British counterterrorism, the international prohibition of torture, and the multiple streams framework

After years of violating the basic principles of human rights in the name of counterterrorism, western democracies have begun to implement extraterritorial safeguards that extend protections under the Convention against Torture to foreigners abroad. The case of the UK and the development of the ‘Principles’ in 2019, however, presents a particular puzzle to policymaking research, as it challenges traditional hypotheses regarding the opening of problem windows within the multiple streams framework. Accordingly, the UK presents an interesting case in which a powerful state willingly engaged in self-restraint, despite little electoral pressure to do so and a persistently high terrorist threat. Drawing on theory-building process-tracing, this article addresses this gap using data from semi-structured interviews with British policy experts to present a refined hypothesis, which can also be applied to policy fields of little public interest and processes of foreign policymaking.

Obtaining redress (damages) for torture committed outside South Africa: A comment on Van Rensburg v Obiang (21748/2014) [2021] ZAWCHC 128 (18 June 2021)

In Van Rensburg v Obiang, the High Court (Western Cape Division) awarded the plaintiff damages for the torture, unlawful arrest, and detention to which the plaintiff was subjected by the respondent’s subordinates in Equatorial Guinea. However, the court does not clearly explain how the respondent was responsible for the applicant’s torture and the legal basis on which it made the order for damages. In this article, the author argues that the court’s order is debatable for the following reasons. The evidence before the court did not prove that the defendant had committed torture within the meaning of art. 1 of the UN Convention against Torture and sec. 3 of the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act; some of the acts attributed to the defendant as torture did not amount to torture; there was no legal basis on which the court based its order to award damages to the plaintiff for the torture committed abroad.

Non-refoulement and national security: A comparative study of UK, Canada and New Zealand

<p>“International law generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.” ¹ There had been a fierce debate when Hassan Ahmed Shaqlane, a Somalian refugee who was sentenced to an 8-year prison term for rape and kidnapping, won his appeal against deportation, upheld by the Deportation Review Tribunal.² Controversy arose again when Al Baiiaty, an Iraqi resettlement refugee was convicted of sexual violation by rape for the fourth time. With the Court of Appeal’s noting that Mr Al Baiiaty poses a serious risk to the community³, the then Minister of Immigration called for a report on the deportation issues raised by the case.⁴ Deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to liberty, security and perhaps life⁵, which is against many states’ domestic laws and international instruments such as the International Conant on Civil and Political Rights⁶ and the Convention against Torture⁷. It has been said that even if Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not categorically reject deportation to torture on its face, it should not be used to deny rights that other legal interments make available to everyone.⁸ It is highly questionable, however, under this broad obligation, if a refugee poses a significant threat to the protecting country’s national security, what action can a state take to protect its own national security and its own people. Are provision in the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT absolute, binding and non derogable? If so, can a state derogate from its international obligation to refoule a refugee to potential torture to protect its national security? On what grounds then, can a state derogate from it? This paper will consider these questions. By doing so, this paper will first outline the international obligations, provided by the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT, what is an international norm and states’ derogation rights in these provisions. The paper then looks at the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach in Suresh, EN⁹ and Zaoui¹⁰ when deporting a person who poses threat to national security can lead to torture and arbitrarily deprivation of life and the deportation potentially violates an international obligation or a state’s constitution. The paper will explain their approaches in relation to the different positions of their international obligations. The paper submits its concerns for some specific provisions in the Refugee Convention and the issues in exercising the absolute rights provided by the ICCPR and the CAT, as well as the ECHR. The paper finally submits its preferable approach after observing states’ practice and comparative study of the three approaches.</p>

Non-refoulement and national security: A comparative study of UK, Canada and New Zealand

<p>“International law generally rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.” ¹ There had been a fierce debate when Hassan Ahmed Shaqlane, a Somalian refugee who was sentenced to an 8-year prison term for rape and kidnapping, won his appeal against deportation, upheld by the Deportation Review Tribunal.² Controversy arose again when Al Baiiaty, an Iraqi resettlement refugee was convicted of sexual violation by rape for the fourth time. With the Court of Appeal’s noting that Mr Al Baiiaty poses a serious risk to the community³, the then Minister of Immigration called for a report on the deportation issues raised by the case.⁴ Deportation to torture may deprive a refugee of the right to liberty, security and perhaps life⁵, which is against many states’ domestic laws and international instruments such as the International Conant on Civil and Political Rights⁶ and the Convention against Torture⁷. It has been said that even if Article 33 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not categorically reject deportation to torture on its face, it should not be used to deny rights that other legal interments make available to everyone.⁸ It is highly questionable, however, under this broad obligation, if a refugee poses a significant threat to the protecting country’s national security, what action can a state take to protect its own national security and its own people. Are provision in the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT absolute, binding and non derogable? If so, can a state derogate from its international obligation to refoule a refugee to potential torture to protect its national security? On what grounds then, can a state derogate from it? This paper will consider these questions. By doing so, this paper will first outline the international obligations, provided by the Refugee Convention, the ICCPR and the CAT, what is an international norm and states’ derogation rights in these provisions. The paper then looks at the courts in Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach in Suresh, EN⁹ and Zaoui¹⁰ when deporting a person who poses threat to national security can lead to torture and arbitrarily deprivation of life and the deportation potentially violates an international obligation or a state’s constitution. The paper will explain their approaches in relation to the different positions of their international obligations. The paper submits its concerns for some specific provisions in the Refugee Convention and the issues in exercising the absolute rights provided by the ICCPR and the CAT, as well as the ECHR. The paper finally submits its preferable approach after observing states’ practice and comparative study of the three approaches.</p>

