Corporate Governance, the Craft Brew Alliance, and A-B

2020 ◽  
pp. 299-326
Author(s):  
Neil Maltby
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Craft Beer ◽  
Public Market ◽  
Governance Challenges ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms ◽  
Market Expectations ◽  
Equity Policy ◽  
Over Time

The Craft Brew Alliance (CBA) resulted from the merger of two well-known craft brewers: Redhook Ale Brewery Inc and Widmer Brothers Brewing Co. The CBA was listed on the NASDAQ and the largest shareholder was Anheuser-Busch (A-B). This shareholder relationship violated the Brewers Association equity policy. At the heart of the dispute was the vision of the craft beer movement and disagreement about how brewers should be owned and governed. This chapter examines the corporate governance of one “craft” beer company and analyzes how, over time, this firm’s governance put it at odds with the culture of the industry in which it operated. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to understand the corporate governance challenges of publicly traded firms operating in craft culture, as such firms operate at a crossroads of artisanal tradition and public market expectations.

Did R&D Firms Used to Patent? Evidence from the First Innovation Surveys

2011 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1032-1059 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOM NICHOLAS
Keyword(s):  
Firm Size ◽  
Research Council ◽  
National Research Council ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Change Over Time ◽  
Innovation Surveys ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms ◽  
Over Time

Matching 2,777 R&D firms in surveys conducted by the National Research Council between 1921 and 1938 with U.S. patents reveals that 59 percent of all firms and 88 percent of publicly traded firms patented. These shares are much higher than those observed for modern R&D firms. Industry, firm size and the location of R&D facilities relative to major cities are shown to be important determinants of the propensity to patent. The effect of these factors remained constant across the 1920s and the Depression years suggesting that the tradeoff between patent disclosure and secrecy did not change over time.

scholarly journals The Impact of Corporate Governance on Stock Price and Trade Volume

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wafaa Salah Mohamed ◽  
May M. Elewa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Trading Volume ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Trade Volume ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance is associated with stock prices and trade volume for 62 publicly traded firms on the Egyptian Stock Exchange during 2007-2014. The authors hypothesize that firms with strong corporate governance have a significant impact on stock prices and trade volume. To examine the associations, a multiple regression analysis is used. Consistent with the first hypothesis, this study finds firms with strong corporate governance have a significant impact on stock prices while has no significant impact on trade volume. Findings indicate that quality of corporate governance can affect firms' stock price while trading volume is not affected by the strength of corporate governance. The results suggest that Egyptian firms should improve their corporate governance as it has a significant effect on firms’ value. Also, providing diverse sources of financial information other than the financial statements and to ensure the presence of high-quality financial reporting and strong investor protection. This study is carried on non-financial firms only. This research is important to regulators and standard setters as it shows the information that affects investors’ decisions and the importance of its disclosure. It pays attention of standard setters for setting a corporate governance framework for improving the level of disclosures of publicly traded firms in Egypt.

Fraud and Governance: The Importance of People

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana R. Hermanson
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Research Projects ◽  
Light Bulb ◽  
Research And Teaching ◽  
Human Aspects ◽  
Research Themes ◽  
Governance Challenges ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Professional Journey

This paper describes my professional journey focusing on human aspects of fraud and corporate governance. I describe the initial “light bulb” moments that highlighted the importance of people and the years of human-focused fraud and governance research and teaching since those events. I summarize key insights from a variety of human-focused research projects, and I develop research themes focused on skills, signals, relationships, fairness, and persuasion (with bad intent). I also provide avenues for future research within each theme. I encourage others to keep the importance of people at the forefront as we address fraud and governance issues. Over time, our systems, regulations, and organizations will change, but we will still have people at the center of our fraud and governance challenges.

scholarly journals The CEO Horizon Problem and Managerial Slack in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junxiong Fang ◽  
Lerong He ◽  
Martin J. Conyon
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Perverse Incentives ◽  
Equity Ownership ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms ◽  
Using Data

ABSTRACTThis study investigates how CEO behavior and incentives change during the CEO's final years in office, known as the horizon problem. We examine how the horizon problem alters managerial slack, a measure of operational inefficiency and managerial value diversion. Using data on Chinese publicly traded firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that managerial slack increases in the last two years of CEO tenure compared to earlier years. We also show that the increase in managerial slack in CEO final years in office is smaller in privately controlled firms than in state-owned enterprises, smaller in firms with CEO equity ownership and more independent boards compared to those without. We conclude that higher quality corporate governance mechanisms ameliorate the perverse incentives associated with the CEO horizon problem, and reduce CEOs’ tendency to increase managerial slack during their final years in office.

Pension funds and corporate governance in developing countries: what do we know and what do we need to know?

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARIO CATALÁN
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Pension Fund ◽  
Pension Funds ◽  
Market Development ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Stock Market Development ◽  
Pension Reforms ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms

Conventional wisdom holds that pension reforms from pay-as-you-go to fully funded systems spur the development of stock markets through a corporate governance channel, i.e. pension funds become large shareholders of publicly traded firms and therefore have the incentives to monitor managers and improve investor protections. This paper reviews the literature on the corporate governance channel associated with pension reforms in developing countries, and asks what we know and need to know about it. We know that pension funds are not yet large shareholders of publicly traded firms in developing countries. However, econometric results suggest that pension reforms lead to stock market development, but do not allow us to identify and separate the corporate governance channel. We know that pension reforms are followed by pro-investor legislation, but there is no convincing evidence that the pro-investor laws are enforced. We need to know more about the effects of pension reform on stock prices and performance of publicly traded firms, and whether pension fund management companies act in the best interest of pensioners. The paper also reviews the political economy explanations of the links between pension fund specific capital controls and the corporate governance channel, and suggests that there is a trade-off between the objectives of pensioners' welfare maximization, and corporate governance reform and stock market development.

scholarly journals Family Control and Corporate Innovation in Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 5044
Author(s):  
Hideaki Sakawa ◽  
Naoki Watanabel
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Innovation Activity ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Main Bank ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms

This study investigates the effects of family control on corporate innovation activity in publicly traded firms in Japan under stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. In a sample of 14,991 firm-year observations in publicly traded firms in Japan during the period 2007 to 2016, we tested whether family owners or board members are enhancing research and development investments. While theoretical perspectives of principal–principal conflicts generally assume a negative relationship between family control and research and development intensity, we find a positive relationship, which supports the stewardship theory perspective. Additionally, we find that main bank ownership positively moderates the relationship between family control and research and development, suggesting that the main bank could affect the decision-making of family board members in the long-term. This result is supported by the close relationships between the main bank and client firms. Furthermore, our study reveals that the shareholder orientation of foreign shareholders suppresses family board members’ long-term orientation. We conclude that the exploitation presumed by principal–principal conflict perspectives has not been thoroughly investigated in Japan’s stakeholder-oriented corporate governance system.

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