From A to B: On “Critique and Morals”

2019 ◽  
pp. 36-52
Author(s):  
Karl Ameriks
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Nature And Grace ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

This chapter gives an account of the transition from Kant’s publishing of the first edition (“A”) of his Critique of Pure Reason and his decision to focus on the topic of morals by suddenly writing a book called the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The interpretation of this transition contrasts with the stress on Christian Garve in recent work by Eckart Förster, in a chapter called “Critique and Morals,” but it agrees with him about the significance in this era of the project of establishing philosophy as a science. A special emphasis is placed on Kant’s intense concern with absolute freedom during this period and with his desire to show that he can present a better account of the realms of “nature” and “grace” than can other philosophers.

Recent Work on the Critique of Pure Reason

1979 ◽  
Vol 29 (117) ◽  
pp. 345
Author(s):  
Leslie Stevenson ◽  
C. D. Broad ◽  
C. Lewy ◽  
Ralph C. S. Walker ◽  
Ted Honderich
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason

Identity, Appearances, and Things in Themselves

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ermanno Bencivenga
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

In his lucid and perceptive essay, “Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy”, Karl Ameriks signals Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as one of the (two) “central issues” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason why the issue is central (and complicated) is that Kant appears to say contradictory things on the matter. At times he says (or implies) that appearances are the same as things in themselves, and at other times he says (or implies) that they are different. Some interpreters have tried to make sense of these contradictions by claiming that “although for Kant there are not two objects involved, there are still two transcendental and intelligible aspects or points of view that are called for by his doctrine of things in themselves and appearances”. However, it is not immediately clear what kind of an animal an aspect or a point of view is, what kind of operation it is to “look at” an object from such different points of view, and what kind of results this operation is supposed to give. In the present paper, I make a fresh proposal. I propose to interpret Kant's conflicting claims on the relation between things in themselves and appearances in terms of the contemporary framework of possible-world semantics.

Spontaneity and Self-Consciousness in theGroundworkand the B-Critique

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (7) ◽  
pp. 936-955
Author(s):  
Yoon Choi
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals ◽  
First Time

AbstractAccording to some influential readings of theGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and the significance of such self-consciousness is irremediably at odds with the Critical theory, and thus roundly and rightly rejected in the second edition of theCritique of Pure Reasonand theCritique of Practical Reason. This paper argues, on the contrary, that theGroundworkcan be read as articulating for the first time the account of self-consciousness and spontaneity that Kant goes on to develop in the B-Critique, especially the B-Transcendental Deduction.

Kant's Conceptus Cosmicus

Dialogue ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-300
Author(s):  
J. Ralph Lindgren
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

“Odd though it may be” writes Lewis White Beck, “The Critique of Practical Reason is a neglected work. There is no study of it in any language that can compare favorably with the commentaries on the Critique of Pure Reason. …” This remark reveals a striking condition within Kantian studies. For more than a century and a half scholars have devoted their efforts to the first and third Critiques to the neglect of the second. Professor Beck suggests two reasons for this condition. First, that the Practical Reason is, relative to the Pure Reason and the Judgment, simple and straightforward. Second, that most scholars prefer, when treating Kant's ethical doctrine, the shorter Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Kants kritische Psychologie als Aufklärung

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-273
Author(s):  
Hyeongjoo Kim ◽  
Carina Pape
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Complete Rejection ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

Kant’s Material Condition of Real Possibility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
Material Condition

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.

Epilogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction

This brief chapter summarizes central findings regarding the role of parenthetical sentences in practical discourse. But it also provides historical context. It suggests that a precursor of parentheticalism may be found in Kant, especially in Kant’s views about the “I think,” especially as they are expressed in the B-Version of the “Transcendental Deduction” and the B-Version of the chapter on Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason.

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