A Sentimentalist Moral Psychology

2020 ◽  
pp. 172-204
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Moral Psychology

This chapter attributes to Nietzsche a sentimentalist moral psychology, according to which our normative judgements and motivational responses are ineradicably shaped and constrained by our antecedent motives. This can be contrasted to rationalist views, which accept a purity thesis. After precisfying the sentimentalist view, the chapter suggests that standard philosophical arguments both for and against it are inconclusive. To make headway, it then turns to empirical evidence. Even if empirical evidence could never definitively rule rationalism out, there is a wealth of evidence strongly supporting sentimentalism. This completes the case against those defences of categoricity like Kant’s resting on a purity thesis; sentimentalism will also be important for the model of normativity developed later.

The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Irving ◽  
Samuel Murray ◽  
Aaron Glasser ◽  
Kristina Krasich
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mediation Analysis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
State Control ◽  
Bus Stop ◽  
Aggregate Effect ◽  
Catch 22

Attribution theorists widely assume that people rely on character assessments to assign blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character has a fundamental effect on blame. Another camp holds that character merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We provide empirical evidence for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has both fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 505), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character assessments do not. Studies 3 and 4 (n = 447) perform a mediation analysis and find that character assessments (about forgetfulness) influence responsibility via two channels, one direct and another indirect. Forgetfulness directly increases judgments of responsibility, presumably because one’s mistakes manifest bad character. But forgetfulness also decreases judgments of state control, which indirectly decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. This is the catch-22 of forgetfulness. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions in the moral psychology of character, including that good character always decreases blame.

Challenges to the social motivation theory of autism: The dangers of counteracting an imprecise theory with even more imprecision

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirko Uljarević ◽  
Giacomo Vivanti ◽  
Susan R. Leekam ◽  
Antonio Y. Hardan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Motivation Theory ◽  
The Social

Abstract The arguments offered by Jaswal & Akhtar to counter the social motivation theory (SMT) do not appear to be directly related to the SMT tenets and predictions, seem to not be empirically testable, and are inconsistent with empirical evidence. To evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the SMT and identify scientifically testable alternatives, advances are needed on the conceptualization and operationalization of social motivation across diagnostic boundaries.

Integrating perspectives: How the development of second-personal competence lays the foundation for a second-personal morality

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Corbit ◽  
Chris Moore
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Developmental Process ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Personal Competence ◽  
Triadic Interactions ◽  
Personal Morality ◽  
Integrative Process

Abstract The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer two additions to this framework: a description of the developmental process through which second-personal competence emerges from early triadic interactions, and empirical evidence that collaboration with a concrete goal may provide an essential focal point for this integrative process.

Cooperation and obligation in early parent-child relationships

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross A. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Close Relationships ◽  
Social Agency ◽  
Infant Survival ◽  
Peer Experiences ◽  
Early Experiences ◽  
Early Parent ◽  
Collaborative Skills ◽  
Parent Child Relationships

Abstract Tomasello's moral psychology of obligation would be developmentally deepened by greater attention to early experiences of cooperation and shared social agency between parents and infants, evolved to promote infant survival. They provide a foundation for developing understanding of the mutual obligations of close relationships that contribute (alongside peer experiences) to growing collaborative skills, fairness expectations, and fidelity to social norms.

Socratic Moral Psychology

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Brickhouse ◽  
Nicholas D. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology

Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An Implicit Gender Stereotype

2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Schmid Mast
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Implicit Association Test ◽  
Gender Stereotype ◽  
Association Test ◽  
Implicit Association ◽  
Two Samples

The goal of the present study was to provide empirical evidence for the existence of an implicit hierarchy gender stereotype indicating that men are more readily associated with hierarchies and women are more readily associated with egalitarian structures. To measure the implicit hierarchy gender stereotype, the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998) was used. Two samples of undergraduates (Sample 1: 41 females, 22 males; Sample 2: 35 females, 37 males) completed a newly developed paper-based hierarchy-gender IAT. Results showed that there was an implicit hierarchy gender stereotype: the association between male and hierarchical and between female and egalitarian was stronger than the association between female and hierarchical and between male and egalitarian. Additionally, men had a more pronounced implicit hierarchy gender stereotype than women.

Socially Shared Regulation of Learning: A Review

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernesto Panadero ◽  
Sanna Järvelä
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Learning Theory ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Social Regulation ◽  
Observation Data ◽  
Optimal Form ◽  
Self Regulated Learning ◽  
The Past ◽  
Recorded Observation ◽  
Socially Shared Regulation

Abstract. Socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) has been recognized as a new and growing field in the framework of self-regulated learning theory in the past decade. In the present review, we examine the empirical evidence to support such a phenomenon. A total of 17 articles addressing SSRL were identified, 13 of which presented empirical evidence. Through a narrative review it could be concluded that there is enough data to maintain the existence of SSRL in comparison to other social regulation (e.g., co-regulation). It was found that most of the SSRL research has focused on characterizing phenomena through the use of mixed methods through qualitative data, mostly video-recorded observation data. Also, SSRL seems to contribute to students’ performance. Finally, the article discusses the need for the field to move forward, exploring the best conditions to promote SSRL, clarifying whether SSRL is always the optimal form of collaboration, and identifying more aspects of groups’ characteristics.

Neuroscience and Ethics

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Joshua Greene

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.

Identity, voice, and the psycho/dialogical perspectives from moral psychology.

1995 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. Day ◽  
Mark B. Tappan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document