Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Stefano Predelli
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Truth In Fiction ◽  
Logical Status ◽  
Preliminary Description

This introduction presents a concise plan for the book, and it provides a sketch of the sense of ‘fictionalism’ relevant for what will follow. It also anticipates the relationships between Radical Fictionalism and so-called non-realist views of fictional discourse, it sketches the consequences of Radical Fictionalism for the distinction between storyworld and periphery, and it introduces the reverberations of Radical Fictionalism on some central themes in the study of narrative. Three homages serve as an indirect preliminary description of the background for Radical Fictionalism, namely Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe, David Lewis’ ‘Truth in Fiction’, and John Searle’s ‘The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse’.

Reflex and Bone Structure

2020 ◽  
pp. 110-131
Author(s):  
Stefano Predelli
Keyword(s):  
Bone Structure ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Narrative Fiction ◽  
Truth In Fiction ◽  
Starting Point

This chapter covers some central topics related to narrative fiction, taking as its starting point the Radical Fictionalist focus on peripheral discourse and fictional telling. In particular, the chapter discusses certain features of allegedly inconsistent fictions and of storyworld importation, with particular attention to the theory in David Lewis’ ‘Truth in Fiction’ and to the case of postmodernist literature. The chapter also discusses some aspects of unreliable narratives, and it puts forth an analysis of alleged cases of importation by appealing to the closure of peripheral discourse. Finally, this chapter defends a Radical Fictionalist take on the distinction between nested and framed narratives.

Whole New People of the Book

2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 24-27
Author(s):  
Aaron Ricker
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Harvard University

A. David Lewis and Martin Lund, eds. 'Muslim Superheroes: Comics, Islam, and Representation'. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 264 pp., 15 illustrations. $24.95, paper.

Introduction to methods of describing the forecast on the risk of failure to the means of transport

2012 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-127
Author(s):  
Henryk Tomaszek ◽  
Ryszard Kaleta ◽  
Mariusz Zieja
Keyword(s):  
Long Range ◽  
Failure Rate ◽  
Risk Of Failure ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Preliminary Description

The paper is an attempt to describe the forecast on the risk of damages resulting from failures to the means of transport. It has been assumed that the product of the probability of failure (fault) occurrence and measures of effects thereof are to be used to estimate the risk. The below presented dependences that describe the risk of damages have been based on the failure rate. With the available literature as the basis, a preliminary description of the probability of a failure (fault) and the level of losses has been proposed. The paper gives dependences on short- and long-range risk forecasts. To determine the relationship for the probability of a failure (fault), the failure rate has been used.

Intentionalist Strategies of Interpretation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Authorial Intention ◽  
Gregory Currie ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Unreliable Narration ◽  
Fictional Truth

This chapter addresses the complaint that extreme intentionalism standardly forces the reader who engages in interpretation to posit private, or hidden, authorial intentions, for which she has little or no evidence. It is first argued that there are no automatic strategies of interpretation of fictional content: at every stage, whether or not a given interpretative strategy is to be appropriately applied depends on the presence of relevant authorial intention as a sanction. (This section includes a discussion, and rejection, of the views of David Lewis and Gregory Currie about fictional truth; a discussion of the relevance of genre to fictional content; and a consideration of the issue of unreliable narration for an intentionalist view.) The foregoing material on strategies of interpretation is then used to show that it is false to think of the extreme intentionalist as being committed to ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’ meanings in the ordinary case.

Only Imagine

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Stock
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Fictional Truth

This book begins with a detailed description and defence of a controversial theory of fictional content (or ‘fictional truth’) known as ‘extreme intentionalism’. On this view, roughly, the fictional content of a particular text is equivalent to exactly what the author of the text intended the reader to imagine. The book situates this theory in relation to its competitors including hypothetical intentionalism, value-maximizing theory, and the influential anti-intentionalism view of David Lewis—and puts forward a strong argument for its superiority, despite its many detractors. In the second half of the book, some consequences of extreme intentionalism are explored as they affect questions such as: the relation of fiction to testimony and belief; whether there are any limits to what we can imagine, and what explains those limits; what is the nature of fiction; to what extent imagination resembles belief; and to what extent the imagination can contribute to the provision of counterfactual and modal knowledge.

David Lewis Meets John Bell

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Butterfield
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis

scholarly journals Philosophy as Synchronic History

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
DANIEL STOLJAR
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
The Way

Abstract Bernard Williams argues that philosophy is in some deep way akin to history. This article is a novel exploration and defense of the Williams thesis (as I call it)—though in a way anathema to Williams himself. The key idea is to apply a central moral from what is sometimes called the analytic philosophy of history of the 1960s to the philosophy of philosophy of today, namely, the separation of explanation and laws. I suggest that an account of causal explanation offered by David Lewis may be modified to bring out the way in which this moral applies to philosophy, and so to defend the Williams thesis. I discuss in detail the consequences of the thesis for the issue of philosophical progress and note also several further implications: for the larger context of contemporary metaphilosophy, for the relation of philosophy to other subjects, and for explaining, or explaining away, the belief that success in philosophy requires a field-specific ability or brilliance.

scholarly journals Necessitism, Contingentism, and Lewisian Modal Realism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Nencha
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Timothy Williamson ◽  
Restricted Quantification

AbstractNecessitism is the controversial thesis that necessarily everything is necessarily something, namely that everything, everywhere, necessarily exists. What is controversial about necessitism is that, at its core, it claims that things could not have failed to exist, while we have a pre-theoretical intuition that not everything necessarily exists. Contingentism, in accordance with common sense, denies necessitism: it claims that some things could have failed to exist. Timothy Williamson is a necessitist and claims that David Lewis is a necessitist too. The paper argues that, granted the assumptions that lead to interpret the Lewisian as a necessitist, she can preserve contingentist intuitions, by genuinely agreeing with the folk that existence is contingent. This is not just the uncontroversial claim that the Lewisian, as a result of the prevalence of restricted quantification in counterpart theoretic regimentations of natural language, can agree with the folk while disagreeing with them in the metaphysical room. Rather, this is the claim that it is in the metaphysical room that the Lewisian can endorse the intuitions lying behind contingentism.

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