scholarly journals The Gulf War (1990–1991) and new foreign political concept of George Herbert Walker Bush

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-69
Author(s):  
Dmitrii N. Khristenko

The article examines the foreign policy concept of the «new world order» of George Herbert Walker Bush, which he put forward during the Gulf War (1990-1991). Despite its short duration, the Middle East conflict has become a symbol of the transformation of international relations initiated by the crisis of the bipolar system and arising of the United States as the main military and political world power. Consequently, Washington sought to rethink its role in the world arena. This task was intended to solve by the concept of a «new world order». The main sources for this article were the memoirs of the former American president and James Addison Baker III (U.S. Secretary of State), documents of White House’ administration, as well as publications of «Foreign Affairs» – the most influential journal on international relations in the United States. The research methodology includes the space-time analysis of Fernand Paul Achille Braudel, historical-descriptive and historical-genetic methods. It is noted that the foreign policy concept of a «new world order» was in the centre of public attention and caused a heated discussion in the United States, as a result of which was rejected its main element – reliance on allies and the rule of international law. The attempts of Russian diplomacy to propose a corrected interpretation of the concept of a «new world order» did not meet the understanding overseas. Washington took a course towards sole leadership in the world that triggered the deterioration of the state of affairs in the world arena in the long term.

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-151
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter studies the Persian Gulf War. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the United States was focused primarily on Europe, where rapid changes to the regional security order provided early signals of the nation’s dawning preeminence, but few indications of what a “new world order” would entail. Beyond the Soviet Union, there were no clear threats to U.S. global interests, and emergent American grand strategy envisioned a world where economic and diplomatic power would predominate, resulting in some measure of multipolarity. Yet the shock and awe of the war revealed that the United States stood alone as the world’s sole superpower, backed by international political support—including from a surprisingly deferential Russia—as well as unprecedented military preponderance. Washington therefore moved toward a more militarily assertive form of hegemony, characterized by the discretionary use of force to enforce the terms of the “new world order.” The war also inaugurated the preoccupation with Iraq and nonproliferation as central focuses of post–Cold War foreign policy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Lloyd E. Ambrosius

One hundred years ago, on April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the First World War. Four days earlier, in his war message to Congress, he gave his rationale for declaring war against Imperial Germany and for creating a new world order. He now viewed German submarine attacks against neutral as well as belligerent shipping as a threat to the whole world, not just the United States. “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind,” he claimed. “It is a war against all nations.” He now believed that Germany had violated the moral standards that “citizens of civilized states” should uphold. The president explained: “We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.” He focused on protecting democracy against the German regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II. “A steadfast concert for peace,” he said, “can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” Wilson called on Congress to vote for war not just because Imperial Germany had sunk three American ships, but for the larger purpose of a new world order. He affirmed: “We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundation of political liberty.”


Author(s):  
T.B. Golam ◽  

The article is devoted to the analysis of the role of Russia in the economic, political and social aspects of the СOVID-19 pandemic. The author considers publications of world leading research centers and think tanks as well as foreign policy decisions of leading world powers, considers relations between Russia and the United States as one of the most influential actors in the international struggle against the COVID-19 pandemic. Particular attention is paid to comparing different approaches to the international struggle against various epidemics and pandemics at the present stage. In conclusion the author makes a forecast on the possibility of the formation of a new world order in the post-pandemic period.


2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-183
Author(s):  
David Daniel Bogumil

International relations research has examined the relationship of the United States and Russia using a theoretical framework of reciprocity. The reciprocity research has subsumed the attributional characteristics of these actions and events that have shaped this relationship. This study evaluates the relationship between the United States and Russia. This dyadic relationship is examined by a reconceptualization of the character of reciprocal interaction between the United States and Russia. Reciprocity and attribution theory provide a heuristic to elucidate the transition to a New World Order. The international relations research on reciprocity reveals the general case for reciprocity between the United States and Russia. Attribution theory permits the decomposition of the perceptual and behavioral states of dyadic interactants.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Burk

The idea of a “new world order,” of an opportunity to remake a broken world into a more liberal and democratic place, was very much in the air in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some historians were encouraged to look at earlier periods with this concept in mind, and this essay is the result of one such attempt. The whole idea of an attempt to build a new world order has a very positive ring about it. At the least it seems to assume a plan, and an active personality or two behind the plan; it also assumes a global reach. If these are in any sense requirements, the United States during the interwar period fulfilled them only partially and erratically. Certainly, if one looks for the strong, general pattern in American foreign policy during this period, the culmination of many smaller plans and patterns, one can be found: the drive to convince the world to adopt policies leading to an international economy characterised by free trade, convertible currencies and open markets, and along with that, the drive to convince countries to disarm. All American administrations from 1919 to 1939 would have agreed with these policy imperatives. But what is undeniable is that they varied in their emphases, in the efforts which US governments themselves made to get these policies accepted. Only Woodrow Wilson had a plan, and only he sought to involve the US Government permanently in this process, to the extent of tying it down to future responsibilities: all others preferred, when feasible, merely to give indicative guidance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Nazhan Hammoud Nassif Al Obeidi ◽  
Abdul Wahab Abdul Aziz Abu Khamra

The Gulf crisis 1990-1991 is one of the important historical events of the 1990s, which gave rise to the new world order by the sovereignty of the United States of America on this system. The Gulf crisis was an embodiment to clarify the features of this system. .     The crisis in the Gulf was an opportunity for the Moroccans to manage this complex event and to use it for the benefit of the Moroccan situation. Therefore, the bilateral position of the crisis came out as a rejection, a contradiction and a supporter of political and economic dimensions at the external and internal levels. On the Moroccan situation, and from these points came the choice of the subject of the study (the dimensions of the Moroccan position from the Gulf crisis 1990-1991), which shows the ingenuity of Moroccans in managing an external crisis and benefiting from it internally.


2020 ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
I. V. Bocharnikov ◽  
O. A. Ovsyannikova

Тhe article reveals the main directions of transformation of the modern world order caused by the decline of the American-centric system, as well as the crisis of European integration. The main factors that determine the development of these processes, problems and prospects for the formation of a new world order at the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century are determined. The most significant aspects of the transformation of the policy of the United States and its European allies in relation to Russia are considered, and historical analogies are drawn with the processes of transformation of the world community in the XIX and XX centuries.


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

This chapter looks to the real “New World Order.” Conventionally, international relations as well as international law concentrated on the interactions of nation-states. On this model, the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, Kenya, Mexico, and the Bahamas, for example, are principally the irreducible units. Recent thinking emphasizes that instead, international relations more and more consists of executive, legislative, and judicial officials directly reaching out to their foreign counterparts to share information, forge ongoing networks, coordinate cooperation, and construct new frameworks. The traditional nation-state has today become “disaggregated,” dealing with its peers less as monolithic sovereign states than through these more specialized “global networks.” Notably, the counterparts that officials of one state seek out in others tracks the divisions of separation of powers: executives to executives, judges to judges, legislators to legislators. How such transnational, interdepartmental networking affects each branch of government within a given state is another matter.


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