Collective Decision-Making and Jury Theorems

Author(s):  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Paroush

Issues related to collective decision making and to Condorcet jury theorems have been studied and publicly discussed for over two hundred years. Recently, there is a burgeoning interest in the topic by academicians as well as practitioners in the fields of Law, Economics, Political Science, and Psychology. Typical questions are: What is the optimal size of a panel of decision makers such as a jury, a political committee, or a board of directors? Which decision rule to utilize? Who should be the members of the team, representatives or professionals? What is the effect of strategic behaviour, group dynamics, conflict of interests, free riding, social interactions, and personal interdependencies on the final collective decision? This article presents current thinking in the field, offers suggestions for further research, and alludes to possible future developments regarding public choice and collective decision making.

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (10) ◽  
pp. 13722-13723
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Lisowski

In my PhD project I study the algorithmic aspects of strategic behaviour in collective decision making, with the special focus on voting mechanisms. I investigate two manners of manipulation: (1) strategic selection of candidates from groups of potential representatives and (2) influence on voters located in a social network.


Author(s):  
Thea Van der Westhuizen ◽  
Max Mkhonta

Co-engagement of organisation leadership in collective decision-making is recognised as a key modality for encouragement of collective creativity as well as responsible and sustainable business practices. In cases of public enterprise (PE) collective decision-making regarding organisational policy is necessary for organisation leadership to co-engage with key decision-makers in government to ensure responsible and sustainable execution of policy. Often policy-making and implementation allows little scope for innovation and creativity, in other words, for flexibility, with direct consequences for success or failure of collaboration. This chapter explores key inferences such as the need for creative strategic intent; need for co-engagement; need for responsible and sustainable business practices to build morale and the need for innovate approach to policy-making.


1998 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-182
Author(s):  
Muhittin Oral ◽  
Ossama Kettani ◽  
Diane Poulin

This paper offers some reflections on the dynamics of globalization, competition, networking and collective decision making in relation with human systems in general and with collective decision making in particular. Globalization and competition are closely connected to one another and their interaction fosters worldwide networking among companies, organizations, and governments. This considerably changes and influences the nature of group dynamics of stakeholders and the interrelationships among themselves. The most important of all is the way decisions are made. What is needed most now is a process of consensual decision making in order to reflect the values and interests of all those stakeholders who are involved in, implicated or affected by such a process. Although the interaction between globalization, competition, and networking will be discussed in some detail, the emphasis will be on collective and consensual decision making. The paper concludes by suggesting a framework for a research agenda.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 897-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Austen-Smith ◽  
William H. Riker

Legislators' beliefs, preferences, and intentions are communicated in committees and legislatures through debates, the proposal of bills and amendments, and the recording of votes. Because such information is typically distributed asymmetrically within any group of decision makers, legislators have incentives to reveal or conceal private information strategically and thus manipulate the collective decision-making process in their favor. In consequence, any committee decision may in the end reflect only the interests of a minority. We address a problem of sharing information through debate in an endogenous, agenda-setting, collective-choice process. The model is game theoretic and we find in the equilibrium to the game that at least some legislators have incentives to conceal private information. Consequently, the final committee decision can be “incoherent” by failing to reflect the preferences of all committee members fully. Additionally, we characterize the subset of legislators with any incentive to conceal data.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1420-1433
Author(s):  
Thea Van der Westhuizen ◽  
Max Mkhonta

Co-engagement of organisation leadership in collective decision-making is recognised as a key modality for encouragement of collective creativity as well as responsible and sustainable business practices. In cases of public enterprise (PE) collective decision-making regarding organisational policy is necessary for organisation leadership to co-engage with key decision-makers in government to ensure responsible and sustainable execution of policy. Often policy-making and implementation allows little scope for innovation and creativity, in other words, for flexibility, with direct consequences for success or failure of collaboration. This chapter explores key inferences such as the need for creative strategic intent; need for co-engagement; need for responsible and sustainable business practices to build morale and the need for innovate approach to policy-making.


Author(s):  
Zoi Terzopoulou ◽  
Ulle Endriss

AbstractWe analyse the incentives of individuals to misrepresent their truthful judgments when engaged in collective decision-making. Our focus is on scenarios in which individuals reason about the incentives of others before choosing which judgments to report themselves. To this end, we introduce a formal model of strategic behaviour in logic-based judgment aggregation that accounts for such higher-level reasoning as well as the fact that individuals may only have partial information about the truthful judgments and preferences of their peers. We find that every aggregation rule must belong to exactly one of three possible categories: it is either (i) immune to strategic manipulation for every level of reasoning, or (ii) manipulable for every level of reasoning, or (iii) immune to manipulation only for every kth level of reasoning, for some natural number k greater than 1.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Addison Pan ◽  
Simona Fabrizi ◽  
Steffen Lippert

Abstract We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "


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