scholarly journals Rights and Persons— Hohfeldian Analysis

Author(s):  
Visa A.J. Kurki

The chapter criticizes the Orthodox View of legal personhood for being internally inconsistent and simplistic as well as lacking in explanatory power. It focuses on four different formulations of the Orthodox View, and points out various deficiencies in all of them. The main criticism is that all of the formulations—when assessed in light of contemporary theories of rights—fail to explain jurists’ widely held convictions regarding who or what is a legal person. The critique is based on the Hohfeldian analysis of legal relations, which is also presented in this chapter.

Author(s):  
Eliza Mik

Cyclical advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) are usually accompanied by theories advocating the granting of legal personhood to sophisticated, autonomous computers. This chapter criticizes such theories as incorrect—a possible result of legal scholars being seduced by incomprehensible technical terminology, sensationalistic stories in the popular press, and ‘creative’ photo filters that transform our faces into animals. Discussions as to when computers should be recognized as persons are, logically, outside of the scope of intellectual property law. The granting of legal personhood is not premised on the existence of consciousness, intelligence, or creativity. Recognizing an entity as a legal person is a normative choice dictated by commercial expediency, not the result of fulfilling any technical criteria. While it is necessary to acknowledge the blurring of borders between art and (computer) science, as well as the increase in the technological sophistication of the tools used by authors and inventors, it is also necessary to state that even an exponential increase in ‘computer creativity’ will not sever the link between the computer and its user. Before discarding the idea of legal personhood for ‘creative algorithms’ once and for all, the chapter explores the relationships between autonomy and creativity. In particular, it places technical terms such as ‘AI’ and ‘autonomy’ in their original context and criticizes uninformed attempts to imbue them with normative connotations.


Human Ecology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-453
Author(s):  
C.Y. Bataille ◽  
K. Luke ◽  
T. Kruger ◽  
S. Malinen ◽  
R.B. Allen ◽  
...  

Abstract The global emphasis on stakeholder engagement in protected area management has increased over the last three decades. Here we present key values of statutory and non-statutory stakeholder groups as they relate to their relationship with the former Te Urewera National Park (NP), New Zealand, which is now recognised as “a legal entity” with “all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.” Non-statutory stakeholders conveyed a close, personal connection to Te Urewera NP in terms of heritage and legacy, which include both consumptive (e.g., hunting; fishing) and non-consumptive use (e.g., sight-seeing, hiking, boating). In contrast, statutory stakeholders expressed a more distant and procedural relationship with the park. Both stakeholder groups perceived the possible transfer of ownership or governance of Te Urewera NP to Tūhoe (the Indigenous Māori peoples of the Te Urewera region) favourably and expressed a desire to be engaged in the future stewardship of the NP. Stakeholders considered the fostering of relations with Tūhoe and other stakeholder groups as important to nurturing and maintaining their links with the area in future. Importantly, common interests that emerge from these relationships can increase mutual understanding between cultures and willingness to collaborate. Moreover, we posit that the legal personhood status for protected areas will be a powerful tool for reconciling pluralistic values and enable deliberative processes and flexible modes of collaboration between Indigenous peoples and non-indigenous stakeholders.


Author(s):  
Visa A.J. Kurki

The chapter scrutinizes the legal personhood of artificial intelligences (AIs). It starts by distinguishing three relevant contexts. Most discussions of AI legal personhood focus either on the moral value of AIs (ultimate-value context); on whether AIs could or should be held responsible (responsibility context); or on whether they could acquire a more independent role in commercial transactions (commercial context). The chapter argues that so-called strong AIs—capable of performing similar tasks as human beings—can indeed function as legal persons regardless of whether such AIs are worthy of moral consideration. If an AI can function as a legal person, it can be granted legal personhood on somewhat similar grounds as a human collectivity. The majority of the chapter is focused on the role of AIs in commercial contexts, and new theoretical tools are proposed that would help distinguish different commercial AI legal personhood arrangements.


Author(s):  
Paul Waldau

This chapter contrasts the dominant sense of the phrase “animals as legal subjects,” which minimizes fundamental protections for nonhuman animals, with alternative senses of the same phrase that focus on nonhuman animals’ realities, such as consciousness and intelligence. Support for the alternatives comes from developments within different domains, including legal education and society more broadly, where the meaning of such phrases as “legal person,” “legal personhood,” and “legal rights” is being debated regarding companion animals, wildlife, and many other forms of life. The upshot of the debate taking place over the status of nonhuman animals in law and broader phenomenon of human exceptionalism is a wide-ranging discussion of additional forms of animal protection.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-76
Author(s):  
Christoph Menke

