Each is to count for one and none for more than one: Predictors of support for economic redistribution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-An Lin ◽  
Timothy Charles Bates

While theory predicts fairness motivates support for redistribution, tests have yielded near-zero effects. Here we propose the relevant evolved fairness motive operates within the community sharing relation, experienced as a unity motive to treat “all as one and none as more than one”. Study 1 (N = 403) supported this model, with a moderate (𝛽 = .15 CI[.06, .23]) significant effect of a communal fairness measure on support for redistribution, incremental to effects of compassion, envy, and self-interest. Study 2 (N=402) replicated with larger effect (𝛽 = .25 CI[.17, .33]). As distribution involves means as well as ends, we tested support for redistribution by coercive means. In both study 1 and 2, support for coercion was predicted by “ends justify the means” intuitions (instrumental harm: 𝛽 = .21 CI[.12, .31)] and .16 CI[.08, .25]). Communal fairness also predicted willingness to coerce (𝛽 = .15 CI[.05 .24] and .32 CI[.23 .41]). These five psychological motives accounted for 45% of support for redistribution, suggesting considerable value for political, economic, evolutionary, and ethical theory.

2019 ◽  
pp. 128-131
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), the most important Newtonian philosopher of his day. Clarke’s views on ‘fittingness’ are explained, along with his idea that there are three ‘great branches’ of ethics: piety, righteousness, and sobriety. His broad welfarism in ethics is described, along with his commitment to the existence of certain absolute evils. His view of the afterlife is discussed, along with his use of the notion to resolve tensions between the elements in his ethical theory as well as between self-interest and morality. A problem for his view on morality and the afterlife is raised.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Cohn

Abstract. Political-economic theory posits that in the face of a perceived decline in service quality, those who might otherwise seek alternatives will be restrained by feelings of loyalty that are a product of their emotional and physical investment in a situation (Hirschman, 1970). Amartya Sen (1977) describes support for policies that is based exclusively in values—rather than self-interest or a combination of the two—as a commitment. This article sets out to answer two questions: First, what proportion of the supporters of Canadian medicare within the province of Alberta currently expresses self-interest, and what proportion does not? We can describe this latter group as possibly expressing commitment. Second, is it possible that those who support medicare and express self-interest also share the same values as those who might be expressing commitment? If so, feelings of loyalty might help to maintain support for medicare among those who currently express self-interest, should they perceive a decline in service quality. While evidence is found to support this view, care must be taken in generalizing the results to the wider population, given the size and nature of the sample.Résumé. La théorie politique-économique pose en principe que, face à la perception d'un déclin de la qualité des services, ceux qui seraient normalement susceptibles de chercher d'autres solutions seront restreints par les sentiments de loyauté produits par l'investissement émotif et physique de l'individu dans son environnement (Hirschman, 1970). Sen (1977) décrit l'appui voué à certaines politiques pour des raisons exclusivement idéologiques, plutôt que par intérêt personnel, ou encore pour une combinaison de raisons idéologiques et d'intérêt personnel, comme un engagement. Cet article se propose de répondre à deux questions: en premier, quelle proportion de partisans du système public de santé canadien en Alberta exprime, ou n'exprime pas, des intérêts personnels? On peut probablement décrire le groupe qui n'exprime pas d'intérêts personnels comme témoignant d'un engagement. Deuxièmement, est-il possible que ceux qui soutiennent le système de santé tout en exprimant des intérêts personnels aient les mêmes valeurs que ceux qui expriment leur engagement? Si oui, ces sentiments de loyauté pourraient aider à maintenir le soutien pour le système de santé parmi ceux qui expriment actuellement des intérêts personnels, s'ils avaient l'impression d'un déclin de la qualité des services. Bien que nous ayons trouvé des preuves étayant cet avis, il faut être prudent dans la généralisation des résultats à l'ensemble de la population à cause de la taille et de la nature de l'échantillon.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-759
Author(s):  
Meg Dobbins

“Young ladies don't understandpolitical economy, you know,” asserts the casually misogynistic uncle of Dorothea Brooke in George Eliot'sMiddlemarch(1871) (17; bk. 1, ch 1). Although Eliot's heroine resents both her uncle's remark and “that never-explained science which was thrust as an extinguisher over all her lights,” her attempt to teach herself political economy in the novel only seems to confirm her uncle's assessment (18; bk. 1, ch. 1): Dorothea gathers a “little heap of books on political economy” and sets forth to learn “the best way of spending money so as not to injure one's neighbors, or – what comes to the same thing – so as to do them the most good” (805; bk. 5, ch. 48). Naively likening “spending money so as not to injure one's neighbors” to “do[ing] them the most good,” Dorothea fails to grasp the self-interest at the core of nineteenth-century political economic thought and so misunderstands the subject matter before her: “Unhappily her mind slipped off [the book] for a whole hour; and at the end she found herself reading sentences twice over with an intense consciousness of many things, but not of any one thing contained in the text. This was hopeless” (805; bk. 5, ch. 48).


