Consequentialism, Virtue, and Character

2020 ◽  
pp. 462-473
Author(s):  
Julia Driver
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Right Action ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay argues that consequentialist theories can both accommodate virtue evaluation, and, indeed, the most plausible versions must do so, and that consequentialist theories can also be structured as forms of virtue ethics. Different strategies available to the consequentialist are presented and criticized, including indirect strategies which argue that the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform. The best way for the consequentialist to approach virtue is as another form of moral evaluation understood in consequentialist terms which is distinct from consequentialist act evaluation; that is, evaluating action is only one part of an overarching consequentialist account of moral evaluation, and the theory can also be applied to dispositions, motives, intentions, etc.

Would a Virtuous Person Grandstand?

Grandstanding ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi ◽  
Brandon Warmke
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
General Character ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
Slave Revolt ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Moral Talk ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

scholarly journals Why helping the victims of disasters makes me a better person: Towards an anthropological theory of humanitarian action

Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleni M Kalokairinou
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Developmental Process ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Humanitarian Action ◽  
Anthropological Theory ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
The Right ◽  
Difficult Situations

AbstractIn this paper I examine which is the most appropriate moral theory for dealing with disaster bioethics contexts. It is pointed out that, contrary to what is usually believed, moral theories of right action cannot actually guide us in such difficult situations. Instead, it is claimed that a virtue ethics theory of an Aristotelian version, which gives emphasis not only on the virtuous person but also on the relevant developmental process of becoming virtuous, can provide us with the right theoretical framework for coping with the problems which the victims of such disastrous situations face.

Bhagavad-Gita and Bhakti-yoga

Hinduism ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyam Ranganathan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
South Asian ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
The South ◽  
Bhagavad Gita ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
The Right ◽  
Bhagavad Gītā ◽  
Children And War

Disagreements about ethics, morality, or dharma (as described in the South Asian tradition) are disagreements about the right or the good. There are four basic theories. The teleological options are Virtue Ethics (the Good character causes the Right action), and Consequentialism (the Good outcome justifies the Right action). These options are teleological because they prioritize the Good (the end) over the Right (the means). The commonly known procedural option that prioritizes the Right over the Good is Deontology (the Right considerations justify the Good action). However there is a fourth option unique to the South Asian tradition that is also procedural. This is Bhakti/Yoga (the right action which consists in devotion to the procedural ideal of the Right—the Lord/Sovereignty—causes a Good outcome, namely the perfection of this devotion). This is a theory defended systematically (likely for the first time) in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra (YS). There the procedural ideal of being a person, Sovereignty (Īśvara), is defined by the traits of being untouched by past choices (karma) and unimpeded (without afflictions or kleśa-s) (YS I.23–25): and this is approximated by the practice of Unconservativism (Tapas) and Self-Governance (Svādhyāya) (YS II.1). The theory is also explored dialectically in the great Sanskrit epic, the Mahābhārata, and especially in its chapter 18, the Bhagavad Gītā (Gītā). Here Arjuna (the protagonist) is faced with the prospects of a fratricidal war and articulates three reasons to avoid the conflict. Consequentialism: if he were to fight the war, it would result in sorrowful outcomes for all concerned (Gītā 1.34–36). Virtue Ethics: though the enemy is evil, fighting would render him (Arjuna) no better than the opponent rendering it the wrong, virtue destroying choice (Gītā 1.38–39). Deontology: war undermines good social practice that, among other things, protects women and children, and war, hence, constitutes a wrong consideration in justifying practice (Gītā 1.41). The three approaches to ethics share a commonality: they define Right action in some way by way of the Good, and they constitute Conventional Morality, which gives rise to Moral Parasites (those who wish others to be bound by Conventional Moral expectations, but do not intend to do so themselves). In response, Krishna, who is Arjuna’s charioteer, teaches Arjuna two procedural responses that prioritize the Right over the Good: karma yoga, a form of Deontology that emphasizes the rightness of duty, and bhakti yoga, known as “Īśvara Praṇidhāna” in the Yoga Sūtra. Yoga/Bhakti is unique among the four ethical theories in defining the right by way of the procedural ideal (Īśvara), and not the Good. This allows Yoga/Bhakti to play an instrumental role in resetting the moral order, by abandoning Conventional Morality. Krishna as the figure of Īśvara in the Mahābhārata subsequently leads Arjuna and his brothers (the Pāṇḍava) to victory over Moral Parasites (the Kauravas). Conventional approaches to bhakti that interpret it by way of familiar beliefs of the Western tradition (such as Theism, a version of Virtue Ethics) do not reveal the philosophical controversies that motivate Bhakti/Yoga or its contribution to philosophy.

