A Community of Principle

2020 ◽  
pp. 108-143
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This chapter examines the question of the relations between EU law and domestic law from the point of view of a political theory of the European Union. It is common to see EU law under ‘federalism’ or under a theory of ‘statism’. These two views are outlined at the start of this chapter by examining various arguments made for them. They are both rejected. The chapter defends a rival view, the ‘internationalist’ reading of the EU, according to which it is a branch of the law of nations. A careful look at the EU treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU shows that the EU endorses an internationalist model based on equality and reciprocity. The EU does not replace the relation between citizens and political power. It does not establish a new constitutional law that replaces the national ones. It is a new way of organizing the relations between the various member states whose equality it fully respects. The coherence of European Union law is therefore not provided by uniformity imposed by a single master or constitutional rule, but is given by the political coordination of the laws of the member states achieved under the treaties. Coherence is achieved because the member states have adopted similar, although not identical, constitutional principles.

Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ladislav Vyhnánek

AbstractThe article raises one principle question: Does the Czech Eternity Clause pose a possible threat to a further integration of the European Union? In a concise introductory part, the article analyses the concept of the Eternity Clause of the Czech Constitution from both the substantive and procedural point of view. Afterwards, the article goes on to eval­uate whether certain aspects of the Eternity Clause (as interpreted by the Czech Constitu­tional Court) might indeed create practical problems for the EU. The opinion of the author is that the ‘danger’ is quite negligible. This is mostly due to the fact that the Czech Consti­tutional Court generally (with an exception that is not to be overestimated) adheres to euro-friendly interpretation and it has even interpreted the Eternity Clause itself (espe­cially concepts like democracy or sovereignty) with respect to the logic and nature of Eu­ropean integration. The euro-friendliness of the Czech Constitutional Court is further com­plemented by the respect that the EU law pays to national (especially constitutional) iden­tity of the member states.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 964-983 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Binder

The Commission of the European Union (EU) sees intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as incompatible with the overall structure of European Union law. Against this background, certain Member States have started to terminate their treaties. Also, some of the new Member States have, in their role as Respondents in intra-EU BIT arbitrations, asserted inter alia that the intra-EU BITs had been automatically terminated upon their accession to the EU and that BIT provisions were inapplicable because of the operation of EU law. This contribution deals with these questions from a treaty law perspective and examines the alleged conflict between EU law and intra-EU BITs in investment cases as well as the consensual termination of intra-EU BITs, including the sunset clauses incorporated therein. It argues that if intra-EU BITs are already ‘in action’, their protection usually persists. On the other hand, investors enjoy only limited protection when States agree to terminate an intra-EU BIT by consent.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2021 ◽  
pp. 124-141
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the Treaty framework and sources of EU law as well as the institutions of the EU. It covers the legal background to the UK’s departure from the EU, the legal process through which the UK left the EU, the key provisions of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020), and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. This chapter also discusses the effect of the UK’s departure from the EU on the status of the sources of EU law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well as failure to transpose a Directive into national law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Francovich principle.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


ICL Journal ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
László Blutman ◽  
Nóra Chronowski

AbstractWhile the European Union is in the process of carefully navigating among the various forms of sub-federalism, Member States - including recent ones like Hungary, trying to find an equilibrium between their sovereignty and European supranationalism - have to cope with possible conflicts between their national legal systems and EU law. Since Hungary's accession to the European Union, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has faced questions regarding the constitutionality of EU legal rules and conflicts between European and national legal norms. This article examines these issues and analyzes criteria of constitutional review that the Court has gradually set out in dealing with some of these conflicts. So far, it has established two principles marking the boundaries of future constitutional practice. First, it will treat the founding and amending treaties of the European Union as part of domestic law for the purposes of constitutional review, thereby setting up a two-tier system of legal rules applicable within Hungarian legal practice instead of a possible three-tier construction that would distinguish between national, international and European law. Second, in the absence of jurisdiction to review substantive (un)constitutionality (as opposed to procedural constitutionality), the Constitutional Court does not regard a conflict between domestic law and EU law as a constitutionality issue and this mandates the ordinary courts to resolve such conflict of a sub-constitutional nature. Taking these conclusions as starting points, this article sets out the possible types of conflicts that may occur between EU rules and other legal rules applicable in Hungary, weighing the constitutional relevance of these conflicts; it also outlines the directions along which the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court may develop in this respect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-39
Author(s):  
Kimmo Nuotio

European Union (EU) law is known for its strong emphasis on effectivity and more generally for its instrumental character. This is not foreign even to European criminal law, a feature which creates some tension between the EU criminal law and criminal law in the national setting. EU Framework Decisions and Directives often require the Member States to criminalize certain forms of conduct with sanctions that are ‘Effective, Dissuasive and Proportionate’. In this article, I try to show that it would be timely to look at EU criminal law from an alternative point of view, as a more mature law. I call this a legitimacy-based approach. Such a reading would ease some of these tensions. It would also be helpful in developing a criminal policy for the EU, a policy which would be realistic and pragmatic. And it would be easier to look at EU criminal law from the point of view of justice. In order to get there, we need to see where the (current) narrow deterrence argument gets is wrong or one-sided. Some social theory is needed in order to make the point.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-177
Author(s):  
Sahra Arif

The Achmea judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) found that arbitration clauses in bilateral investment treaties (BITS) between Member States of the European Union are incompatible with European Union law. Following this, Member States attempted to invoke this judgment in relation to similar intra-EU arbitrations under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Tribunals established under the ECT have however generally rejected the applicability of the Achmea judgement. While the EU Commission and the majority of Member States concluded that this judgment also precludes intra-EU ect arbitrations, a few Member States held the opposite view. The future of intra-EU ECT arbitrations therefore seems fragile in the least. A closer analysis of the decisions of ECT Tribunals, and the relationship between obligations under European Union law and international law however argues that the future of such intra-EU ECT arbitrations is not as fragile as it may seem.


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