Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosko Tripkovic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
The People ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Universal Reason ◽  
Constitutional Identity

The chapter summarizes the main argument of the book. It contends that previously identified value-based arguments—from constitutional identity, common sentiment, and universal reason—fail as independent grounds of moral judgment. However, combining these arguments allows constitutional courts to emulate the moral point of view in a process that is both sensitive to different moral perspectives and attuned to their institutional position. The chapter concludes that constitutional courts ought to respect the moral intuitions of the people that can be reflectively attributed to their constitutional identity.

Justice, Exploitation and the End of Morality

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 117-134
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Small Contribution ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Moral Assessment

This paper is a small contribution to two large subjects. The first large subject is that of exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Marx's understanding of exploitation was and whether it was adequate: all these are issues on which I merely touch, at best. My particular concern here is to answer the two questions, whether Marx thought capitalist exploitationunjustand how the answer to that question illuminates Marx's conception of morality in general. The second large subject is that of the nature of morality—whether there are specificallymoralvalues and specifically moral forms of evaluation and criticism, how these relate to our explanatory interests in the same phenomena, what it would be like to abandon the ‘moral point of view’, whether the growth of a scientific understanding of society and ourselves inevitably undermines our confidence in the existence of moral ‘truths’. These again are issues on which I only touch if I mention them at all, but the questions I try to answer are, what does Marx propose to put in the place of moral judgment, and what kind of assessment of the horrors of capitalism does he provide if not a moral assessment?

Justice, Exploitation and the End of Morality

1987 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 117-134
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Small Contribution ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Moral Assessment

This paper is a small contribution to two large subjects. The first large subject is that of exploitation—what it is for somebody to be exploited, in what ways people can be and are exploited, whether exploitation necessarily involves coercion, what Marx's understanding of exploitation was and whether it was adequate: all these are issues on which I merely touch, at best. My particular concern here is to answer the two questions, whether Marx thought capitalist exploitationunjustand how the answer to that question illuminates Marx's conception of morality in general. The second large subject is that of the nature of morality—whether there are specificallymoralvalues and specifically moral forms of evaluation and criticism, how these relate to our explanatory interests in the same phenomena, what it would be like to abandon the ‘moral point of view’, whether the growth of a scientific understanding of society and ourselves inevitably undermines our confidence in the existence of moral ‘truths’. These again are issues on which I only touch if I mention them at all, but the questions I try to answer are, what does Marx propose to put in the place of moral judgment, and what kind of assessment of the horrors of capitalism does he provide if not a moral assessment?

scholarly journals The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosko Tripkovic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
The Self ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Moral Perspective ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
Universal Reason ◽  
Constitutional Identity

The book explores the metaethical foundations of value-based arguments in constitutional adjudication. The argument develops in four steps. First, the book identifies three dominant types of value-based arguments in comparative constitutional practice: the arguments from constitutional identity, common sentiment, and universal reason. Second, it examines the assumptions about the nature of moral value implicit in these arguments and subjects them to a critique. The book maintains that these arguments presuppose inadequate conceptions of value and fail as self-standing approaches to moral judgment. Third, the book develops an account of moral value and explains its practical consequences. It argues that a credible understanding of value suggests that the appropriate moral judgment emerges from the dynamics between practical confidence, which denotes the inescapability of the self and evaluative attitudes it entails, and reflection, which denotes the process of challenging and questioning these attitudes. Fourth, departing from this conception of value, the book reconstructs the existing value-based arguments of constitutional courts. It applies the notions of confidence and reflection to constitutional reasoning and shows how the arguments from constitutional identity, common sentiment, and universal reason can be combined to refashion the moral perspective of a constitutional court so that it coheres with a sound understanding of value. The book argues that the moral inquiry of the constitutional court ought to depart from the emotive intuitions of the constitutional community and then challenge these intuitions through reflective exposure to different perspectives in order to better understand and develop the underlying constitutional identity.

Poetry?

2021 ◽  
pp. 364-380
Author(s):  
Floris Bernard ◽  
Kristoffel Demoen
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
The Difference

This chapter gives an overview of how Byzantines conceptualized “poetry.” It argues that from the Byzantine point of view, poetry only differs from prose in a very formal way, namely that it is written in verse. Both prose and poetry belonged to the category of logoi, the only label that was very frequently used, in contrast to the term “poetry,” which was reserved for the ancient poetry studied at schools. Many authors considered (and exploited) the difference between their own prose texts and poems as a primarily formal one. Nevertheless, poetry did have some functions that set it apart from prose, even if these features are for us less expected. The quality of “bound speech” gained a spiritual dimension, since verse was seen as a restrained form of discourse, also from a moral point of view. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview of the social contexts for which (learned) poetry was the medium of choice: as an inscription, as paratext in a wide sense, as a piece of personal introspection, as invective, as summaries (often of a didactic nature), and as highly public ceremonial pieces.

A Dialogue on Compassion and Supererogation in Medicine

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Thomasma ◽  
Thomasine Kushner
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View

According to Frankena, “the moral point of view is what Alison Wilde and Heather Badcock did not have.” Most of us, however, are not such extreme examples. We are capable of the moral point of view, but we fail to take the necessary time or make the required efforts. We resist pulling ourselves from other distractions to focus on the plight of others and what we might do to ameliorate their suffering. Perhaps compassion is rooted in understanding what it is that connects us with others rather than what separates us, and rests on developing sufficient awareness, to internalize what our actions, or lack of them, mean in the lives of others.

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