Constituent Power and the Law

Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This book examines the place of the concept of constituent power in constitutional history, focusing on the legal and institutional implications that theorists, politicians, and judges have derived from it. It shows that constituent power, even though having historically been associated with extra-legality and violations of the constitutional order, has played important functions in the making of determinations of legal validity. Constitutional courts have employed it to justify their jurisdiction to invalidate constitutional amendments that alter the fundamental structure of the constitution and thus amount to a constitution-making exercise. Some governments have recurred to it to defend the legality of the transformation of the constitutional order through procedures not contemplated in the constitution’s amendment rule but considered participatory enough to be seen as equivalent to ‘the people in action’, and these attempts have sometimes been sanctioned by courts. Commentators and citizens have relied on the theory of constituent power to defend the idea that electors have the right to instruct representatives, and that the creation of new constitutions must take place through extra-legislative entities, such as primary assemblies open to all citizens. Several Latin American constitutions explicitly incorporate the theory of constituent power and allow citizens, acting through popular initiative, to trigger constitution-making episodes that may result in the replacement of the entire constitutional order. Building on these findings, the book ultimately develops a distinction between sovereignty and constituent power and argues that even a constitution-making body can be made legally subject to the conditions arising from a constituent referendum.

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Stüssi

AbstractThe proposal to ban minarets is controversial by its very nature. On the one hand Swiss citizens are sovereign and act as the ultimate supreme authority. By their will they may seek via popular initiative to enact, revoke or alter such, and any, constitutional provision as they see fit. On the other hand there are so-called material bars to Swiss constitutional amendments—such as human rights—arising from the provisions of international law. Not surprisingly, these material bars to absolute sovereignty are fiercely contested because they mean either greater or lesser powers to the citizen and, indirectly, to the political parties. The popular initiative to ban minarets raises not only questions in respect of the relationship between domestic and international law, but also appears to challenge the legal architecture of Switzerland. The initiative may be held invalid by the Swiss General Assembly (henceforth 'General Assembly' or 'Assembly') on the grounds that it breaches the peremptory norms of international law. If this proves to be the case, the Swiss people will not be given the opportunity to vote on it. Arguably, such interference is feasible only if the material bar to initiatives is widened beyond its originally accepted scope. Apparently, the powers of the Swiss Sovereign became thereby unequivocally curbed. The relationship between Swiss domestic law and international law is pivotal also should the General Assembly declare the initiative to be valid. The people would as a consequence of the Assembly's decision possess the right to vote either for or against the initiative. But regardless of the poplar vote's outcome, the second option prima facie implies that the sovereignty of the Swiss citizens has been upheld, and concessions need only to be made by those who are either for or against the proposed ban. Yet in its international context the matter is more complex and more far-reaching than that. The first part of this paper concentrates on the question of whether it is advisable for the General Assembly to compromise the people's sovereignty by widening the original scope of peremptory norms. The second part explores what a popular vote in favour of the ban on minarets could mean in law. In order to raise the awareness of the subject matter beyond its legal dimension, the introduction and conclusion of this paper will shed specific light on the rule of law as a philosophical doctrine.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834
Author(s):  
Michael Gorup

Lynch mobs regularly called on the language of popular sovereignty in their efforts to authorize lynchings, arguing that, as representatives of the people, they retained the right to wield public violence against persons they deemed beyond the protections of due process. Despite political theorists’ renewed interest in popular sovereignty, scholars have not accounted for this sordid history in their genealogies of modern democracy and popular constituent power. I remedy this omission, arguing that spectacle lynchings—ones that occurred in front of large crowds, sometimes numbering in the thousands—operated as public rituals of racialized people-making. In the wake of Reconstruction, when the boundaries of the polity were deeply contested, spectacle lynchings played a constitutive role in affirming and circulating the notion that the sovereign people were white, and that African Americans were their social subordinates.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Lucas Machado Fagundes ◽  
Ivone Fernandes Morcilo Lixa

