Clarke

2019 ◽  
pp. 128-131
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), the most important Newtonian philosopher of his day. Clarke’s views on ‘fittingness’ are explained, along with his idea that there are three ‘great branches’ of ethics: piety, righteousness, and sobriety. His broad welfarism in ethics is described, along with his commitment to the existence of certain absolute evils. His view of the afterlife is discussed, along with his use of the notion to resolve tensions between the elements in his ethical theory as well as between self-interest and morality. A problem for his view on morality and the afterlife is raised.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-An Lin ◽  
Timothy Charles Bates

While theory predicts fairness motivates support for redistribution, tests have yielded near-zero effects. Here we propose the relevant evolved fairness motive operates within the community sharing relation, experienced as a unity motive to treat “all as one and none as more than one”. Study 1 (N = 403) supported this model, with a moderate (𝛽 = .15 CI[.06, .23]) significant effect of a communal fairness measure on support for redistribution, incremental to effects of compassion, envy, and self-interest. Study 2 (N=402) replicated with larger effect (𝛽 = .25 CI[.17, .33]). As distribution involves means as well as ends, we tested support for redistribution by coercive means. In both study 1 and 2, support for coercion was predicted by “ends justify the means” intuitions (instrumental harm: 𝛽 = .21 CI[.12, .31)] and .16 CI[.08, .25]). Communal fairness also predicted willingness to coerce (𝛽 = .15 CI[.05 .24] and .32 CI[.23 .41]). These five psychological motives accounted for 45% of support for redistribution, suggesting considerable value for political, economic, evolutionary, and ethical theory.


1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lester H. Hunt

Early in Peter Abelard's Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, the philosopher (that is, the ancient Greek) and the Christian easily come to agreement about what the point of ethics is: “[T]he culmination of true ethics … is gathered together in this: that it reveal where the ultimate good is and by what road we are to arrive there.” They also agree that, since the enjoyment of this ultimate good “comprises true blessedness,” ethics “far surpasses other teachings in both usefulness and worthiness.” As Abelard understood them, both fundamental elements of his twelfth-century ethical culture — Greek philosophy and Christian religion — held a common view of the nature of ethical inquiry, one that was so obvious to them that his characters do not even state it in a fully explicit way. They take for granted, as we take the ground we stand on, the premise that the most important function of ethical theory is to tell you what sort of life is most desirable, or most worth living. That is, the point of ethics is that it is good for you, that it serves your self-interest.


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 264-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Slote

As a motive, self-interest is constituted by a certain kind of concern for oneself; but we also use the term “self-interest” to refer to the object of such a motive, to the well-being or good life sought by a self-interested agent. In this essay, I want to concentrate on self-interest in the latter sense and say something about how self-interest or well-being relates to virtue. One reason to be interested in this relationship stems from our concern to know whether virtue pays, i.e., is in the moral agent's self-interest, a question which Plato notably asks in the Republic and which has been of concern to moral philosophers ever since. But the importance for ethics of notions like virtue and self-interest is hardly exhausted by their role in the debate over whether virtue pays; indeed, any large-scale ethical theory will presumably have something to say about how these major notions relate, so we have reason to want to understand this relationship independent of the particular desire to show that morality or virtue is in the self-interest of the (virtuous) agent.It will be a background assumption of this essay that some ways of connecting virtue and well-being/self-interest redound to the advantage of the larger theories that incorporate them. If, in particular, we believe in the bona fides of ethical theory, then unifying power is a desideratum in ethics and it stands in favor of utilitarianism (and Epicureanism) that it offers us a way of unifying our understanding of virtue and well-being. To be sure, that advantage may to some extent or ultimately be undercut if unification leads to counterintuitive ethical consequences.


Author(s):  
Alexander Blaszczynski

Abstract. Background: Tensions exist with various stakeholders facing competing interests in providing legal land-based and online regulated gambling products. Threats to revenue/taxation occur in response to harm minimisation and responsible gambling policies. Setting aside the concept of total prohibition, the objectives of responsible gambling are to encourage and/or restrict an individual’s gambling expenditure in terms of money and time to personally affordable limits. Stakeholder responsibilities: Governments craft the gambling environment through legislation, monitor compliance with regulatory requirements, and receive taxation revenue as a proportion of expenditure. Industry operators on the other hand, compete across market sectors through marketing and advertising, and through the development of commercially innovative products, reaping substantial financial rewards. Concurrently, governments are driven to respond to community pressures to minimize the range of negative gambling-related social, personal and economic harms and costs. Industry operators are exposed to the same pressures but additionally overlaid with the self-interest of avoiding the imposition of more stringent restrictive policies. Cooperation of stakeholders: The resulting tension between taxation revenue and profit making, harm minimization, and social impacts creates a climate of conflict between all involved parties. Data-driven policies become compromised by unsubstantiated claims of, and counter claims against, the nature and extent of gambling-related harms, effectiveness of policy strategies, with allegations of bias and influence associated with researchers supported by industry and government research funding sources. Conclusion: To effectively advance policies, it is argued that it is imperative that all parties collaborate in a cooperative manner to achieve the objectives of responsible gambling and harm minimization. This extends to and includes more transparent funding for researchers from both government and industry. Continued reliance on data collected from analogue populations or volunteers participating in simulated gambling tasks will not provide data capable of valid and reliable extrapolation to real gamblers in real venues risking their own funds. Failure to adhere to principles of corporate responsibility and consumer protection by both governments and industry will challenge the social licence to offer gambling products. Appropriate and transparent safeguards learnt from the tobacco and alcohol field, it is argued, can guide the conduct of gambling research.


1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Graham L. Staines
Keyword(s):  

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