Thought’s Indebtedness to Being

I identify in Kant’s 1763 Beweisgrund an original insight that is both relevant to late Schelling and a dim anticipation of Kant’s conception of transcendental proof. The insight is best revealed by contrast with an alternative reading of the text that situates Kant at this period firmly within early modern rationalism. While the insight that I locate is proto-Schellingian, the alternative reading is proto-Hegelian. Deciding how to read the Beweisgrund is consequently a kind of rehearsal of Schelling’s argument with Hegel. My reading makes two gains vis-à-vis Schelling: an entry point into his late thought that is independent of the constantly shifting terms that he himself employs; and a reason to think that his late thought has a deep Kantian root and is not merely an abreaction to Hegel or to his own earlier Identity Philosophy.