Hume

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish empiricist philosopher David Hume (1711–76). The view that Hume’s ethics is purely anthropological or descriptive is criticized. Hume’s deontological ethics of action is compared with his utilitarian ethics of motive. It is shown that his utilitarianism is a view about rather than within morality: morality itself is a device for the promotion of happiness, so that non-utilitarian or deontological moral views may be conceptually confused. Hume’s conception of impartiality is explained, and finally his dualism of the practical reason, which allows for the rationality of self-sacrifice as well as that of immorality, depending on circumstances.

Gay, Tucker, Paley, and Bentham

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of four key figures in the British utilitarian tradition. The associationist theory of virtue of John Gay (1699–1745) is outlined. It is shown how psychological and rational hedonism are combined with utilitarianism in the work of Abraham Tucker (1705–74). The largely instrumental view taken by William Paley (1743–1805) of the rules of common-sense morality is described, and it is demonstrated how he sometimes slides into a non-instrumental position. The ‘split-level’ act utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is placed within his largely legislative project. A conclusion outlines several philosophical themes running through the ethics of the period discussed in the book, and the importance of that period as an influence on, and a source for, contemporary ethics.

Price

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Welsh dissenting minister, theologian, probability theorist, and philosopher, Richard Price (1723–91). Price’s deontological pluralism is described, and his distinction between practical and abstract virtue elucidated. Price’s volitionalism is compared with the views of Adam Smith. The question of whether Price believes partial virtue sufficient for virtue is discussed. Price’s view of supererogation, and his opposition to rational egoism are explained. Price’s identification of the truth about duty with God is elucidated, along with its implications for any conflict between morality and self-interest.

Clarke

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), the most important Newtonian philosopher of his day. Clarke’s views on ‘fittingness’ are explained, along with his idea that there are three ‘great branches’ of ethics: piety, righteousness, and sobriety. His broad welfarism in ethics is described, along with his commitment to the existence of certain absolute evils. His view of the afterlife is discussed, along with his use of the notion to resolve tensions between the elements in his ethical theory as well as between self-interest and morality. A problem for his view on morality and the afterlife is raised.

Mandeville

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Anglo-Dutch philosopher and satirist Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), focusing in particular on Mandeville’s famous Fable of the Bees. Mandeville’s rigorist conception of morality is described. It is explained how, on that conception, fallen human beings can still distinguish virtue from vice. Mandeville’s recommendation of a life of piety and humility is critically interpreted, and some account offered of how Mandeville came to be so widely misunderstood as a Hobbesian, who advocated a form of egoism which makes no room for self-standing moral reasons.

More

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1647–87). More’s attempt to combine substantive hedonism about self-interest or well-being (the view that self-interest consists only in pleasures) with the advocacy of virtue is explained. His notion of the ‘boniform faculty’, an intellectual power that enables us to see what is good and to take pleasure in it, is elucidated. Some problems are raised for his account of how to evaluate different kinds of pleasure, based as it is on the Aristotelian idea that the virtuous person is the only competent judge of pleasantness and painfulness.

Reid

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish ‘common-sense’ philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–96). The influence of Joseph Butler on Reid’s conception of human nature is explained, and the similarities and differences between their positions elucidated. Reid’s arguments against rational egoism are discussed. His view that virtue is a component of well-being is outlined, and it is suggested that his position on the pleasures of virtue may be said to be somewhat exaggerated. Reid’s appeal to the afterlife to guarantee complete overlap between self-interest and morality is explained.

Butler

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752), often said to be one of the very greatest British moral philosophers of the eighteenth century. The chapter focuses particularly on Butler’s famous Fifteen Sermons. Butler’s view on human nature and the supremacy of conscience is explained. Discussion follows of his views on how to understand self-love and benevolence. His first-order ethics is shown to be both welfarist and, in effect, non-utilitarian. His arguments for the harmony of self-love and beneficence, including those depending on the idea of divine reward and punishment in the afterlife, are critically elucidated.

Shaftesbury

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), focusing in particular on his Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, but also discussing other works such as his Regimen. Shaftesbury’s commitment to Stoic ethics is elucidated. He is claimed to accept a broadly Aristotelian account of moral motivation, which resolves any ultimate conflict between morality and self-interest in the goals of a rational agent. The ethical aspects of his moral philosophy are brought out. His restricted hedonism, and in particular his views on the hedonic value of virtue and ‘higher pleasures’, are explained and criticized.

Introduction

This chapter introduces Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham. The main topic of the book is explained within a framework first set out clearly by the Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick, in the nineteenth century. The ancient background to the discussion is described, especially in connection to the views of Socrates and Plato. Psychological egoism—the view that the sole ultimate motivation of voluntary human action is self-interest—is elucidated. Rational egoism is defined as the view that the only reason any agent has for acting is to promote their own self-interest.