Pluralistic Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 221-238
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
General Ground ◽  
Good For ◽  
Ethical Response

This chapter advocates a pluralistic form of virtue ethics according to which there are several ultimate grounds of virtue, features which make traits of character excellences as opposed to deplorable or bad. These are fundamental evaluatively significant features in objects to which virtue is characteristically responsive (such as the value of those items). We call these fundamental features bases of ethical response. We could say then that virtues have but one ultimate general ground if there is but one basis of ethical response and a plurality of ultimate grounds if there are several (such as value, status, and the good for an individual). Thus, according to a monistic form of virtue ethics, for all traits, what makes that trait a virtue is that it is a disposition of (basically) correct responsiveness to the fundamental basis of ethical response (such as value, or the good for an agent), whereas for a pluralistic virtue ethics for any virtue what makes that trait a virtue is that it is a disposition of characteristically good or correct responsiveness to any or all of a number of fundamental bases of ethical response (such as value, considerations of status, and the good for).

The Self-Absorption Objection and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

2018 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff D’Souza ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
The Self ◽  
Virtuous Agent ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Way

This paper examines one of the central objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: the self-absorption objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is that doing so is for the sake of and/or is constitutive of our own eudaimonia. In this paper, I provide an overview of the various attempts made by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to address the self-absorption objection and argue that they all fall short for one reason or another. I contend that the way forward for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists is to reject the view that the virtuous agent ought to organize her life in a way that is ultimately good for her, and instead adopt a more expansive conception of her ultimate end, one in which no special preference is given to her own good.

Welfare-Prior Eudaimonism, Excellence-Prior Eudaimonism, and the Self-Absorption Objection

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Jeff D’Souza ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Self ◽  
Virtuous Agent ◽  
Adequate Response ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Way

One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts is that the virtuous agent’s motive is to promote her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two of Anne Baril’s criticisms: that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.

Stoic Virtue

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Becker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Attractive Alternative ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Human Scale ◽  
Aristotelian Ethics ◽  
Good For ◽  
Naturalistic Account ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

The Stoics notoriously held that virtue was the perfection of human-scale rational agency; that such perfection was rare but humanly possible; that it was both necessary and sufficient for happiness; that it was, in fact, the only unqualified good for human beings; and that it was an all-or-nothing achievement—there were no intermediate degrees of virtue. The mere recital of that list of Stoic doctrines has often been enough to disqualify Stoicism as a viable form of virtue ethics. This chapter, however, describes Stoic ethics as a systematic and attractive alternative to Aristotelian ethics. The implicit suggestion is that the usual caricatures of Stoicism can be erased, and that contemporary virtue ethics can benefit from working in the Stoic tradition—particularly with its naturalistic account of moral development.

Eudaimonistic versus Target Centred Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-153
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Ethical Response

This chapter distinguishes eudaimonistic virtue ethics (in contemporary forms) in terms of which virtue ethics as such is often defined, from Target Centred Virtue Ethics. This form of virtue ethics comprises two main theses: a target-centred account of what makes a trait of character a virtue and a target-centred account of right action. Target Centred Virtue Ethics is given a partial defence in this chapter. Part of this defence involves getting clear on what are the presuppositions of contemporary eudaimonistic virtue ethics, for these may be more or less controversial. Another part discusses the problems of indirection and egoism faced by eudaimonism, and the target-centred virtue ethical response.

Virtue Ethics, Value-centredness, and Consequentialism

Utilitas ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Swanton
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Response ◽  
A Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
Better Than

This paper argues against two major features of consequentialist conceptions of virtue: Value-centredness and the Hegemony of Promotion as a mode of moral acknowledgement or responsiveness. In relation to the first feature, I argue against two ideas: (a) Value should be understood entirely independently of virtue; and (b) The only right-making respects which serve to make an action better than another is degree of value. I argue that what I call the bases of moral response are several, including also status, the good for, and bonds. Against the Hegemony of Promotion thesis I argue for several modes of moral responsiveness constitutive of virtue.

Seti Figure of Merit

1997 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 711-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Dreher ◽  
D. Kent Cullers
Keyword(s):  
Figure Of Merit ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Current Generation ◽  
Detection Range ◽  
Sky Surveys ◽  
Independent Observations ◽  
Good For

AbstractWe develop a figure of merit for SETI observations which is anexplicitfunction of the EIRP of the transmitters, which allows us to treat sky surveys and targeted searches on the same footing. For each EIRP, we calculate the product of terms measuring the number of stars within detection range, the range of frequencies searched, and the number of independent observations for each star. For a given set of SETI observations, the result is a graph of merit versus transmitter EIRP. We apply this technique to several completed and ongoing SETI programs. The results provide a quantitative confirmation of the expected qualitative difference between sky surveys and targeted searches: the Project Phoenix targeted search is good for finding transmitters in the 109to 1014W range, while the sky surveys do their best at higher powers. Current generation optical SETI is not yet competitive with microwave SETI.

Lactamide-MEA Looks Good for Cradle Cap

2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (12) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
SHARON WORCESTER
Keyword(s):  
Good For

PDLs Equally Good for Scar Ablation

2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Michele G. Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Good For
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