1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lester H. Hunt

Early in Peter Abelard's Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, the philosopher (that is, the ancient Greek) and the Christian easily come to agreement about what the point of ethics is: “[T]he culmination of true ethics … is gathered together in this: that it reveal where the ultimate good is and by what road we are to arrive there.” They also agree that, since the enjoyment of this ultimate good “comprises true blessedness,” ethics “far surpasses other teachings in both usefulness and worthiness.” As Abelard understood them, both fundamental elements of his twelfth-century ethical culture — Greek philosophy and Christian religion — held a common view of the nature of ethical inquiry, one that was so obvious to them that his characters do not even state it in a fully explicit way. They take for granted, as we take the ground we stand on, the premise that the most important function of ethical theory is to tell you what sort of life is most desirable, or most worth living. That is, the point of ethics is that it is good for you, that it serves your self-interest.


Author(s):  
Ann Cecilie Bergene ◽  
Ida Drange

This article explores a potential socialization effect of unions on member preferences in wage outcomes and bargaining structures. This challenges notions of union wage policies simply reflecting the material self-interest of their constituency.  In their formative role, unions can either propagate more redistribution in society, that is, increasing equality, or increasing societal inequalities, arguing instead for equity. However, equity could be measured either individually or collectively, where the latter would mean increasing societal wage inequalities while favouring intra-union equality. By putting perspectives on worker preferences and political economic theories in dialogue with the literature on the role of unions in constructing notions of equality/equity, we discuss on union strategy as it relates to their socialization effects and members’ attitudes towards income inequality and bargaining structures. Analysing survey data, we find that socioeconomic status has greater influence on preferred wage outcomes, while union membership has more influence over bargaining structure.


Author(s):  
Onur Ulas Ince

This chapter examines Edmund Burke’s arguments on the Anglo-Indian trade and the British rule in Bengal. In contrast to the culturalist interpretations of Burke’s position on the British Empire, the chapter brings Burke’s political economic writings to bear on his efforts to maintain the empire in India while expunging its illiberal economic aspects. Behind Burke’s attempt to reform the Indian administration and impeach Warren Hastings, it is argued, was the East India Company’s systematic violation of the liberal economic principles that defined the British character as a commercial society. Burke openly castigated the illiberal extractive policies being used in India and sequestered them from the essentially liberal conception of British commercial society. His condemnation of Company policies in India can therefore be understood as an attempt to shore up the increasingly blurred distinctions between civilized commerce and unabashed pillage, between enlightened self-interest and unbridled rapacity, and between “imperial commerce” and “imperious commerce.”


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 1693-1709 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atina Krajewska

The Constitutional Treaty was thought to address the new challenges occurring in front of the enlarged Europe in relation to the rapidly changing international political, economic, social and cultural circumstances. In this respect, the problem of the new quality of the European Union is being repeatedly disputed. If the EU is to be something more than an arrangement for inter-state cooperation, the Union has to be able to act rationally on a collective basis, in a way that different interests or preferences will give priority to seeking agreement over self-interest maximization. The question of whether the EU envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty represents a deeper form of integration can be answered by examining its ability to achieve consensus on conflicting issues and to form a common will about how to solve common problems. The field in which the most controversies arise nowadays is that of biotechnology and biomedicine.


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 264-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Slote

As a motive, self-interest is constituted by a certain kind of concern for oneself; but we also use the term “self-interest” to refer to the object of such a motive, to the well-being or good life sought by a self-interested agent. In this essay, I want to concentrate on self-interest in the latter sense and say something about how self-interest or well-being relates to virtue. One reason to be interested in this relationship stems from our concern to know whether virtue pays, i.e., is in the moral agent's self-interest, a question which Plato notably asks in the Republic and which has been of concern to moral philosophers ever since. But the importance for ethics of notions like virtue and self-interest is hardly exhausted by their role in the debate over whether virtue pays; indeed, any large-scale ethical theory will presumably have something to say about how these major notions relate, so we have reason to want to understand this relationship independent of the particular desire to show that morality or virtue is in the self-interest of the (virtuous) agent.It will be a background assumption of this essay that some ways of connecting virtue and well-being/self-interest redound to the advantage of the larger theories that incorporate them. If, in particular, we believe in the bona fides of ethical theory, then unifying power is a desideratum in ethics and it stands in favor of utilitarianism (and Epicureanism) that it offers us a way of unifying our understanding of virtue and well-being. To be sure, that advantage may to some extent or ultimately be undercut if unification leads to counterintuitive ethical consequences.


2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 538-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Roth Singerman

AbstractThis article shows how John Maynard Keynes's lifelong commitment to eugenics was deeply embedded in his political, economic, and philosophical work. At the turn of the century, eugenics seemed poised to grant industrial nations unprecedented control over their own future, but that potential depended on contested understandings of the biological mechanisms of inheritance. Early in his career, Keynes helped William Bateson, Britain's chief proponent of Mendelian genetics, analyze problems in human heredity. Simultaneously, Keynes publicly opposed the efforts by Francis Galton and Karl Pearson to study inheritance through statistical biometry. For Keynes, this conflict was morally laden: Mendelism incorporated the only ethical theory of uncertainty, while biometry rested on false and dangerous concepts. This early study of heredity shaped Keynes's visions of industrial democracy after 1918. Liberals looked for a system of societal and economic management to engineer an escape from the postwar Malthusian trap. Britain's economic plight, Keynes argued, was rooted in the hereditary weaknesses of its leadership. Successful technocratic liberalism would depend on control over the quality as well as quantity of human beings. Ultimately, in his essay “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren,” Keynes predicted that effective eugenic management would bring about capitalism's end.


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