Hybrid Conflict and Prisoners of War

2018 ◽  
pp. 191-222
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Kahn

The conflicts in eastern Ukraine and Crimea are not the first time sovereign States have clashed under murky and confused circumstances. The law governing international armed conflict, i.e. the law regulating war between States, has long recognized this fact; the threshold to trigger it is a very low one, and it applies “even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” Nevertheless, some perceive Ukraine as a case of “hybrid war” for which the old rules are ill-fitting at best, and no longer capable of regulation or restraint. What happens to international humanitarian law (IHL) when, according to Russian General Valériy Gerasimov, the hybrid nature of recent conflicts produces a “tendency to erase differences between the states of war and peace?” This chapter argues that there are in fact two distinct armed conflicts ongoing in eastern Ukraine. First, there is an ongoing but unacknowledged international armed conflict (IAC) in eastern Ukraine between Ukraine and Russia. Second, there is also fighting sufficiently intense and involving sufficiently organized non-State actors to be considered a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the Ukrainian State and rebel forces in Donetsk and Luhansk. Adding another layer of complexity, at certain times and places, it may be that this NIAC might have transformed into an IAC because of Russia’s overall control of these non-State actors.

Author(s):  
Hill-Cawthorne Lawrence

This chapter identifies the main categories of persons deemed to be in need of protection in situations of armed conflict, according to which the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) are structured. The two principal categories of persons under the law of international armed conflict (IAC) are combatants/prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians. This categorization lies at the heart of one of the key principles of IHL, that of the distinction between combatants (being, generally, lawful targets) and civilians (being, generally, not lawful targets). These two principal categories are then further divided, with special (additional) rules applying to certain persons falling within each sub-category—including the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; women; children; the elderly, disabled, and infirm; refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); mercenaries and spies; journalists; and the missing and the dead. For some of these categories of persons, such as women and displaced persons, the rules remain very basic and inadequate for the contemporary challenges faced in armed conflicts. What is more, many of these categories are even less clearly defined under the law of non-international armed conflict (NIAC).


2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (893) ◽  
pp. 29-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Kreβ ◽  
Frédéric Mégret

The Debate section of the Review aims to contribute to reflection on contemporary questions of humanitarian law, policy or action. In this issue of the Review, we invited two experts in international humanitarian law (IHL) – Claus Kreβ and Frédéric Mégret – to debate on how IHL applicable in non-international armed conflict (NIAC) should develop. In the two pieces that follow, Professor Kreβ submits for debate a new norm of international law outlawing NIACs – a jus contra bellum internum – with a corresponding set of rules applicable in NIACs – a jus in bello interno. The jus in bello interno would give the “privilege of belligerency” – akin to combatants' privilege in international armed conflicts – to non-State actors in NIACs, providing an incentive for them to comply with these new rules of civil war. Frédéric Mégret critically examines the proposed privilege of belligerency, pointing out its problematic aspects and positing that the creation of such a privilege is, in fact, not desirable.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 252-260
Author(s):  
Bartłomiej Krzan

Abstract The present study analyses climate change from the perspective of the law of armed conflict. Climate may be both a victim and a means of warfare. Arguably, the existing normative framework is broad enough to allow for accommodating climate change. It cannot be denied that the environment is easily harmed, or at least jeopardized in times of armed conflicts. Despite the obvious lack of explicit references in the instruments of international humanitarian law, it may be argued that it is possible to fit climate change in. The accompanying analysis addresses the respective potential and the ensuing hurdles.


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


2011 ◽  
Vol 93 (882) ◽  
pp. 463-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

AbstractArmed groups frequently issue ad hoc commitments that contain a law of armed conflict component. These commitments detail the obligation of the relevant armed group to abide by international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, or particular rules set out in the commitment. They commit the group to abide by international standards, sometimes exceed international standards, or in certain respects violate international standards. Although these commitments are often overlooked, they offer certain lessons for the law of armed conflict. This article considers the commitments of armed groups with respect to two specific areas of the law that are either of contested interpretation or seemingly inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts, namely the identification of legitimate targets and the prisoners of war regime.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-123
Author(s):  
Ben Clarke

In their quest to find ways to reduce civilian casualties during armed conflict, States often emphasise the importance of compliance with fundamental rules of international humanitarian law that apply during the conduct of hostilities. Chief among them are the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution. This contribution focuses on the proportionality principle. It examines whether there is a need for clarification or development of this rule. After highlighting reasons why clarification of the law on proportionality is necessary, the author proposes a guidance document on proportionality decision-making in armed conflict. To lay the foundation for such a document, the author identifies a range of issues that could be addressed in the document.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
Yugichha Sangroula

The paper is a doctrinal and a dialectic endeavour to comment on LOAC/IHL from a bird’s-eye view. It is the author’s initial attempt to contribute to an ongoing discussion on the theory and practice of LOAC/IHL, reflecting on the key issues relevant to Nepal. The question-answer approach is based on the author’s interactions with law students, colleagues, members from the police, military, victims, bureaucrats and politicians in the Nepali diaspora. The paper will benefit from the readers’ critique.


Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This chapter considers the normative underpinnings of the present-day regulation of combatancy. It argues that a wholesale denial of combatant status to fighters in internationalized armed conflicts would be incongruous with the principles of distinction and equal application of the law. The chapter then considers specific objections against the extension of combatant status to non-state actors from the perspective of internationalized armed conflicts. It argues that although some of the objections carry certain weight in the context of traditional civil wars, their effect in internationalized armed conflicts is significantly weaker. The chapter thus shows that in principle, the availability of combatant status to fighters in internationalized armed conflicts is in accordance with the normative underpinnings of International Humanitarian Law.


Author(s):  
Fleck Dieter

This chapter provides an overview of the law of non-international armed conflicts and its progressive development. The law of armed conflict, as it has developed in the last part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century, deals predominantly with wars between states. Its basic principles and rules are, however, likewise relevant for non-international armed conflicts: in all armed conflicts, elementary considerations of humanity must be respected under all circumstances, in order to protect victims, to reduce human sufferings, and to minimize damages to objects vital for survival. Therefore, the parties to the conflict do not have an unlimited choice of the means and methods of conducting hostilities, nor of selecting the targets to be attacked, and they must protect the victims from the effects and consequences of war. This concept is reflected in the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, to be respected by all and, while taking military necessity into account, limiting the use of force for humanitarian reasons. Parties to the conflict respecting these principles and rules are considered as respecting the international order, while those seriously violating them will commit internationally wrongful acts and perpetrators are liable to punishment.


Author(s):  
Kleffner Jann K

This chapter explains the application of human rights in armed conflicts. International humanitarian law has much in common with the law of human rights, since both bodies of rules are concerned with the protection of the individual. Nevertheless, there are important differences between them. Human rights law is designed to operate primarily in normal peacetime conditions, and governs the vertical legal relationship between a state and its citizens and other persons subject to its jurisdiction. Human rights law applies primarily within the territory of the state that is subject to the human rights obligation in question. International humanitarian law, by contrast, is specifically designed to regulate situations of armed conflict. These differences between human rights law and international humanitarian law have led some to argue that human rights law is only intended to be applicable in time of peace. However, it is now generally accepted that human rights continue to apply during armed conflict. Hence, international humanitarian law and human rights law can apply simultaneously in situations of armed conflict.


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