Eudaimonistic versus Target Centred Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-153
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Ethical Response

This chapter distinguishes eudaimonistic virtue ethics (in contemporary forms) in terms of which virtue ethics as such is often defined, from Target Centred Virtue Ethics. This form of virtue ethics comprises two main theses: a target-centred account of what makes a trait of character a virtue and a target-centred account of right action. Target Centred Virtue Ethics is given a partial defence in this chapter. Part of this defence involves getting clear on what are the presuppositions of contemporary eudaimonistic virtue ethics, for these may be more or less controversial. Another part discusses the problems of indirection and egoism faced by eudaimonism, and the target-centred virtue ethical response.

Pluralistic Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 221-238
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
General Ground ◽  
Good For ◽  
Ethical Response

This chapter advocates a pluralistic form of virtue ethics according to which there are several ultimate grounds of virtue, features which make traits of character excellences as opposed to deplorable or bad. These are fundamental evaluatively significant features in objects to which virtue is characteristically responsive (such as the value of those items). We call these fundamental features bases of ethical response. We could say then that virtues have but one ultimate general ground if there is but one basis of ethical response and a plurality of ultimate grounds if there are several (such as value, status, and the good for an individual). Thus, according to a monistic form of virtue ethics, for all traits, what makes that trait a virtue is that it is a disposition of (basically) correct responsiveness to the fundamental basis of ethical response (such as value, or the good for an agent), whereas for a pluralistic virtue ethics for any virtue what makes that trait a virtue is that it is a disposition of characteristically good or correct responsiveness to any or all of a number of fundamental bases of ethical response (such as value, considerations of status, and the good for).

Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Tiwald
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Explanatory Priority ◽  
The Relationship

In this chapter the author defends the view that the major variants of Confucian ethics qualify as virtue ethics in the respects that matter most, which concern the focus, investigative priority, and explanatory priority of virtue over right action. The chapter also provides short summaries of the central Confucian virtues and then explains how different Confucians have understood the relationship between these and what some regard as the chief or most comprehensive virtue, ren (humaneness or benevolence). Finally, it explicates what most Confucians take to be a requirement of all virtues, which the author calls “wholeheartedness,” and concludes by highlighting some neglected implications of the wholeheartedness requirement for ethics more generally. These include reasons for linking conceptions of virtue and human nature, for thinking that good character necessitates that individuals change how things seem to them, and for endorsing automatic as opposed to intensively deliberative judgments and decisions.

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

Consequentialism, Virtue, and Character

2020 ◽  
pp. 462-473
Author(s):  
Julia Driver
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Right Action ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay argues that consequentialist theories can both accommodate virtue evaluation, and, indeed, the most plausible versions must do so, and that consequentialist theories can also be structured as forms of virtue ethics. Different strategies available to the consequentialist are presented and criticized, including indirect strategies which argue that the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform. The best way for the consequentialist to approach virtue is as another form of moral evaluation understood in consequentialist terms which is distinct from consequentialist act evaluation; that is, evaluating action is only one part of an overarching consequentialist account of moral evaluation, and the theory can also be applied to dispositions, motives, intentions, etc.

Has Virtue Ethics Sold Out?

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-261
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Core Concepts

This chapter discusses a contemporary criticism of virtue ethics as focusing too much on providing a criterion of right action. I claim that the criticism is off the mark on a variety of fronts, including a misinterpretation of Anscombe, a misguided view that what is offered is a criterion of right action as opposed to a framework, and that what is offered is a criterion of morally right action in a suspect sense of “moral.” I show how the important deontic notions can have a place in virtue ethics. The chapter explores also further problems with the notion of rightness in ethics: the essential contestedness of even core concepts of rightness and both combinatorial and degree vagueness in the relation between the thick concepts and rightness.

A Virtue Theoretic Ethics of Intellectual Agency

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-452
Author(s):  
Shane Ryan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Virtuous Agent ◽  
Virtue Responsibilism ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

There is a well-established literature on the ethics of belief. Our beliefs, however, are just one aspect of our intellectual lives with which epistemology should be concerned. I make the case that epistemologists should be concerned with an ethics of intellectual agency rather than the narrower category of ethics of belief. Various species of normativity, epistemic, moral, and so on, that may be relevant to the ethics of belief are laid out. An account adapted from virtue ethics for an ethics that goes beyond the ethics of belief is defended. The main claim advanced here is that we should act as the virtuous agent would characteristically act in the circumstances. This claim is supported with reference to a number of examples, as well as considerations informing virtue ethics. An acknowledged feature of this account is that it provides limited guidance regarding right action in intellectual agency. While the account draws on virtue responsibilism to offer guidance, the case is made that it’s a mistake to think that an account in this area can provide a successful decision procedure.

4. Principles for right action

2018 ◽  
pp. 44-60
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Broad Theory ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Theory Of Value

Environmental ethics cannot escape from considering what ought or ought not to be done, and how this is to be decided or discovered. ‘Principles for right action’ reflects on how to understand moral principles. It considers different contract theories of ethics, concluding that they continue to fail to ensure equity between generations and between species. Virtue ethics may be a more promising approach, but well-chosen, justifiable moral rules are essential. Rules and duties, and beneficial practices, traits, and actions are also discussed. The approach that is the more consistent, most fruitful, and best serves the needs of future generations seems to be consequentialism, allied to a broad theory of value.

Virtue Ethics and Right Action

2003 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Das
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Right Action
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