A Union of Peoples

Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,

2020 ◽  
pp. 108-143
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This chapter examines the question of the relations between EU law and domestic law from the point of view of a political theory of the European Union. It is common to see EU law under ‘federalism’ or under a theory of ‘statism’. These two views are outlined at the start of this chapter by examining various arguments made for them. They are both rejected. The chapter defends a rival view, the ‘internationalist’ reading of the EU, according to which it is a branch of the law of nations. A careful look at the EU treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU shows that the EU endorses an internationalist model based on equality and reciprocity. The EU does not replace the relation between citizens and political power. It does not establish a new constitutional law that replaces the national ones. It is a new way of organizing the relations between the various member states whose equality it fully respects. The coherence of European Union law is therefore not provided by uniformity imposed by a single master or constitutional rule, but is given by the political coordination of the laws of the member states achieved under the treaties. Coherence is achieved because the member states have adopted similar, although not identical, constitutional principles.


Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C

This chapter discusses the scope of the Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. This is an important issue because if a case is outside their scope, they will not apply. It considers the international and territorial aspects: the rule that the instruments apply only in situations with an international element; and the fact that they apply only to particular territories. All three instruments apply in the European Union as part of EU law. Their territorial scope is, first and foremost, to be determined by looking at the EU Treaties. In the non-EU Parties to Lugano and Hague, the position is different. In those States, the instruments apply by virtue of international law.


Author(s):  
Alisdair Gillespie ◽  
Siobhan Weare

This chapter discusses international sources of law. Conventions and treaties are the primary sources of international law. International law also relies on custom, that is to say informal rules that have been commonly agreed over a period of time. The United Kingdom joined the (then) European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972. As part of the conditions for joining the UK agreed that EEC (now EU) law would become automatically part of the law of the United Kingdom. The principal treaties governing the EU are the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Disputes are adjudicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Whilst the UK has recently voted to leave the EU, it will not do so for at least two years, meaning EU law will remain part of UK law. The United Kingdom is also a member of the Council of Europe, which has issued a number of international Conventions that impact the English Legal System.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 321-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joris Larik

EU external relations law is a doubly peculiar field of scholarship that has attracted significant scholarly attention over the last several decades. It is both part of EU law—considered a “new legal order” distinct from international law—and it is concerned with the European Union as a global actor, a “strange animal” in that the EU is neither a state nor a classical international organization.


Author(s):  
Rupert Dunbar

Article 3(5) of the Treaty on the European Union concerns EU external relations and was a new provision of the Lisbon Treaty. It has been seized upon by scholars for its reference to ‘strict observance of international law’ by the EU in its relations with the wider world. However, recent case law in the Court of Justice of the European Union has demonstrated little movement towards this supposed ideal. This article supports the fact that rigid and unquestioning adherence to international law has not emerged in case law, particularly as Article 3(5) TEU also mandates that the Union ‘uphold and promote its values and interests’. By taking a broader view of both the text and context of Article 3(5) TEU in EU law as a whole, and through consideration of the limited demands international law places on domestic courts, the article argues that – contrary to current literature – a more expressly balanced approach towards respect for international law is required and should be nurtured in the case law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Michael Connolly

On the 13 July of this year, the UK Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 1 more commonly called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’. Aside from the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 (and with it the proposed ousting of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice), the Bill’s purpose is to ‘convert the acquis’ of EU law and preserve any UK law implementing EU law.2 This will include ‘workers’ rights’ and with it their employment discrimination rights.3 The efficacy of such a move will be limited if the British judges fail to adopt the same interpretations of these rights as their counterparts in the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Over the years of Britain’s membership, there have been many references to Luxembourg to clarify the meaning of particular aspects of the discrimination provisions, with the Court generally giving a more liberal interpretation than the domestic courts had suggested would be their preference. One element of the law largely untouched by this process is the objective justification defence to claims of indirect discrimination. This is because the domestic courts have maintained a fiction that their interpretation is consistent with the EU formula. For no apparent reason, the domestic courts have reworded the EU formula while labelling it as being no different. This presents a major challenge for the Bill. It would be all too easy for Parliament to assume all is well with this aspect of workers’ rights, especially when the judges tell them so. Using a handful of cases, this article exposes the shortfalls within the domestic law and suggests some solutions. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the Bill (which no doubt is due for many amendments), but to focus on one important aspect of discrimination law, both pre- and post-Brexit.