Right and good

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Larmore
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
The Right ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
At Will ◽  
Do So

‘Right’ and ‘good’ are the two basic terms of moral evaluation. In general, something is ‘right’ if it is morally obligatory, whereas it is morally ‘good’ if it is worth having or doing and enhances the life of those who possess it. Acts are often held to be morally right or wrong in respect of the action performed, but morally good or bad in virtue of their motive: it is right to help a person in distress, but good to do so from a sense of duty or sympathy, since no one can supposedly be obliged to do something (such as acting with a certain motive) which cannot be done at will. Henry Sidgwick distinguished between two basic conceptions of morality. The ‘attractive’ conception, favoured by the ancient Greeks, views the good as fundamental, and grounds the claims of morality in the self-perfection to which we naturally aspire. The ‘imperative’ conception, preferred in the modern era, views the right as fundamental, and holds that we are subject to certain obligations whatever our wants or desires.

Agent-based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liezl van Zyl
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Michael Slote ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

AbstractAgent-based accounts of virtue ethics, such as the one provided by Michael Slote, base the rightness of action in the motive from which it proceeds. A frequent objection to agent-basing is that it does not allow us to draw the commonsense distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons, that is, between act-evaluation and agent-appraisal. I defend agent-basing against this objection, but argue that a more fundamental problem for this account is its apparent failure to provide adequate argue action guidance. I then show that this problem can be solved by supplementing an agent-based criterion of right action with a hypothetical-agent criterion of action guidance.

scholarly journals Schizophrenia and the Virtues of Self-Effacement

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-48
Author(s):  
Paul Barry
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Right Action ◽  
De Re ◽  
Deontological Ethics ◽  
De Dicto

Michael Stocker’s “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” attacks versions of consequentialism and deontological ethics on the grounds that they are self-effacing. While it is often thought that Stocker’s argument gives us a reason to favour virtue ethics over those other theories, Simon Keller has argued that this is a mistake. He claims that virtue ethics is also self-effacing, and is therefore afflicted with the self-effacement-related problems that Stocker identifies in consequentialism and deontology. This paper defends virtue ethics against this claim. Although there is a kind of self-effacement involved in the exercise of virtue, this is quite different from the so-called schizophrenia that Stocker thinks is induced by modern ethical theory. Importantly, manifesting virtue does not require one to embrace mutually inconsistent moral commitments, as is at times encouraged by consequentialists and deontologists. This paper also considers a reading of the virtue-ethical criterion of right action that is encouraged by Bernard Williams’s distinction between a de re and a de dicto interpretation of the phrase “acting as the virtuous person would.” I argue that such a reading addresses concerns that a virtue-ethical criterion of right action inevitably generates a problematic form of self-effacement.

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

Heinrich von Kleist and the Right to War

Romanticism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254
Author(s):  
Jan Mieszkowski
Keyword(s):  
Heinrich Von Kleist ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay explores the conceptualization of warfare in Romanticism. The focus is on two plays by Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea and Prince Friedrich von Homburg. I begin by discussing Carl von Clausewitz's influential understanding of conflict and the problems that arise when he attempts to explain the interdependence of warring parties. I go on to argue that in Kleist's dramas war is a competition between different languages of authority. When no coherent paradigm of agency emerges from this contest, the right to wage war is revealed to be anything but a guarantee that one knows how to do so.

In the Labyrinth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew McNeillie
Keyword(s):  
The Right ◽  
First Time ◽  
Do So

It is now widely acknowledged, and far beyond Ireland, that Tim Robinson’s two volumes jointly known as Stones of Aran (‘Pilgrimage’ and ‘Labyrinth’) are modern classics, exemplary in every way of how to write about place and to do so with a formal, literary accomplishment that more than earns the right to nod at Ruskin’s own classic. In 2012, Robinson went back to Árainn, the largest of the three islands, for the first time in nearly ten years. He did so at the urging of Andrew McNeillie, with whom he spent two and a half days revisiting old haunts. This chapter makes account of the occasion and uses, in the process, a unique document provided by Robinson as an experiment in annotating his work. This prompts McNeillie to investigate some of his own annotations and footnotes to Aran.

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