The Right to Housing: Challenges Associated with the ‘Waiting List System’ Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality V Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 5 2014 3 SA 23 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2019 ◽  
pp. 160-195
Author(s):  
James Holland ◽  
Julian Webb

This chapter examines the use of case law to solve legal problems. In the study and practice of law we seek to analyse legal principles; and the ‘principles’ in English law are derived from pure case law or from case law dealing with statutes. The discussions cover the idea of binding precedent (stare decisis); establishing the principle in a case; the mechanics of stare decisis; whether there are any other exceptions to the application of stare decisis to the Court of Appeal that have emerged since 1944; whether every case has to be heard by the Court of Appeal before it can proceed to the Supreme Court; precedent in the higher courts; other courts; and the impact of human rights legislation.


Author(s):  
Dickson Brice

This chapter considers the performance of the Irish Supreme Court during the life of the Irish Free State (1922–37). It charts the way in which the right to appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council was abolished (comparing the position in other Dominions) and shows that, despite the rhetoric of Irish politicians at the time, the judges were keen to uphold the British approach to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter then describes some of the emergency legislation enacted in the Free State to combat republican violence and examines how it was viewed by the Supreme Court, most notably in the very deferential (albeit split) decision in The State (Ryan) v Lennon. The chapter sums up the Court’s performance during the existence of the Irish Free State as disappointing and uninspiring.


Author(s):  
Akhileshwar Pathak

The case discusses the issues related to Zee Tele Films Limited's claims that the Board of Cricket Control of India was “state” and could act arbitrarily in the award of telecasting rights. The “state” as defined in Article 12 includes “other authorities”, and these are subject to the constitutional limitations. The right to equality requires them to not act arbitrarily. A body which is an instrumentality or agency of the government is “other authority”. The term has been subject to judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, by a majority judgement, in the Zee Tele Films Case ruled that the Board is not “other authorities” within Article 12 of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.


2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-446
Author(s):  
Raoul P. Barbe

This paper describes the state of federal and Québec law as regards judicial notice of statutory instruments. The position in respect of federal instruments is first surveyed by reference to the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act and Canadian and British cases on the subject ; mention is then made of the now superseded Regulations Act of 1950 and the questions of interpretation that arose from it; and finally the impact of s. 23 of the Statutory Instruments Act of 1971 is evaluated in the light of the Supreme Court ruling in R. v. The « Evgenia Chandris ». The position in Québec law appears to be somewhat more confused. While the rule that regulations should be a matter for judicial notice seems well secured by s. 105 of the Summary Proceedings Act, this obviously only settles the point as regards penal proceedings under provincial statutes. In civil litigation, in the absence of any clear statement that regulations are to be judicially noticed, caution would seem to advise litigants to specifically plead and evidence the existence of regulations they intend to rely on. The author concludes by calling on the Québec Legislature to state explicitly the rule that regulations are a matter for judicial notice in any kind of proceedings.


1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 418-432
Author(s):  
Roy L. Miller

Although many of our states have exhibited unsettled political conditions in recent months, North Dakota has passed through a unique experience in having four different governors occupy the executive office in six and one-half months. Twice during this period, the supreme court of the state has been requested to determine the right of the governor to hold office, and in each instance it has elevated the lieutenant-governor to the office. The first occasion resulted from the conviction of Governor William Langer of a felony after a trial in the federal district court, and the second involved the constitutional qualifications of Governor Thomas H. Moodie, elected last November.


Author(s):  
Clive Vinti

The Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), permits the imposition of anti-dumping duties for as long and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury subject to the proviso that they must be terminated after five years unless a sunset review has been initiated. Sunset review has the purpose of either permitting or terminating the continuation of an anti-dumping duty. This is significant because if the sunset review is not initiated prior to the expiry of the five year period, the anti-dumping duties will be terminated.Therefore, this places a greater emphasis on the determination of the precise date of commencement of the anti-dumping duties. This is because an incorrect determination of the date of imposition of the anti-dumping duty has obvious financial implications for the interested parties. To this end, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa has delivered two salient judgments in this regard: firstly, in Progress Office Machines CC v SARS, and then more recently, in Association of Meat Importers v ITAC. These two cases hinge on the interpretation of the date of 'imposition' of definitive anti-dumping duties particularly where provisional measures are involved, which invariably determines the date of expiry of the duties as espoused by Regulations 38 and 53 of the International Trade Administration Commission Anti-Dumping Regulations.This paper contends that these two judgments are conflicting and riddled with inconsistencies. Secondly, the paper contends that the SCA has in the recent AMIE case, virtually rewritten its earlier judgment of Progress Office Machines. Lastly, the paper shows that the approach of South African courts on whether the Anti-Dumping Agreement is binding on South African law, is fraught with uncertainty and an ambivalence .The case analysis also reflects on the impact of the newly minted but yet to be implemented, Customs Duty Act, with a view to assess the impact of the new legislation on the issues currently plaguing the anti-dumping regime of South Africa. 


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 205-213
Author(s):  
P H Pettit

In this important case on the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (as amended by the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002) the Supreme Court, by a bare majority, allowed the appeal against the decision of a Leasehold Valuation Tribunal (LVT) which had been affirmed by, first, the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), and, secondly, by the Court of Appeal. Almost all long leases of flats contain an obligation on the landlord (or a service company) to provide services, such as repairing the exterior and common parts of the block, and a concomitant obligation on the tenants to pay service charges. The right of the landlord to recover such service charges depends on the terms of the particular lease, but the 1985 Act and the Service Charges (Consultation Requirements)(England) Regulations 2003 impose certain statutory requirements and restrictions on a landlord, which impinge on its ability to recover service charges. These requirements are designed to ensure that tenants of flats are not required (i) to pay for unnecessary services or services which are provided to a defective standard, and (ii) to pay more than they should for services which are necessary and have been provided to an acceptable standard.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
WG Schulze

Does a bank have the right to cancel the contract between it and its customer unilaterally? This was the crisp question put to the court in the recent decision in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (2010 4 SA 468 (SCA); 2010 4 All SA 113 (“Bredenkamp: appeal”)). Before this case reached the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”), two lower courts were asked to pronounce on the same question (see Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa 2009 3 All SA 339 (GSJ); 2009 5 SA 304 (GSJ) (“Bredenkamp: interim application”)); and Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2009 6 SA 277 (GSJ) (“Bredenkamp: main application”). (In passing it should be mentioned that Bredenkamp’s name was spelt incorrectly in the citation of both the interim and main applications; Bredenkamp’s name was correctly spelt in the citation of the decision of the SCA). The present discussion will refer to all three these decisions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document