Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism

This chapter responds primarily to a recent criticism of Kant by Stephen Houlgate. Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Houlgate’s severe critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant’s Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant’s idealism and his general Critical procedure, the chapter defends Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also gives an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of difficult passages in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

Revisiting Freedom as Autonomy

This chapter responds in detail to two recent discussions of Kant’s notion of freedom. Jörg Noller’s book argues, in part against Kant, for a graduated concept of degrees of freedom that might help make sense of the phenomenon of evil. Owen Ware, in articles on the notions of “fact” and “will,” revisits Kant’s transition from his argument in the Groundwork to his reliance, in the Critique of Practical Reason, on the notion of a “fact of reason.” I agree with most of Noller’s nuanced historical approach but do not endorse his view on degrees of freedom as a needed improvement of Kant. In reaction to Ware, I agree that there are many elements of continuity between Kant’s Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, but I disagree with his argument against the now common view that the latter work involves a significant “reversal” in Kant’s methodology in arguing for freedom.

From A to B: On “Critique and Morals”

This chapter gives an account of the transition from Kant’s publishing of the first edition (“A”) of his Critique of Pure Reason and his decision to focus on the topic of morals by suddenly writing a book called the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The interpretation of this transition contrasts with the stress on Christian Garve in recent work by Eckart Förster, in a chapter called “Critique and Morals,” but it agrees with him about the significance in this era of the project of establishing philosophy as a science. A special emphasis is placed on Kant’s intense concern with absolute freedom during this period and with his desire to show that he can present a better account of the realms of “nature” and “grace” than can other philosophers.

On the Many Senses of “Self-Determination”

This chapter begins by noting a number of basic meanings that “determination” has for Kant: causal, epistemic, formal, and normative, in the sense of defining a “vocation” for the individual and humanity as a whole. These distinctions are employed in a reinterpretation of the difficult transition in Kant’s argument connecting Sections II and III of the Groundwork. In this context, a new reading is given of Kant’s “Formula of Autonomy,” one of the basic meanings of his categorical imperative. It is argued that it is primarily the autonomy of the faculty of reason and its appreciation of an absolutely necessary norm that is Kant’s main concern. It is also argued that Kant’s notion of autonomy should not be understood in a loose, anarchic way, nor in such a way that free action against morality, that is, evil, is not clearly possible.

Universality, Necessity, and Law in General in Kant

The first part of this chapter distinguishes different basic senses of the terms “universality,” “necessity,” and “law” in Kant: strict vs. loose; strong particular vs. weak general; logical vs. metaphysical vs. transcendental; constitutive vs. regulative; for judgment, vs. system, vs. reason; re modality, math, morals, or mind. In addition, practical and theoretical contexts are distinguished. In the second part, these distinctions are used in slightly amending a general definition, offered by Eric Watkins of the notion of law with regard nature and also to morality. Use is also made of recent work by Michela Massimi on the modern idea that laws of nature can be understood as commanded. Throughout, Kant’s interest in a strict and absolutely necessary sense of law is emphasized.

Introduction to an Extended Era

In addition to outlining the chapters that follow, this introduction distinguishes three relevant meanings attached to the notion of “Kantian subjects.” The first meaning concerns the fact that a number of subjects, in the sense of a wide range of topics, are worthy of contemporary study on account of Kant’s Critical philosophy in general. The second meaning concerns the more specific point that Kant’s Critical philosophy has a specific conception of being a subject, one which deserves close examination and defense. The third meaning concerns that fact that in the wake of the development of post-Kantian philosophy there has developed a general cultural notion of what it is to be a subject in the era after Kant’s, that is, the late modern period. A new conception of philosophical methodology and historical self-consciousness arises in this context.

Once Again

This chapter offers a first detailed discussion of Kant’s late essay on “the end of all things.” The essay has many layers, concerning not only the topic of immortality but also the general notion of an apocalypse. This chapter distinguishes temporal and ethical aspects of Kant’s notion of an “end,” at both individual and global levels, and notes his special stress on the human tendency to keep repeating a concern with this issue, which shows that it is a basic idea of reason. It also offers a first defense of Kant’s complex notion of “noumenal duration,” which is his final attempt to make sense of the combined temporal and non-temporal aspects of the person, especially in light of the doctrine of transcendental idealism.

On Some Reactions to “Kant’s Tragic Problem”

Nietzsche describes “Kant’s tragic problem” as a matter of making things seem “relative” and thereby giving art a “new dignity.” What Nietzsche means by “tragedy” here is not a matter of pain or ethical conflict but rather the impact of modern science and Kant’s Critical philosophy, which teaches that our theoretical knowledge is limited in principle to phenomena and does not reach unconditioned reality. This is not a form of skepticism or nihilism, but it does imply that the search for such knowledge can be considered secondary to other human interests. This chapter argues that this position also fits well the outlook of the aesthetic approach of Kant and the Early German Romantics. To make this case, it argues against suggestions, coming from a Hegelian direction, by Frederick Beiser and Robert Pippin, that the Kantian aesthetics and Romantic philosophy are overly subjective.

History, Succession, and German Romanticism

This chapter defends Early German Romanticism, defined by Schlegel and Novalis as “progressive,” “universal,” and “poetic,” as offering an ideal philosophy of history. The elliptical shape of the Romantic account is contrasted favorably with the other alternatives: linear, circular, and chaotic, each of which can be characterized in either simple or complex forms. The chapter explains how the Romantic terms have precise systematic meanings: the “progressive” characteristic concerns democratic ethics, the “universal” characteristic concerns a rational, philosophical approach, and the “poetic” characteristic concerns a way of writing with regard to history that aims at being maximally effective by being broadly aesthetic in style. Hölderlin’s work, and especially his poem, “Celebration of Peace,” is analyzed as an ideal presentation of this conception of history, one that builds on the Kantian notion of a succession of exemplary geniuses as crucial to history’s elliptical progress.

History, Idealism, and Schelling

This chapter places Schelling’s philosophy in the context of the general historical turn of German Idealism. It notes the many phases of Schelling’s career and his move from an early highly systematic approach that stresses the non-scientific character of history, toward a later more aesthetic and nuanced teleological approach that shows an appreciation for history, including religion and mythology, precisely because of its open and not entirely rational character. Following the interpretation of Odo Marquard and Dieter Jähnig, the chapter argues for the continuing relevance of Schelling’s philosophical notion of history, and also explains how its idealism in no way undermines its basically objective orientation.