Categories and Modalities

Author(s):  
Kohei Kishida

Category theory provides various guiding principles for modal logic and its semantic modeling. In particular, Stone duality, or “syntax-semantics duality”, has been a prominent theme in semantics of modal logic since the early days of modern modal logic. This chapter focuses on duality and a few other categorical principles, and brings to light how they underlie a variety of concepts, constructions, and facts in philosophical applications as well as the model theory of modal logic. In the first half of the chapter, I review the syntax-semantics duality and illustrate some of its functions in Kripke semantics and topological semantics for propositional modal logic. In the second half, taking Kripke’s semantics for quantified modal logic and David Lewis’s counterpart theory as examples, I demonstrate how we can dissect and analyze assumptions behind different semantics for first-order modal logic from a structural and unifying perspective of category theory. (As an example, I give an analysis of the import of the converse Barcan formula that goes farther than just “increasing domains”.) It will be made clear that categorical principles play essential roles behind the interaction between logic, semantics, and ontology, and that category theory provides powerful methods that help us both mathematically and philosophically in the investigation of modal logic.

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAVEL NAUMOV ◽  
JIA TAO

AbstractModal logic S5 is commonly viewed as an epistemic logic that captures the most basic properties of knowledge. Kripke proved a completeness theorem for the first-order modal logic S5 with respect to a possible worlds semantics. A multiagent version of the propositional S5 as well as a version of the propositional S5 that describes properties of distributed knowledge in multiagent systems has also been previously studied. This article proposes a version of S5-like epistemic logic of distributed knowledge with quantifiers ranging over the set of agents, and proves its soundness and completeness with respect to a Kripke semantics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-518
Author(s):  
PHILIP KREMER

AbstractWe add propositional quantifiers to the propositional modal logic S4 and to the propositional intuitionistic logic H, introducing axiom schemes that are the natural analogs to axiom schemes typically used for first-order quantifiers in classical and intuitionistic logic. We show that the resulting logics are sound and complete for a topological semantics extending, in a natural way, the topological semantics for S4 and for H.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP KREMER

AbstractIn the topological semantics for propositional modal logic, S4 is known to be complete for the class of all topological spaces, for the rational line, for Cantor space, and for the real line. In the topological semantics for quantified modal logic, QS4 is known to be complete for the class of all topological spaces, and for the family of subspaces of the irrational line. The main result of the current paper is that QS4 is complete, indeed strongly complete, for the rational line.


Author(s):  
Melvin Fitting ◽  
Richard L. Mendelsohn

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-393

Steve Awodey and Kohei Kishida (2008). Topology and Modality: The Topological Interpretation of First-Order Modal Logic. The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(2): 146-166.On page 148 of this article an error was introduced during the production process. The final equation in the displayed formula 8 lines from the bottom of the page should read,[0, 1) ≠ [0, 1]The publisher regrets this error.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 584-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Fritz

AbstractI consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only the cardinalities of these sets matters, and that not all pairs of infinite sets determine the same logic. I use so-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and show how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Williamson's argument.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 549-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikhail Rybakov ◽  
Dmitry Shkatov

Abstract We investigate the relationship between recursive enumerability and elementary frame definability in first-order predicate modal logic. On one hand, it is well known that every first-order predicate modal logic complete with respect to an elementary class of Kripke frames, i.e. a class of frames definable by a classical first-order formula, is recursively enumerable. On the other, numerous examples are known of predicate modal logics, based on ‘natural’ propositional modal logics with essentially second-order Kripke semantics, that are either not recursively enumerable or Kripke incomplete. This raises the question of whether every Kripke complete, recursively enumerable predicate modal logic can be characterized by an elementary class of Kripke frames. We answer this question in the negative, by constructing a normal predicate modal logic which is Kripke complete, recursively enumerable, but not complete with respect to an elementary class of frames. We also present an example of a normal predicate modal logic that is recursively enumerable, Kripke complete, and not complete with respect to an elementary class of rooted frames, but is complete with respect to an elementary class of frames that are not rooted.


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