Co-Engagement of Organisational Leadership in Collective Decision-Making

2017 ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Thea Van der Westhuizen ◽  
Max Mkhonta
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Enterprise ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Sustainable Business ◽  
Strategic Intent ◽  
Collective Creativity

Co-engagement of organisation leadership in collective decision-making is recognised as a key modality for encouragement of collective creativity as well as responsible and sustainable business practices. In cases of public enterprise (PE) collective decision-making regarding organisational policy is necessary for organisation leadership to co-engage with key decision-makers in government to ensure responsible and sustainable execution of policy. Often policy-making and implementation allows little scope for innovation and creativity, in other words, for flexibility, with direct consequences for success or failure of collaboration. This chapter explores key inferences such as the need for creative strategic intent; need for co-engagement; need for responsible and sustainable business practices to build morale and the need for innovate approach to policy-making.

Co-Engagement of Organisational Leadership in Collective Decision-Making

2020 ◽  
pp. 1420-1433
Author(s):  
Thea Van der Westhuizen ◽  
Max Mkhonta
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Enterprise ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Sustainable Business ◽  
Strategic Intent ◽  
Collective Creativity

Co-engagement of organisation leadership in collective decision-making is recognised as a key modality for encouragement of collective creativity as well as responsible and sustainable business practices. In cases of public enterprise (PE) collective decision-making regarding organisational policy is necessary for organisation leadership to co-engage with key decision-makers in government to ensure responsible and sustainable execution of policy. Often policy-making and implementation allows little scope for innovation and creativity, in other words, for flexibility, with direct consequences for success or failure of collaboration. This chapter explores key inferences such as the need for creative strategic intent; need for co-engagement; need for responsible and sustainable business practices to build morale and the need for innovate approach to policy-making.

Collective Decision-Making and Jury Theorems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Paroush
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Group Dynamics ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Optimal Size ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Future Developments ◽  
Current Thinking

Issues related to collective decision making and to Condorcet jury theorems have been studied and publicly discussed for over two hundred years. Recently, there is a burgeoning interest in the topic by academicians as well as practitioners in the fields of Law, Economics, Political Science, and Psychology. Typical questions are: What is the optimal size of a panel of decision makers such as a jury, a political committee, or a board of directors? Which decision rule to utilize? Who should be the members of the team, representatives or professionals? What is the effect of strategic behaviour, group dynamics, conflict of interests, free riding, social interactions, and personal interdependencies on the final collective decision? This article presents current thinking in the field, offers suggestions for further research, and alludes to possible future developments regarding public choice and collective decision making.

Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 897-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Austen-Smith ◽  
William H. Riker
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Committee Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic

Legislators' beliefs, preferences, and intentions are communicated in committees and legislatures through debates, the proposal of bills and amendments, and the recording of votes. Because such information is typically distributed asymmetrically within any group of decision makers, legislators have incentives to reveal or conceal private information strategically and thus manipulate the collective decision-making process in their favor. In consequence, any committee decision may in the end reflect only the interests of a minority. We address a problem of sharing information through debate in an endogenous, agenda-setting, collective-choice process. The model is game theoretic and we find in the equilibrium to the game that at least some legislators have incentives to conceal private information. Consequently, the final committee decision can be “incoherent” by failing to reflect the preferences of all committee members fully. Additionally, we characterize the subset of legislators with any incentive to conceal data.

Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Addison Pan ◽  
Simona Fabrizi ◽  
Steffen Lippert
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Decision Making Models ◽  
Conventional Models

Abstract We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority.

Islands of Stability: Engaging Emergence from Cellular Automata to the Occupy Movement

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pickering
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Black Box ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Occupy Movement ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1960S

"Instead of considering »being with« in terms of non-problematic, machine-like places, where reliable entities assemble in stable relationships, STS conjures up a world where the achievement of chancy stabilisations and synchronisations is local.We have to analyse how and where a certain regularity and predictability in the intersection of scientists and their instruments, say, or of human individuals and groups, is produced.The paper reviews models of emergence drawn from the history of cybernetics—the canonical »black box,« homeostats, and cellular automata—to enrich our imagination of the stabilisation process, and discusses the concept of »variety« as a way of clarifying its difficulty, with the antiuniversities of the 1960s and the Occupy movement as examples. Failures of »being with« are expectable. In conclusion, the paper reviews approaches to collective decision-making that reduce variety without imposing a neoliberal hierarchy. "

Corruption and Anticorruption in Democratic Athens

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Participatory Democracy ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Alexander The Great ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Individual Judgment ◽  
Collective Judgment ◽  
Hidden Knowledge

The chapter examines a major corruption scandal that involved the Athenian orator Demosthenes and an official of Alexander the Great. This episode reveals how tensions between individual and collective decision-making practices shaped Athenian understandings of corruption and anticorruption. The various and multiple anticorruption measures of Athens sought to bring ‘hidden’ knowledge into the open and thereby remove information from the realm of individual judgment, placing it instead into the realm of collective judgment. The Athenian experience therefore suggests that participatory democracy, and a civic culture that fosters political equality rather than reliance on individual expertise, provides a key bulwark against corruption.

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