Internalism and Externalism

This chapter explores in some detail the question of whether Buddhist accounts of knowledge should be regarded as supportive of epistemic internalism or externalism. After unpacking how the distinction between internalism and externalism can or cannot be extended to the Buddhist epistemological context, it is argued that the Buddhist account stands largely in accord with an externalist account of epistemic warrant. The second half of the chapter examines Buddhist claims about whether the determination of a cognition’s knowledge status is intrinsic or extrinsic to a given cognition. Finally, the chapter concludes by arguing that the Buddhist account must be understood to endorse a version of externalism about the constitutive nature of cognitions.

Ignorance

This chapter engages in a prolonged discussion of those episodes of cognition that are not instances of knowledge. More explicitly, it focuses on Tibetan Buddhist epistemological developments in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Three overarching categories of ignorant cognition are discussed: mistaken cognition, nonascertaining perception, and factive assessment. Of particular interest are those cognitions that are correct or true but which, nonetheless, fail to yield knowledge. In examining these forms of cognition, this chapter explores the boundary between knowledge and ignorance, and does so by highlighting the conditions for knowledge that fail to be satisfied in these different forms of ignorant cognition.

Experimental and Cross-Cultural Epistemology

Chapter 10 examines how contemporary trends in experimental philosophy can benefit from the study of Buddhist epistemology. In particular, it explores the question of whether an appreciation of Buddhist epistemology could inform philosophers about both the merits of experimental epistemology and experimental philosophy’s emphasis on probing intuitions about knowledge. The second half of the chapter steps back from this examination of experimental philosophy and argues that there is value to be found in contemporary philosophers learning more about other traditions of epistemological theorizing, including the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions of epistemology. Among other things, it can serve to change the way we view our own tradition of epistemology and lay bare the tacit assumptions that undergird contemporary discussions of knowledge.

Knowledge

This chapter carries out a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti’s definitions of the term pramāṇa. After elucidating his definitions and subsequent Indian interpretations of them, it is argued that we can characterize the standard post-Dharmakīrtian account of knowledge as a novel, truth-tracking cognition. The second half of the chapter explores how this Buddhist account of knowledge compares to analyses of knowledge in the contemporary analytic tradition of epistemology. It is argued, for example, that the Buddhist account cannot be assimilated to analyses of knowledge that appeal to justification, nor to standard versions of reliabilism. Instead, it more closely resembles the theory of knowledge defended by David Armstrong.

Skepticism

This chapter entertains a series of skeptical criticisms of the very project of epistemological theorizing—criticisms leveled by the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. The chapter begins with a discussion of the role of skeptical scenarios in Western and Buddhist philosophy. The remaining portions of the chapter explore a series of criticisms of the whole pramāṇa-based epistemological program that is predominant within the Indian tradition of philosophy. It examines a series of arguments provided by the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna against the very idea that epistemic instruments can be used to establish the existence of epistemic objects.

Inference

This chapter introduces the Buddhist theory of inference. It begins with the distinction between “inference for oneself” and “inference for others,” and argues that what is of primary importance in epistemology is the category of “inference for oneself.” The chapter then lays out the standard features of the Buddhist account of inferential knowledge, including Dignāga’s appeal to “the three characteristics” of good evidence and Dharmakīrti’s account of three different types of evidence. The chapter concludes with a section on the topic of epistemic closure principles and how such principles might apply to Buddhist accounts of inferential knowledge.

Testimony

This chapter provides a discussion of the epistemology of testimony as it plays out in classical Buddhist accounts of knowledge. The chapter begins by describing the contrast between the (non-Buddhist) Nyāya School’s account of testimony and Dharmakīrti’s (Buddhist) account of testimony. The chapter then proceeds to illuminate various other differences between the Nyāya and Buddhist accounts, focusing principally on the distinction between reductive and nonreductive theories of testimonial knowledge and on the distinction between speaker conditions and hearer conditions for testimonial knowledge. The chapter concludes with a section on the transmission theory of testimony and investigates whether the transmission theory would be supported by classical Buddhist epistemologists.

Preliminaries

This chapter lays the foundation for the remainder of the book. It provides a brief historical overview of the most central figures in the Buddhist epistemological tradition and emphasizes the importance of two figures in particular, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The chapter additionally provides an overview of several of the most important terms and concepts that are employed within Buddhist epistemological treatises. In particular, an extensive discussion is provided of the notion of a pramāṇa, which is the most important concept in all of Buddhist epistemology. Multiple different understandings of the term pramāṇa are elucidated, including those of a pramāṇa as an “instrument of knowledge” and as an “episode of knowledge.”

Sensitivity and Safety

This chapter undertakes a deeper dive into the post-Dharmakīrtian understanding of knowledge episodes by focusing on Buddhist attempts to ensure that accidentally true cognitions not be counted as instances of knowledge. Much of the chapter is devoted to detailing Buddhist invocations of a principle of sensitivity in order to exclude accidentally correct cognitions from the realm of knowledge. The final portion of the chapter explores the theory of perceptual discrimination that is developed by some Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists and that can be understood as a path by which to further restrict knowledge to a narrower set of true/correct cognitions.

Perception

This chapter provides an overview of Buddhist accounts of perceptual knowledge as articulated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It identifies the key features of these two epistemologists’ accounts of perception and discusses the important ways in which these two thinkers’ accounts differ from one another. The second half of the chapter explores the question of how far the scope of perceptual knowledge can be extended and looks at the various subtypes of perception that are adopted by Buddhist epistemologists including reflexive perception, mental perception and yogic perception. The chapter concludes by exploring how perceptual cognitions differ from instances of illusion and hallucination.