A Minimal Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Unsolved Problem ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The Self ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Causal Processes ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

In this book Franklin develops and defends a version of event-causal libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility. This view is a combination of libertarianism—the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the upshots of nondeterministic causal processes—and agency reductionism—the view that the causal role of agents in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agents. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable and robust kind of freedom and responsibility. But Franklin argues that this is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains. Toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. If this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

Minimal Event-Causal Libertarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Free Action ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Action

This chapter explains the differences between agency reductionism and nonreductionism, explains the varieties of libertarianism, and sets out the main contours of minimal event-causal libertarianism, highlighting just how minimal this theory is. Crucial to understanding how minimal event-causal libertarianism differs from other event-causal libertarian theories is understanding the location and role of indeterminism in human action, the kinds of mental states essential to causing free action, the nature of nondeterministic causation, and how the theory is constructed from compatibilist accounts. The chapter argues that libertarians must face up to both the problem of luck and the problem of enhanced control when determining the best theoretical location of indeterminism.

Hume, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Pitson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Common Life

This chapter aims to relate Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity to central themes in his philosophy, including causation, the self, the distinction between virtue and vice, and naturalism as a response to skepticism. From this perspective, many points of contact with contemporary discussions of free will and moral responsibility emerge. Hume’s account of moral responsibility, with its implications for the conditions under which ascriptions of responsibility are withheld or qualified, is considered in detail. The notion of agent autonomy is linked to Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions. The kind of self-determination for which Hume allows here is distinguished from that of the libertarian and is also contrasted with the problematic notion of responsibility for self that leads to skepticism about the very possibility of moral responsibility. Hume’s appeal to “common life” provides a naturalistic response to skepticism in this, as well as in other philosophical contexts.

scholarly journals Deceiving ourselves about self-deception

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-26
Author(s):  
Stevan Harnad
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Causal Role

AbstractWere we just the Darwinian adaptive survival/reproduction machines von Hippel & Trivers invoke to explain us, the self-deception problem would not only be simpler, but also nonexistent. Why would unconscious robots bother to misinform themselves so as to misinform others more effectively? But as we are indeed conscious rather than unconscious robots, the problem is explaining the causal role of consciousness itself, not just its supererogatory tendency to misinform itself so as to misinform (or perform) better.

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will

2005 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Consequence Argument ◽  
The Past ◽  
Hard Determinism ◽  
Determinism And Indeterminism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The Oxford Handbook of Free Will provides a guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of free will—perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The articles combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. The book is divided into eight parts: Part I (Theology and Fatalism), Part II (Physics, Determinism, and Indeterminism), Part III (The Modal or Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism). Part IV (Compatibilist Perspectives on Freedom and Responsibility), Part V (Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt-Style), Part VI (Libertarian Perspectives on Free Agency and Free Will), Part VII (Nonstandard Views: Successor Views to Hard Determinism and Others), and Part VIII (Neuroscience and Free Will). Taken as a whole, the book provides a roadmap to the state of the art thinking on this enduring topic.

The Form of Evil

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-117
Author(s):  
Irit Samet
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Primo Levi ◽  
Rational Discourse ◽  
Ethical Discourse ◽  
Absolute Dependence

Upon arriving in Auschwitz Primo Levi discovered that rational discourse, in which actions are done for reasons, was left lying on the carriage floor together with his human dignity. By responding ‘Here one doesn't ask why’, the camp guard succinctly conveys the insight that evil defies reason. This paper examines two studies of evil that are predicated on that idea: Kant's and Augustine's. It argues that their theories share an underlying formation wherein evil remains incomprehensible, except in negative terms as an absence of the reasonable. This deep similarity in the structure of the concept of evil is exceptionally striking if we bear in mind the radical difference in the scope of its application: whereas for Augustine ‘evil’ is a general metaphysical concept that concerns everything that goes wrong in creation, for Kant it is limited to agents and what they do. My argument is that the privative structure which underlies their understanding of evil stems from a shared belief in the central role of rationality in ethical discourse, and in an absolute dependence of moral responsibility on free will.

scholarly journals Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.

scholarly journals Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
David Rose ◽  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
Shaun Nichols
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Reliable Evidence ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism.

scholarly journals Mental Mechanisms of Psychological States Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 182-204
Author(s):  
A.O. Prokhorov
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Mental States ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Process ◽  
The Self ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Analytical Review

The article presents the analytical review of theories and studies of the psychological state regulation through the “self-processes — self-regulation” aspect. The main objective of the article is the analysis of concepts, mechanisms and the role of consciousness structures in the regulatory process. The theories of mental states self-regulation are analyzed: system-activity, system-functional and structures-functional. The specificity of each approach to the regulatory process is shown. It was found that the less developed area in presented theoretical constructions is the mental component of regulation: the contribution of the consciousness structures to the regulation of states, their significance and functions in the regulatory process, the specificity of the influence of individual structures on regulation and their synergy during self-regulation, etc. Review of the concepts of the mental states regulation’s mechanisms points the key role of the consciousness structures in the regulatory process. The consciousness structures are an integral part of the individual’s mental subjective experience. Subjective mental experience integrates meanings with categorical structures of consciousness, goal features, semantic structures of consciousness (personal meaning, values, semantic attitudes, etc.), reflection and its types, experiences, mental representations (imaginative characteristics), the self-system. The relationship between the consciousness structures in the process of mental states regulation is considered. It is shown that the integration of the consciousness components is aimed at the goal achieving — the regulation of the subject’s mental stateThe operational side of the regulatory process is associated with the actions of the subject, aimed at changing the state, feedback and time characteristics.

Naturally Free Action

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oisín Deery
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Intelligent Agent ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Free Actions ◽  
Compatibility Question

Do we have free will? This book argues that the answer to that question is “yes,” by showing how the concept of free will refers to many actual behaviors, and how free actions are a natural kind. Additionally, the book addresses the role of phenomenology in fixing the reference of the concept, and argues that free-agency phenomenology is typically accurate, even if determinism is true. The result is a realist, naturalistic framework for theorizing about free will, according to which free will exists and we act freely. For the most part, this verdict is reached independently of addressing the compatibility question, which asks whether free will is compatible with determinism. Even so, the book weighs in on that question, arguing that the natural-kind view both supports compatibilism and provides compatibilists with an attractive way to be realists about free will. The resulting position is preferable to previous natural-kind accounts as well as to revisionist accounts of free will and moral responsibility. Finally, the view defuses recent empirical threats to free will and is able to address emerging questions about whether an artificially intelligent agent might ever act freely or be responsible for its behaviors.

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