argument is unsound because it requires us to wrongly suppose that speakers do far less labour than their audiences in context-sensitive linguistic communication. I aim to show why – in the context of the epistemology of testimony and the philosophy of language – it's important to recognize the labour that speakers can do, and so can be held responsible for not doing, in episodes of context-sensitive linguistic communication.