"Das Rechtssystem geht davon aus, dass der Mensch – und nur der Mensch – eine natürliche Person ist. Das sei ein Irrtum, argumentiert Malte-Christian Gruber, denn die Rechtssubjektivität wird keineswegs alleine mit dem bloßen Menschsein begründet. Es ist die sittliche Autonomie, die den Menschen zu einem »Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind« (Kant) und mithin zur Person macht. Personen werden nicht mit dem Menschsein als solchem identifiziert, sondern durch die Zuschreibung von Handlungs- und Rechtsträgerschaft. Eine solche funktionale Vorstellung von Rechtssubjektivität ist prinzipiell auch dazu imstande, neben Menschen noch weitere autonome Agenten als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten ein- zusetzen, z.B. technische Artefakte und andere nicht-menschliche Agenten. Christoph Menke macht dagegen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Erfindung neuer Rechte das eigentliche Bewegungsgesetz der politischen Emanzipation in der Moderne war. Das begann mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen und ist immer noch das generelle Modell, mit dem Politik und Theorie operieren, die neue Rechte für nicht-menschliche Lebewesen und Artefakte einfordern. So wie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die rechtliche Emanzipation zunächst über die Grenzen bürgerlicher Subjektivität hinausgeführt hat und soziale und kulturelle Rechte erfand, so sollen wir nun den weiteren, konsequenten Schritt tun und auch noch die Bindung der juridischen Anerkennung an die Kategorie menschlicher Subjektivität aufbrechen. Auch Bio- und Artefakte sollen als eigenständige Rechtssubjekte rekonstruiert werden. Es fehlt ihnen allerdings etwas, das in den emanzipatorischen Kämpfen der Vergangenheit schlechthin grundlegend war: Ein Träger von Rechten zu sein, hieß, ein Fordernder von Rechten, ja, ein Kämpfer für Rechte gewesen zu sein. Man konnte keine rechtliche Person als Träger von Rechten sein, ohne ein politisches Subjekt als Kämpfer und Denker von Rechten gewesen zu sein. Wenn die Bindung der rechtlichen Personalität an die menschliche Subjektivität aufgelöst wird, damit es Bio- und Artefakt-Rechte geben kann, löst sich zugleich auch diese Einheit von rechtlicher Personalität und politischer Subjektivität auf, die die moderne Idee der Rechte definiert hatte. The legal system assumes that human beings – and only human beings – are natural persons. That is erroneous, argues Malte-Christian Gruber, because legal subjectivity isn’t founded in humanity alone. It is moral autonomy that makes man into a “subject whose actions are capable of attribution” (Kant) and thus into a person. Personhood is not identified with being human as such, but by the attribution of actions and legal ownership. Besides human beings, such a functional concept of legal subjectivity can in principle also be applied to other autonomous agents as holder of rights and obligations, e.g. techno- logical artifacts and other non-human agents. Christoph Menke in turn points out that the invention of new rights was the actual law of motion of political emancipation in modern times. This began with the bourgeois revolutions and is still the general model with which politics and theory operate to claim new rights for non-human creatures and artifacts. Just as in the 19th and 20th centuries, the legal emancipation initially led beyond the limits of bourgeois subjectivity and in- vented social and cultural rights, so should we make a further consequent step and break with the dependence of juridical recognition on the category of human subjectivity. Also bio- and artifacts are to be reconstructed as independent legal entities. However, they lack something that was absolutely fundamental in the emancipatory struggles of the past: to be a subject of rights meant to have demanded rights, indeed, to have been a fighter for rights. One could not be a legal person and holder of rights without having been a political subject as fighter and thinker of rights. To suspend the dependence of legal personhood on human subjectivity so that there may be bio- and artifact-rights also means to dissolve the unity between legal personality and political subjectivity that once defined the modern idea of rights. "


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-70
Author(s):  
Malte-Christian Gruber

