Critical Discussion of the Belief Model
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Chapter 6 argues that most of the reductive assumptions put forward by the Belief Model are wrong. It rejects the view that suspended judgement is nothing but the absence of belief and disbelief, and likewise rejects the view that disbelief is nothing but belief-in-negation. Thought experiments demonstrate that all three types of coarse-grained attitude are self-standing elements of our rational architecture. It is shown that norms for belief put forward by the Belief Model do not morph automatically into norms for disbelief or suspended judgement. Then it is shown that the model’s main transition rule does not function at all like rational shift of belief in ordinary life.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series A Physical and Engineering Sciences
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1994 ◽
Vol 349
(1689)
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pp. 133-146
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1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 210-211
1977 ◽
Vol 35
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pp. 260-261
1990 ◽
Vol 48
(4)
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pp. 928-929
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2020 ◽
Vol 29
(3S)
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pp. 638-647
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