4. Principles for right action

2018 ◽  
pp. 44-60
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Broad Theory ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Theory Of Value

Environmental ethics cannot escape from considering what ought or ought not to be done, and how this is to be decided or discovered. ‘Principles for right action’ reflects on how to understand moral principles. It considers different contract theories of ethics, concluding that they continue to fail to ensure equity between generations and between species. Virtue ethics may be a more promising approach, but well-chosen, justifiable moral rules are essential. Rules and duties, and beneficial practices, traits, and actions are also discussed. The approach that is the more consistent, most fruitful, and best serves the needs of future generations seems to be consequentialism, allied to a broad theory of value.

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

Target Centred Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
New Developments ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Doctrine Of The Mean ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
The Mean ◽  
Continental Tradition

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was groundbreaking but by now has been subject to considerable critical attention. The time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed in this book (TVE) is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the ‘natural goodness’ metaphysics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a ‘hermeneutic ontology’ of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well-known ‘qualified agent’ account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target-centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. The target-centred view, introduced in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (VEP), is much more developed in TVE with discussions of Dancy’s particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean (suitably interpreted). TVE retains the pluralism of VEP but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. Besides the pluralism TVE develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of “dwelling”; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

Justice as a Personal Virtue and Justice as an Institutional Virtue: Mencius’s Confucian Virtue Politics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Yong Huang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Affirmative Answer ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Social Policies ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Government

AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

Breaking Boundaries as the Clue for Post Ecological Architecture

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-32
Author(s):  
María Jesús González Díaz ◽  
Justo García Navarro
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Time Limit ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Natural Phenomena ◽  
Know How ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
Remote Locations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mega Cities

Ecology shows us not only environmental problems; it shows that we need a new balance and harmony between individuals, beings, communities and all of Nature. We need a new contract with Nature (SERRES, 1991) and new Ethics (GUATTARI, 1990) for our lives. What is therefore new in Architecture? The environmental ethics have given us a universal and supra-generational vision of the management of our Nature and, as a consequence, a new way to construct our “second” nature. What is essential for this new architecture that the new ethics demand? Exploring this subject, the paper firstly analyzes how the relationship between ethics and architecture has been described by other authors. Secondly, how the relationship between mainstream architecture and ecology is evolving, from technical matters to social and more complex issues, to work towards ethics. Finally, the convergence between them (Ethics, Architecture and Nature) could provide the clues to understand the ends and means of eco-architecture. As a result of this analysis, we interpret that there are underlying keys in the post-eco-architecture. These summarize in new roles for the “locus” and the break of habitual limits of architecture, which have been replaced for new ones. There are no limits of scale: macro-structures such as mega-cities, as well as micro-organism are involved in the architectural process. The client of our construction is universal: we do not build only for our client, we must think about all beings, including animals since we know how our decisions may inflict damage to biodiversity. The site has no boundaries: we know how any local actions can have an effect in remote locations of the planet, since natural phenomena are interconnected. There is also no time limit: we must build now, but we must think about future generations.

6. Social and political movements

2018 ◽  
pp. 77-90
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Justice ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Social Ecology ◽  
Environmental Problems ◽  
Deep Ecology ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Human World

Large contributions have been made to environmental ethics by social and political movements, such as Deep Ecology, ecofeminism, Social Ecology, the Environmental Justice Movement, and Green political movements. ‘Social and political movements’ considers these in turn. Social Ecology and the Environmental Justice Movement serve as correctives to Deep Ecology in foregrounding social structures in which environmental problems are often found. But Deep Ecology and ecofeminism serve as counter-correctives to these movements, with their concern for non-human species, habitats, and ecosystems. Green movements (and Deep Ecology too) emphasize our obligations to future generations and to the non-human world. Tensions can arise between environmentalism and liberalism, but they are not always insuperable.

The Place of Concerns for Posterity in the Global Education for Sustainable Development Agenda

2017 ◽  
pp. 1433-1453
Author(s):  
Katia Vladimirova
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Global Education ◽  
Education For Sustainable Development ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Education Philosophy ◽  
Development Agenda ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Conceptual Foundations

Education is a powerful tool to alter unsustainable values and mindsets. But in order for it to be used most efficiently it is crucial to have a clear understanding of what values should be advanced, changed, or developed. This chapter aims to clarify some conceptual difficulties with the value of future generations in education for sustainable development. Future generations are embedded in the definition of sustainable development and can be reasonably expected to be at the heart of education for sustainable development. This chapter explores this assumption and analyzes how future-oriented concerns are formulated and advanced in the global educational agenda put forward during the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014) led by UNESCO. This analysis compares conceptual foundations of ESD against key developments in climate and environmental ethics on the treatment of posterity. This chapter can contribute to the disciplines of environmental education, philosophy of education, and to climate ethics.

Virtue epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Early Form ◽  
Epistemic Agent ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Theory Of Value

‘Virtue epistemology’ is the name of a class of theories that focus epistemic evaluation on good epistemic properties of persons rather than on properties of beliefs. The former or some interesting subset of the former are called intellectual virtues. Some of these theories propose that the traditional concepts of justification or knowledge can be analysed in terms of intellectual virtue, whereas others maintain that these traditional concepts are defective or uninteresting and it is desirable to replace them with the notion of an intellectual virtue. In all these theories, epistemic evaluation rests on some virtuous quality of persons that enables them to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way. Simple reliabilism may be treated either as a precursor to virtue epistemology or as an early form of it. Later versions add requirements for virtue intended to capture the idea that it is a quality which makes an epistemic agent subjectively responsible as well as objectively reliable. Proponents of virtue epistemology claim a number of advantages. It is said to bypass disputes between foundationalists and coherentists on proper cognitive structure, to avoid sceptical worries, to avoid the impasse between internalism and externalism and to broaden the range of epistemological enquiry to include such neglected epistemic values as understanding and wisdom. Some theorists argue that the real virtue of virtue epistemology is the way it permits us to redefine the central questions of epistemology. In addition, since virtue epistemology can be blended with virtue ethics, it holds out the promise of a unified theory of value.

scholarly journals Virtue ethics: an approach to moral dilemmas in nursing

Curationis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
E Arries
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One

Nurses are increasingly confronted with situations of moral difficulty, such as not to feed terminally ill patients, whistle blowing, or participation in termination of pregnancy. Most of these moral dilemmas are often analyzed using the principle-based approach which applies the four moral principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and nonmalificence. In some instances, consequentialism is considered, but these frameworks have their limitations. Their limitations has to do with a consideration for the interpersonal nature of clinical nursing practice on the one hand, and is not always clear on how to judge which consequences are best on the other hand. When principles are in conflict it is not always easy to decide which principle should dominate. Furthermore, these frameworks do not take into account the importance of the interpersonal and emotional element of human experience. On the contrary, decision making about moral issues in healthcare demands that nurses exercise rational control over emotions. This clearly focuses the attention on the nurse as moral agent and in particular their character. In this article I argue that virtue ethics as an approach, which focus of the character of a person, might provide a more holistic analysis of moral dilemmas in nursing and might facilitate more flexible and creative solutions when combined with other theories of moral decision-making. Advancing this argument, firstly, I provide the central features of virtue ethics. Secondly I describe a story in which a moral dilemma is evident. Lastly I apply virtue ethics as an approach to this moral dilemma and in particular focusing on the virtues inherent in the nurse as moral agent in the story.

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