Freedom and Responsibility in Context

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Whittle
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Respective Control ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Context Dependent ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

Freedom and Responsibility in Context argues for a contextualist account of freedom and moral responsibility. It aims to challenge the largely unarticulated orthodoxy of invariantism, by arguing that contextualism is crucial to an understanding of both freedom and moral responsibility. The argument for contextualism regarding freedom and moral responsibility focuses upon their respective control conditions. Abilities are argued to be central to an understanding of the control required for freedom and moral responsibility. A unified ability analysis of control is developed, which supports the thesis that attributions of freedom and moral responsibility are context dependent. The resulting contextualism offers a rapprochement of compatibilism and incompatibilism. By going beyond the false dichotomy of invariant compatibilism and invariant incompatibilism, it is argued that both positions can be given their due, since there is no ‘right’ answer to the question of whether or not determinism undermines freedom and moral responsibility.

Freedom and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to Hunter's Reply

Dialogue ◽  
1980 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 572-574
Author(s):  
P. Gosselin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Preceding Article ◽  
John Hunter ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

In the preceding article John Hunter attempts to show that my criticisms of his position on freedom and responsibility are defective.Hunter believes that (what he calls) my first criticism is directed against his explanation of why so many people have come to believe in the freedom principle (i.e. the principle that freedom is necessary for moral responsibility). But at no point in my paper do I even consider the merit of that explanation. What Hunter calls my first criticism is in fact merely a preliminary point I make before attacking his arguments against the freedom principle itself. The preliminary point is that in evaluating Hunter's arguments one must bear the following in mind: in some of the examples of unfreedom he provides it is doubtful that the actions are unfree at all; they are at best borderline cases of unfree acts.

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.

A Minimal Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Unsolved Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Self ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

In this book Franklin develops and defends a version of event-causal libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility. This view is a combination of libertarianism—the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the upshots of nondeterministic causal processes—and agency reductionism—the view that the causal role of agents in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agents. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable and robust kind of freedom and responsibility. But Franklin argues that this is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains. Toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. If this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.

Watsonian Compatibilism

2019 ◽  
pp. 5-37
Author(s):  
Michael McKenna
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Critical Points ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

This chapter provides a compatibilist theory of freedom and responsibility built from key elements of Gary Watson’s important essays on these topics. Its aim is the construction of something like a Watsonian theory of freedom and responsibility, using important elements of Watson’s views— preserving his centrally important proposed mesh theory—but also departing from them at critical points. Three features of Watson’s work are addressed. First, that acting freely is explained in terms of acting in accord with one’s evaluative commitments. Second, that Watson’s view is a version of a reasons-responsive theory. The chapter examines his notion of responsiveness or sensitivity to reasons and looks at how it differs from those of others who have developed a reasons-responsive view? Third, Watson’s deepening of our understanding of moral responsibility, by way of both his critical assessment of Strawson’s views and his own work on the topic. How should we understand morally responsible agency in light of his contributions?

scholarly journals Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.

scholarly journals Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.

Existentialist ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. Cooper
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Bad Faith ◽  
Moral Conduct ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

Central to existentialism is a radical doctrine of individual freedom and responsibility. On the basis of this, writers such as Sartre have offered an account of the nature of morality and also advanced proposals for moral conduct. Important in that account are the claims that (a) moral values are ‘created’ rather than ‘discovered’, (b) moral responsibility is more extensive than usually assumed, and (c) moral life should not be a matter of following rules. Existentialist proposals for conduct derive from the notion of authenticity, understood as ‘facing up’ to one’s responsibility and not ‘fleeing’ it in ‘bad faith’. Authenticity, many argue, entails treating other people so as to encourage a sense of freedom on their part, although there is disagreement as to the primary forms such treatment should take. Some have argued that we promote a sense of freedom through commitment to certain causes; others that this is best achieved through personal relationships.

scholarly journals Taking the Straight Path. P.F. Strawson's Later Work on Freedom and Responsibility

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin De Mesel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Reactive Attitudes ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Straight Path ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Knowledge Condition ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

I highlight three features of P.F. Strawson’s later, neglected work on freedom and responsibility. First, in response to a criticism by Rajendra Prasad, Strawson explicitly rejects an argument put forward in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ against the relevance of determinism to moral responsibility. Second, his remarkable acceptance of Prasad’s criticism motivates him to take the ‘straight path’, that is, to be straightforward about the relation between determinism, freedom, the ability to do otherwise and the conditions of responsibility. He claims that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of responsibility and provides a list of additional conditions, including a knowledge condition. Third, he clarifies the relation between responsibility, quality of will and the reactive attitudes. The latter do not figure essentially in his answer to the question, ‘What are the conditions of responsibility?’, but they do play an essential role in his answer to the question, ‘Why do we have the concept of responsibility?’ We have it, Strawson suggests, because of our natural concern about the quality of will with which people act, a concern expressed in our reactive attitudes. I argue that, although Strawson’s later work definitely involves a shift of emphasis when compared to ‘Freedom and Resentment’, his overall account of freedom and responsibility is coherent. The later work helps to better understand the nature and significance of Strawson’s contribution, and to identify problems with common interpretations of and objections to ‘Freedom and Resentment’. 

scholarly journals Revisiting Frankfurt on Freedom and Responsibility

2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (142) ◽  
pp. 35-56
Author(s):  
Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agentis morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s reflected choices and actions are constrained by an irresistible force. The conclusion is that Frankfurt should have acknowledged that freedom from an irresistible force is not a necessary condition for responsibility.

Obesity and Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beth Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Healthy Eating ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Moral Indignation ◽  
Capacity To Act ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Number Of Individuals ◽  
Moral Blame ◽  
The Way

This chapter explores whether obese individuals are morally responsible for their condition of obesity. The main argument is that some who are classified as obese are exempt from moral responsibility for two possible reasons. Either food situationism may interfere with an individual’s capacity to detect the moral considerations that favor healthy eating. Or, structural inequalities may interfere with an individual’s capacity to act on moral considerations that favor healthy eating. The account of situated moral agency employed here makes it possible to resist the false dichotomy of saying that either all obese individuals are morally responsible for being obese or that they are exempt from responsibility altogether. If moral exemptions apply in the way suggested, then a large number of individuals who are obese do not deserve to be the targets of moral blame, nor do they deserve the moral indignation that is sometimes directed toward them.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document