Conditional Commitment and the Ramsey Test

2020 ◽  
pp. 197-218
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Chapter 7 is a critical discussion of conditional commitment in both the Bayesian and the Belief model. Both use their treatment of conditional commitment as something to connect their theory of states with their respective transition theory. In doing so both models are immediately hit with technical difficulties. The Belief Model generates the ‘impossibility theorem’ first proved by Peter Gärdenfors, and the Bayesian model generates ‘triviality results’ first proved by David Lewis. Each of these technical areas is explained from scratch and diagnosed philosophically. It is argued that the bombshells discussed are best seen as showing that the Binary-Attitude Assumption is false when it comes to conditional commitment, and that there is no essential tie between conditional commitment and rational shift-in-view. Throughout the discussion the 3-place theory of conditionality is related back to Chapter 4’s restricted-vision approach to conditionality.

Author(s):  
R.A. Briggs

According to Adams’ thesis the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. According to Stalnaker semantics, a conditional is true at a world just in case its consequent is true at all closest antecedent worlds to the original world. The chapter argues that Adams’ thesis and Stalnaker semantics are ways of cashing out the same ‘Ramsey test’ idea. Unfortunately, a well-known class of triviality theorems shows that Adams’ thesis and Stalnaker semantics are incompatible. Stefan Kaufmann has proposed (for reasons largely independent of the triviality theorems) a revised version of Adams’ thesis, which the chapter calls Kaufmann’s thesis. The chapter proves that combining Kaufmann’s thesis with Stalnaker semantics leads to ‘local triviality’ results, which seem just as absurd as the original triviality results for Adams’ thesis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 180-196
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Chapter 6 argues that most of the reductive assumptions put forward by the Belief Model are wrong. It rejects the view that suspended judgement is nothing but the absence of belief and disbelief, and likewise rejects the view that disbelief is nothing but belief-in-negation. Thought experiments demonstrate that all three types of coarse-grained attitude are self-standing elements of our rational architecture. It is shown that norms for belief put forward by the Belief Model do not morph automatically into norms for disbelief or suspended judgement. Then it is shown that the model’s main transition rule does not function at all like rational shift of belief in ordinary life.


Studia Logica ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G�rdenfors

2020 ◽  
pp. 155-179
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Chapter 5 is an introduction to the AGM model of belief revision. It begins with an explanation of belief and how sets of sentences are used to model psychological states of an agent. The model’s norms are shown to flow directly from Jamesian ideas that inquiry targets truth and the avoidance of error. Suspended judgement and disbelief are discussed, and the model’s treatment of them is used to spell out its transition rules. Slowly and carefully the main technical idea in the model’s transition theory—known as ‘partial meet contraction’—is explained for the beginner. The model’s postulates are then listed, its revision theorem is explained, and its approach to conditional belief is spelled out. The chapter closes by describing a notionally possible agent, Bella, whose psychology matches the Belief Model.


2020 ◽  
pp. 61-100
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Chapter 3 is a critical discussion of the Bayesian theory of states. It argues that our psychology includes many more types of confidence than Bayesian credence. There is an extended discussion of the missing types of confidence—from both a functionalist and intuitive point of view. Conditional credence is discussed and it’s shown that the Bayesian way of thinking of it—baked into the formalism—is wrong. It is argued that conditional credence is a fundamental part of our rational psychology. Three attempts are then considered to generalize the Bayesian model: one uses midpoints of mathematical intervals, one uses midpoints along with 3-place psychological attitudes, and one uses richly membered sets of probability functions. It is argued that none of the generalizations work very well.


Author(s):  
Robert Stalnaker

A critical discussion of David Lewis’s two-dimensional framework for doing semantics. Lewis’s framework has the same abstract structure as David Kaplan’s semantics for demonstratives, where the truth-value of a sentence is defined as a function of two parameters, one of which is a context. This chapter focuses on the notion of context that is common to the two frameworks, arguing that it is not suited to play the pragmatic role that we need a notion of context to play. The technical notion that both Kaplan and Lewis call ‘context’ plays several different roles in the explanation of speech that need to be distinguished, and this notion also needs to be distinguished from a pragmatic notion of context as the body of information that is available for the determination of what is said.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3S) ◽  
pp. 638-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine F. J. Meijerink ◽  
Marieke Pronk ◽  
Sophia E. Kramer

Purpose The SUpport PRogram (SUPR) study was carried out in the context of a private academic partnership and is the first study to evaluate the long-term effects of a communication program (SUPR) for older hearing aid users and their communication partners on a large scale in a hearing aid dispensing setting. The purpose of this research note is to reflect on the lessons that we learned during the different development, implementation, and evaluation phases of the SUPR project. Procedure This research note describes the procedures that were followed during the different phases of the SUPR project and provides a critical discussion to describe the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken. Conclusion This research note might provide researchers and intervention developers with useful insights as to how aural rehabilitation interventions, such as the SUPR, can be developed by incorporating the needs of the different stakeholders, evaluated by using a robust research design (including a large sample size and a longer term follow-up assessment), and implemented widely by collaborating with a private partner (hearing aid dispensing practice chain).


1997 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 847-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
LIDIA SMENTEK ◽  
B.ANDES HESS

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