"Das Rechtssystem geht davon aus, dass der Mensch – und nur der Mensch – eine natürliche Person ist. Das sei ein Irrtum, argumentiert Malte-Christian Gruber, denn die Rechtssubjektivität wird keineswegs alleine mit dem bloßen Menschsein begründet. Es ist die sittliche Autonomie, die den Menschen zu einem »Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind« (Kant) und mithin zur Person macht. Personen werden nicht mit dem Menschsein als solchem identifiziert, sondern durch die Zuschreibung von Handlungs- und Rechtsträgerschaft. Eine solche funktionale Vorstellung von Rechtssubjektivität ist prinzipiell auch dazu imstande, neben Menschen noch weitere autonome Agenten als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten ein- zusetzen, z.B. technische Artefakte und andere nicht-menschliche Agenten. Christoph Menke macht dagegen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Erfindung neuer Rechte das eigentliche Bewegungsgesetz der politischen Emanzipation in der Moderne war. Das begann mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen und ist immer noch das generelle Modell, mit dem Politik und Theorie operieren, die neue Rechte für nicht-menschliche Lebewesen und Artefakte einfordern. So wie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die rechtliche Emanzipation zunächst über die Grenzen bürgerlicher Subjektivität hinausgeführt hat und soziale und kulturelle Rechte erfand, so sollen wir nun den weiteren, konsequenten Schritt tun und auch noch die Bindung der juridischen Anerkennung an die Kategorie menschlicher Subjektivität aufbrechen. Auch Bio- und Artefakte sollen als eigenständige Rechtssubjekte rekonstruiert werden. Es fehlt ihnen allerdings etwas, das in den emanzipatorischen Kämpfen der Vergangenheit schlechthin grundlegend war: Ein Träger von Rechten zu sein, hieß, ein Fordernder von Rechten, ja, ein Kämpfer für Rechte gewesen zu sein. Man konnte keine rechtliche Person als Träger von Rechten sein, ohne ein politisches Subjekt als Kämpfer und Denker von Rechten gewesen zu sein. Wenn die Bindung der rechtlichen Personalität an die menschliche Subjektivität aufgelöst wird, damit es Bio- und Artefakt-Rechte geben kann, löst sich zugleich auch diese Einheit von rechtlicher Personalität und politischer Subjektivität auf, die die moderne Idee der Rechte definiert hatte. The legal system assumes that human beings – and only human beings – are natural persons. That is erroneous, argues Malte-Christian Gruber, because legal subjectivity isn’t founded in humanity alone. It is moral autonomy that makes man into a “subject whose actions are capable of attribution” (Kant) and thus into a person. Personhood is not identified with being human as such, but by the attribution of actions and legal ownership. Besides human beings, such a functional concept of legal subjectivity can in principle also be applied to other autonomous agents as holder of rights and obligations, e.g. techno- logical artifacts and other non-human agents. Christoph Menke in turn points out that the invention of new rights was the actual law of motion of political emancipation in modern times. This began with the bourgeois revolutions and is still the general model with which politics and theory operate to claim new rights for non-human creatures and artifacts. Just as in the 19th and 20th centuries, the legal emancipation initially led beyond the limits of bourgeois subjectivity and in- vented social and cultural rights, so should we make a further consequent step and break with the dependence of juridical recognition on the category of human subjectivity. Also bio- and artifacts are to be reconstructed as independent legal entities. However, they lack something that was absolutely fundamental in the emancipatory struggles of the past: to be a subject of rights meant to have demanded rights, indeed, to have been a fighter for rights. One could not be a legal person and holder of rights without having been a political subject as fighter and thinker of rights. To suspend the dependence of legal personhood on human subjectivity so that there may be bio- and artifact-rights also means to dissolve the unity between legal personality and political subjectivity that once defined the modern idea of rights. "


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID GINDIS

AbstractFrom the legal point of view, ‘person’ is not co-extensive with ‘human being’. Nor is it synonymous with ‘rational being’ or ‘responsible subject’. Much of the confusion surrounding the issue of the firm's legal personality is due to the tendency to address the matter with only these, all too often conflated, definitions of personhood in mind. On the contrary, when the term ‘person’ is defined in line with its original meaning as ‘mask’ worn in the legal drama, it is easy to see that it is only the capacity to attract legal relations that defines the legal person. This definition, that avoids the undesirable emotional associations and equivocations that often plague the debate, is important for a legally grounded view of the firm.


Author(s):  
Visa A.J. Kurki

The chapter assesses the rather popular claim that anything can be endowed with legal personhood. This ‘everything-goes’ view is often supported by examples such as the putative legal personhood of Indian idols and the Whanganui River in New Zealand. The chapter exposes a conflation of two senses of the phrase ‘legal person’, which can refer both to the holders of legal positions (rights and duties) or to the legal positions themselves. This conflation often underlies the everything-goes view, rendering it unsustainable. Instead, one must either have the capacity to act or the capacity for claim-rights in order to qualify as a potential legal person. As rivers can neither act nor hold claim-rights, rivers cannot be legal persons. The Whanganui River arrangement should rather be understood as endowing a collectivity—the Maori and other sentient beings who are dependent on the river—with legal personhood.


Author(s):  
Visa A.J. Kurki

This chapter examines corporate legal personhood as well as the legal status of collectivities in general. It exposes a number of problems the Orthodox View has as regards the rights and duties of collectivities. For instance, many constitutions and human rights documents recognize the rights of minorities, but minorities are regardless generally not taken to be corporations or legal persons. The chapter offers a different explanation of corporations. It applies social ontology to argue that even non-incorporated group agents can hold legal rights. Regardless, such groups are not legal persons. What distinguishes corporations from other groups is not that they hold rights, but rather that they are endowed with a significant number of the incidents of legal personhood: they can own property, sue, and so on. The chapter concludes by considering whether collectives that are not group agents could be legal persons.


Author(s):  
Visa A.J. Kurki

This chapter introduces the reader to the topic of legal personhood. It presents the central concepts, terminology, and legal doctrines pertaining to legal personhood, and explains the relevance of the notion for various contemporary legal debates. The chapter also presents the book’s methodology, which is a version of the reflective equilibrium. It thus lays the groundwork for one of the central theses the book: that the Orthodox View of legal personhood is unable to explain many of the convictions regarding legal personhood that are accepted widely by jurists in the Western world.


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