Politeja ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3(66)) ◽  
pp. 103-117
Author(s):  
Ewa Kamarad

The Term ‘Spouse’ in EU Law – Comments on the Judgment in the Coman Case (C‑ 673‑16) The paper concerns the judgment of 5 June 2018 issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Coman case (C‑673‑16), in which the Court for the first time defined the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. It discusses the consequences of the judgement and its relation to the traditional mechanisms of private international law and the EU principle of mutual recognition.


Author(s):  
Nanopoulos Eva

This chapter explores the European Union’s relationship and contribution to the international law of global security through the lens of ‘ambivalence’. The reasons for this approach are threefold. First, that relationship oscillates between symbiosis and friction. On the one hand, the European Union (EU) has been gradually integrated into the global security architecture. On the other hand, the EU, as a power bloc and ‘autonomous’ legal community, also provides a source of conflict with, disassociation from, or destabilization of, global security arrangements. Second, the interaction between EU law and global security law, as well as the substantive contribution of the EU to the law of global security, produces mixed results. Finally, the ambivalence of the EU as a ‘global security provider’ has also explanatory value when it comes to contemporary developments and challenges, particularly as they emerge from the EU’s response to the increased ‘questioning’ of the European project and the global liberal order more generally, and that cut across several aspects of global security.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This chapter introduces the central legal and political interpretations of the European Union (EU). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) suggests a federalist legal account when it speaks of EU law as a ‘new legal order’ and as ‘autonomous’ from international law and the law of the member states. This doctrine has met with resistance by the courts of the member states, which have refused to apply EU law without reference to their domestic constitution. The courts’ views can be seen as either a ‘constitutional’ approach, which we find in Neil MacCormick’s ‘pluralism’ under international law, or in the ‘pluralism’ defended by Mattias Kumm, Neil Walker, and others. But the general legal architecture of the EU is not only a theoretical but also a political problem. These legal interpretations correspond to rival political approaches, namely ‘federalism’, ‘statism’, and a new view proposed in this book ‘internationalism’. The most challenging political view of the EU, articulated for example by the historian Noel Malcolm, believes that it is actually a serious risk to self-government and democracy. Any legal and political interpretation of the treaties supporting the legitimacy of the EU requires that we have an effective response to this democratic challenge. Can the EU be democratically legitimate?


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 107-122
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Pacuła

The terms ‘characterization’ (‘classification’) and ‘exercise of characterization’ refer in particular to the efforts made to determine which conflict of law rule — and in the sense presented in this paper, also rule on jurisdiction — which is part of the law of the forum State, should be applied to the circumstances of a particular case. In relation to the norms of private international law of the European Union, the triumph of an autonomous characterization at first sight seems undeniable. The term autonomous characterization (in principle — ‘autonomous interpretation’, the case law usually does not distinguish between exercise of characterization and exercise of interpretation) has been referred to over the last fifty years in order to describe the vast majority of operations of interpretation undertaken in relation to the norms of EU private international law. The contemporary concept of characterization in private law of the European Union, although consistently referred to as ‘autonomous’, does not fully meet the criteria thereof. The papers argues that while the starting point was the autonomous characterization in its pure form (stage one), over time it partially gave way to the place of characterization according to the EU law-oriented legis fori (stage two), and finally it was enriched with new elements which gave it the form of a specific functional characterization (stage three). It is not so much about the consistency of the results of the exercises of characterization with the universal understanding of certain concepts. Exercises of characterization are carried out through the prism of their effects, so as to ensure the effectiveness of the norms of EU law (effet utile) other than rules on conflict of laws and on jurisdiction.


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