Connecting the Obligation Gap: Indonesia’s Non-Refoulement Responsibility Beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention

This article explains the extent to which Indonesia has international obligations to comply with the non-refoulement principle in the absence of ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention. While Presidential Regulation No. 125 of 2016 concerning the Treatment of Refugees provides the general impression that Indonesia respects the non-refoulement principle, there is no specific text within Indonesian law and policy that regulates the matter. This article argues that Indonesia is legally bound by non-refoulement obligations under international human rights treaties to which it is a party, as well as under customary international law. It examines the extent of Indonesia’s non-refoulement obligations under the Convention Against Torture, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and customary international law. It concludes that the Presidential Regulation was a missed opportunity for Indonesia to reinforce its non-refoulement obligations, as illustrated by the recent treatment of Rohingya asylum seekers near Aceh.

Cо-perpetrators of torture: national and convention definition framework

The article is prepared in continuation of development of author's dissertation researches. The paper reveals the peculiarities of objective and subjective features of cо-perpetration in torture (both on the basis of the provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, and taking into account the provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. When interpreting national criminal law norms in the light of convention provisions, the requirements of two-frame criminal law research are met. The authors' positions are supported by message from human rights organizations, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and theoretical modeling. The article contains the following conclusions. A co-perpetrator of torture may commit this criminal offense by his or her own actions or omissions, use another person as a “means” of committing a criminal offense, or delegate the commission of a criminal offense to another person. A co-perpetrator of torture may join in committing torture at any stage of the commission of this criminal offense. If, under the circumstances of complicity in torture, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity direct torture, he or she is the perpetrator (co-perpetrator) of the offense. If, in complicity in torture, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity creates the conditions for committing the offense, he or she should be recognized as the organizer, instigator or accomplice of the torture (depending on the role he or she has played). If, in complicity in torture, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity doesn't interfere of torture, he or she is the accomplice to torture. Not preventing torture should not be confused with the mental violence that can be used to torture. Article 1 of the 1984 Convention also covers cases of involvement in the torture of public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

Social Power and the Politics of Reservations and Objections in Human Rights Treaties

States often file reservations to human rights treaties with the goal of reducing their legal commitments under the treaty. Other states within the treaty have the right to declare objections in response to states making reservations. This is a potentially powerful tool for objecting states, and has numerous consequences for relations within and outside the human rights institution. So why do only some states lodge formal objections, while others do not? We argue that states consider the degree of social power they wield over a reserving state when formulating the decision to lodge an objection, because higher levels of social power amplify the effects of an objection. To evaluate our expectation, we gather data on all states’ reserving and objecting behaviors within the Convention against Torture. Controlling for a number of factors, we find that the measure of social power significantly increases the likelihood that a state will object to another state's reservation. This research calls attention to the power of objections as a legal tool, and suggests areas of future research for the effects of objections on the legality of human rights agreements.

The legal meaning of the terms "torture", "inhuman treatment or punishment", "degrading treatment or punishment" and their distinction in the decisions of the European commission of human rights and the European court of human rights

The paper reveals the legal meaning of the terms "torture", "inhuman treatment or punishment", "treatment or punishment that degrades human dignity". A distinction between these concepts is made on the examples of court decisions of European courts, taking into account the individual circumstances of each case. The genesis of the origin of the above concepts is investigated through a prism of the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. The paper reveals the absolute nature of the "jus cogens" norm of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The author proposes to modernize the Ukrainian criminal legislation on the reception of the position of the European Court of Human Rights on the delimitation of these concepts. In contrast to the European convention regulation of ill-treatment, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the author notes that the Ukrainian legislation regulates this issue quite succinctly. The Article 127 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides a definition only of torture, which in essence coincides with the definition of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the position of the European Court of Human Rights. The paper notes that the practice of Ukrainian courts shows that a distinction (similar to that provided by the European Court of Human Rights) is not implemented.

Has Italy Finally Implemented its International Obligations Concerning the Punishment of Torture?

Almost 30 years after acceding to the Convention against Torture, in 2017 Italy introduced the crime of torture into its penal code. There was great debate as to whether the new provisions were in line with the country’s international obligations. The first interpretations of these rules by the highest criminal court draw heavily on international notions, in particular on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The result is that, while the wording of the provisions remains questionable, their application tends to be consistent with (at least some) international rules.