Cayman Islands

Author(s):  
Morven McMillan
Keyword(s):  

The Cayman Islands introduced its first trusts statute in 1967. The Trusts Law is currently in its 2018 revision (the ‘Trusts Law’). The Cayman Islands is a common law jurisdiction and its court will have regard not only to local reported cases but to reported trusts cases and equitable principles developed over centuries in England and other common law jurisdictions.

Author(s):  
James Ayliffe ◽  
Shivji Sharif ◽  
Guy Olliff-Cooper

For regulatory and tax reasons, many businesses now choose to incorporate at least part of their corporate structure in offshore jurisdictions. Many of these jurisdictions have strong historical links to England, which is reflected in their legislation and in their adherence to the common law. Leading examples include the Crown Dependencies of Jersey and Guernsey and the Overseas British Territories of Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-143
Author(s):  
Mitchell C Davies

Resort to public policy in order to impugn a foreign judgment or to negate the effects of the application of foreign law has correctly been given a narrow compass by the English courts. In the sphere of common law choice of law rules in contract and tort this approach has been encouraged by the in-built forum bias of the rules themselves which reduces significantly the need for circumvention of foreign law. At common law a tort, for example, is never actionable in England unless the cause of action is recognised as a tort by English law.1 The common law choice of law rules in contract, ostensibly less parochial, are so open textured however as to leave a judge minded to apply English law rarely without legal justification for doing so. An increase in the resort by English courts to the safety mechanism of public policy is therefore anticipated by most commentators to be a direct result of placing the choice of law rules in contract and tort on a statutory footing, respectively, by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 and the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995.2 What was achieved openly through an application of the rules themselves may now be arrived at less ingenuously by more indiscriminate resort to the mechanism of public policy. At one extreme a danger exists that public policy may become a badge of partiality resorted to for no better reason than to protect the perceived innate superiority of the forum's rules. At another, a misplaced desire to promote international comity may lead to an exclusion of public policy where it ought properly to be invoked; a balance must be struck. The delicate question of the correct weight to be accorded to the doctrine of public policy recently fell to be determined by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands3 in Wheeler v. Wheeler.4


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Matthews

The Common Law rules of private international law on the capacity of a person to create a trust are peculiarly difficult to ascertain. It is submitted that, despite the claims of other candidates (such as the proper law of the trust, the law of the situs of the trust assets, and even the settlor's nationality), the law of the settlor's domicile should govern capacity of the settlor (i) to make a contract to create a trust, (ii) to transfer ownership of moveable property to the trustee, and (in) to impose the trust obligation on the trustee. Capacity of the settlor to transfer immovables to the trustee is, however, governed by the lex situs. Some offshore trust jurisdictions have enacted special rules relating to capacity to create a trust. Two main models may be distinguished, that of Jersey and that of the Cayman Islands. These rules were mainly designed to deal with a quite different problem, namely that of the settlor whose personal law includes rules on the protection of family wealth, such as so-called “forced heirship”". Whether the offshore rules actually succeed in avoiding the problem is, however, open to doubt in some cases.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-337
Author(s):  
Steve Hedley

In this article, Professor Steve Hedley offers a Common Law response to he recently published arguments of Professor Nils Jansen on the German law of unjustified enrichment (as to which, see Jansen, “Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment” (2016) 20 EdinLR 123). The author takes the view that Jansen's paper provided a welcome opportunity to reconsider not merely what unjust enrichment can logically be, but what it is for. He argues that unjust enrichment talk contributes little of value, and that the supposedly logical process of stating it at a high level of abstraction, and then seeking to deduce the law from that abstraction, merely distracts lawyers from the equities of the cases they consider.


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