The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction

Author(s):  
Roger D. Congleton

Rent Creation, Rent Extraction, and Rent Seeking are closely related concepts whose relationships are often misunderstood. For example, neither rent extraction nor rent seeking are possible until rents are created. Both rent extraction and rent seeking thus begin with the creation of rents. If one begins with the Hobbesian perspective on anarchy, all rents are ultimately the creation of government policies. Civil law determines what it means to own something, which includes an owner’s claims on the rents associated with his or her property and private activities. One in place, civil law also allows the possibility that rents can be created through private actions. Public policy may alter those claims through changes in use and rent-extraction rights associated with ownership. Such policies may create new rents or redistribute existing rents. In doing so, such policies induce rent-seeking efforts (or not) depending on the policies adopted and the manner in which rents are distributed. The welfare gains and losses associated with the various procedures for rent creation, rent seeking, and rent extraction imply that prohibitions against many, but not all, forms of rent extraction are warranted.

1989 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Evensky ◽  
Charles Rowley ◽  
Robert Tollison ◽  
Gordon Tullock

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Boldrin ◽  
David K Levine

The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity. Both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent, the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative. A properly designed patent system might serve to increase innovation at a certain time and place. Unfortunately, the political economy of government-operated patent systems indicates that such systems are susceptible to pressures that cause the ill effects of patents to grow over time. Our preferred policy solution is to abolish patents entirely and to find other legislative instruments, less open to lobbying and rent seeking, to foster innovation when there is clear evidence that laissez-faire undersupplies it. However, if that policy change seems too large to swallow, we discuss in the conclusion a set of partial reforms that could be implemented


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