Article 21A

The Right to Education in India ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199494286.003.0003 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 118-210

Author(s):

Florian Matthey-Prakash

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

The State ◽

High Courts ◽

Legal Obligations ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Enforcement Mechanisms

Chapter 3 offers some guidance concerning the content of Article 21A. This question is approached purely legally, not politically. Therefore, the chapter does not describe what content would be desirable. Instead, it discusses which concrete legal obligations the article might impose on the state. It also highlights that Article 21A, read with Articles 32 and 226, clearly imposes an obligation on the state to provide accessible and effective enforcement mechanisms to right-bearers. The fact that the petitioners in none of the cases concerning Article 21A decided by the Supreme Court, and in hardly any cases decided by the high courts, were aggrieved children or their parents shows that the higher judiciary is not accessible enough.

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Enforcing Rights against the State in India

The Right to Education in India ◽

10.1093/oso/9780199494286.003.0004 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 211-279

Author(s):

Florian Matthey-Prakash

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Public Interest ◽

Empirical Studies ◽

The State ◽

Access To Justice ◽

District Courts ◽

Public Interest Litigation ◽

High Courts ◽

The Supreme Court

Chapter 4 deals with the issue of lack of access to justice and attempts to find reasons for the inaccessibility of the higher judiciary. While it appears to be clear to observers that the Supreme Court and high courts are not accessible enough, surprisingly, there are actually no empirical studies that examine why this is the case. Some factors can, however, be deduced from a study dealing with the inaccessibility of district courts, that is, the lower judiciary.The fourth chapter also shows that the institution of Public Interest Litigation, for various reasons, cannot compensate for lack of access to justice, and that the state is not properly implementing (or not at all exploring) many other possible alternative mechanisms.

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Scandalizing the judiciary: An analysis of the uneven response of the Supreme Court of India to sexual harassment allegations against judges

International Journal of Constitutional Law ◽

10.1093/icon/moaa029 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 18 (2) ◽

pp. 563-590

Author(s):

Sanjay Jain ◽

Saranya Mishra

Keyword(s):

Sexual Harassment ◽

Supreme Court ◽

The State ◽

Fundamental Rights ◽

The Other ◽

Lower Court ◽

High Courts ◽

Supreme Court Of India ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Systematic Pattern

Abstract The Supreme Court of India (SC) pronounced a momentous judgment in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan in 1997, categorically recognizing the menace of sexual harassment (SH) at workplace and constitutionally rendering it as being in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India 1950. The Court also provided a mechanism for redressal against SH, which was ultimately reinforced by Parliament with the enactment of Sexual Harassment at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (POSH Act). However, when it comes to allegations of SH against judges in the SC and High Courts by its employees, interns, or lower court judges, the response of the SC has been abysmal to say the least. There is a systematic pattern to suggest foul play and conspiracy in each such allegation, and judges, including even the Chief Justice of India (CJI), have not hesitated to openly indulge in victim-shaming and-blaming. In other words, the court has not been able to uphold its own jurisprudence on sexual harassment, which it expects to be scrupulously adhered to by other organs of the state. It is submitted that in not supporting the cause of victims alleging SH against judges, the other organs of the state are also party to this constitutional decay and serious infraction of fundamental rights. It leads us to ask the question, how can we guard against the guardians?

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An Evaluation of the Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and the Controversy of Jurisdiction of the Federal and State High Courts in Nigeria

Africa Journal of Comparative Constitutional Law ◽

10.47348/ajcl/2020/a3 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2020 ◽

pp. 59-78

Author(s):

Bo Alloh

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Federal Republic ◽

Supreme Court Decision ◽

The State ◽

Fundamental Rights ◽

Court Decision ◽

High Courts ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

State High Courts

This article examines the issue of jurisdiction between various high courts on the enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria. Fundamental rights are derived from the constitution and are expressly entrenched in the constitution of a country. They vary from one country to another and are specifically enacted in a country’s constitution in line with the history and culture of the country. In Nigeria, jurisdiction is vested in both State and Federal High Courts with respect to the enforcement of fundamental rights. However, the jurisdiction of the State High Courts is ousted and donated to the Federal High Courts, once a case on fundamental rights falls under section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The researcher adopted the doctrinal method of research. The objective of this article is to reveal that the concurrent jurisdiction of both the Federal and State High Courts to hear and determine applications to secure the enforcement of fundamental rights has led to years of seemingly unsettled controversies, academically and procedurally. However, this controversy has been settled in the case of FUT Minna v Olutayo. This article concludes that the Supreme Court decision in the case of FUT Minna v Olutayo supports the realisation of the enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria.

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A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

Southern African Public Law ◽

10.25159/2522-6800/4027 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 34 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Sipho Stephen Nkosi

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

The State ◽

The Other ◽

Customary Law ◽

Eastern Cape ◽

High Court ◽

Nelson Mandela ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

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The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

Southern African Public Law ◽

10.25159/2522-6800/3531 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 30 (1) ◽

pp. 112-121

Author(s):

Shamier Ebrahim

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Waiting Lists ◽

The State ◽

Waiting List ◽

Allocation Process ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

The Right ◽

The Impact ◽

Court Of Appeal

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

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PERSINGGUNGAN KEWENANGAN MENGADILI PENYALAHGUNAAN DISKRESI ANTARA PENGADILAN TUN DAN PENGADILAN TIPIKOR / INTERCEPTION OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY OF DISCRETION ABUSE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION COURT AND CORRUPTION COURTS

JURNAL HUKUM DAN PERADILAN ◽

10.25216/jhp.7.2.2018.213-236 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

pp. 213

Author(s):

Budi Suhariyanto

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

Criminal Law ◽

Administrative Law ◽

The State ◽

Government Officials ◽

Criminal Process ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

State Finance ◽

The Law ◽

To Receive

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.

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