Resumo: O presente estudo comporta uma análise do pensamento jurídico crítico do autor mexicano Jesús Antonio De La Torre Rangel na sua contribuição para a temática dos Direitos Humanos como evolução conceitual sócio histórico fundamentada pela perspectiva filosófica da libertação latino-americana. Assim, a delimitação é embasada na concepção de juridicidade libertadora, categoria que serve de abertura para a noção jurídica totalizada – calcada na ideia positivada –. Dessa forma, objetiva-se aproximar o Direito do sentido de justo que nasce do povo na sua práxis de libertação e, por essa razão dotando-o de uma compreensão política. A problemática da pesquisa perpassa pela existência ou não de uma fundamentação latino-americana para a compreensão dos Direitos Humanos. Com isso, a hipótese que permeia o trabalho é que os Direitos Humanos devem ser resgatados na experiência e evolução conceitual encoberta pela modernidade, recuperando uma tradição ibero-latino-americana, olvidada no espaço geopolítico e epistêmico colonizado. Portanto, o estudo irá permear três dimensões no pensamento jurídico crítico dos Direitos Humanos do jurista mexicano, estabelecendo um panorama reflexivo que pretende demonstrar ao final uma proposta crítica de juridicidade libertadora.Abstract: The present study includes an analysis of the critical legal thinking of Mexican author Jesús Antonio de La Torre Rangel in his contribution to the theme of Human Rights as a socio-historical conceptual evolution based on the philosophical perspective of Latin American liberation. Thus, the delimitation is based on the conception of liberating juridicity, a category that serves as an opening for the totalized juridical notion - based on the positive idea -. In this way, the objective is to approximate the Right of the sense of the righteous that is born of the people in their praxis of liberation and, therefore, endowing it with a political understanding. The research problematic pervades the existence or not of a Latin American foundation for the understanding of Human Rights. With this, the hypothesis that permeates the work is that Human Rights must be rescued in the experience and conceptual evolution concealed by modernity, recovering an Ibero-Latin American tradition, forgotten in colonized geopolitical and epistemic space. Therefore, the study will permeate three dimensions in the critical legal thinking of the human rights of the Mexican jurist, establishing a reflective panorama that intends to demonstrate at the end a critical proposal of liberating juridicity.


Author(s):  
John Mac Kilgore

This chapter analyzes the broad history and philosophy of enthusiasm from the Antinomian Crisis of 1636-1638 in colonial America to the revolutionary Enlightenment at the end of the eighteenth century. From Immanuel Kant to Thomas Paine, Anne Hutchinson to Nathaniel Hawthorne, enthusiasm emerges as a discourse of “constituent power,” the notion in political theory that democracy emanates from the living will of the people and that individuals have the right, therefore, to resist or abolish governments that use the force of law to abuse them. The author argues that, in early American debates about religious antinomianism, especially women’s access to political or social power, the language of enthusiasm was a theological construct of “constituent power” that became overtly politicized in the Revolutionary era and eventually incorporated into Romantic philosophy. Finally, through short readings of Charles Brockden Brown’s Ormond and Sarah Pogson’s The Female Enthusiast, the chapter demonstrates that certain literatures of the early Republic define enthusiasm (as women’s dissent and constituent power) over/against domestic sensibility and the sentimental tradition.


Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This concluding chapter summarizes the main insights of the book, which present constituent power as an eminently juridical concept, one that can play a key role in determinations of legal validity and that places important demands on constitutional orders. It also identifies avenues for further research, particularly with respect to the imperative mandate, primary assemblies, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, the legality of informal but democratic constitution-making processes, and the enforceability of constituent mandates. The chapter concludes by arguing that to approach constituent power through legal lenses does not necessarily entail an attempt to domesticate an otherwise revolutionary concept. In the case of this book, such an approach seeks to realize part of the radical democratic potential of the concept: that, as in Rousseau, it is the sovereign people, and not its representatives, who must determine the content of the fundamental laws.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-116
Author(s):  
Justin Ngambu Wanki

The article examines unconstitutional constitutional amendments in the constitutional order of Cameroon dating back from 1960 to 2008. The examination reveals that all the amendments engaged within this period fail to comply with the rule of law and constitutionalism, facilitated and abetted by the three branches of government in Cameroon. The article ends by emphasising that since power is held by government only as a trust for the benefit of the people, it entails that constitutional amendments should be undertaken only when they are in the interests of the people who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-58
Author(s):  
Morris Kiwinda Mbondenyi

AbstractA practice of frequent constitutional amendments started shortly after Kenya attained her independence in 1963. Consequently, the country has witnessed a confusion of systems of governance, ranging from single-party autocracy to virtual multi-party democracy, which have served to endorse the chronic condition of human rights violations in the country. In the process of such experimentation, Kenyans have unabatedly been denied the enjoyment of many of their fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to participate in their government. This article analyses Kenya's constitutional order with the intention of highlighting the extent to which the country's citizens have been denied the right to participate in their government. Drawing inspiration from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the article recommends ways in which this right could be entrenched in the country's constitutional order.


ICL Journal ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Catalina Torres-Artunduaga ◽  
Santiago García-Jaramillo

AbstractThe increasing interest of legal academia on the doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments and its growing enforcement by the judiciary in different jurisdictions has started to normalize a doctrine that was considered controversial and extraordinary. This paper seeks to cast some doubts on the use of this doctrine, especially when the Court that enforces it is the subject of the amendment itself. In the first section it will question the conceptual foundations of the doctrine by recourse to legal theory, focusing not only on the idea of constituent power, but also on those of the rule of law and accountability. In the second section, some comparative cases of unconstitutional constitutional amendments will be analyzed, focusing on those where the judiciary itself was the subject of the amendment. Finally, from a normative and conceptual standpoint, a dialogic approach to the application of the doctrine will be proposed, to mitigate the fact that Constitutional Courts can become an unaccountable accountability-holder.


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