Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Addison Pan ◽  
Simona Fabrizi ◽  
Steffen Lippert

Abstract We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority.

Author(s):  
Shmuel Nitzan ◽  
Jacob Paroush

Issues related to collective decision making and to Condorcet jury theorems have been studied and publicly discussed for over two hundred years. Recently, there is a burgeoning interest in the topic by academicians as well as practitioners in the fields of Law, Economics, Political Science, and Psychology. Typical questions are: What is the optimal size of a panel of decision makers such as a jury, a political committee, or a board of directors? Which decision rule to utilize? Who should be the members of the team, representatives or professionals? What is the effect of strategic behaviour, group dynamics, conflict of interests, free riding, social interactions, and personal interdependencies on the final collective decision? This article presents current thinking in the field, offers suggestions for further research, and alludes to possible future developments regarding public choice and collective decision making.


Author(s):  
Jörg Rothe

Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summarize recent advances related to Borda in computational social choice and, more generally, in collective decision making. We first present a variety of well known attacks modeling strategic behavior in voting—including manipulation, control, and bribery—and discuss how resistant Borda is to them in terms of computational complexity. We then describe how Borda can be used to maximize social welfare when indivisible goods are to be allocated to agents with ordinal preferences. Finally, we illustrate the use of Borda in forming coalitions of players in a certain type of hedonic game. All these approaches are central to applications in artificial intelligence.


1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannu Nurmi

Roughly two centuries ago the Marquis de Condorcet and Chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda originated a research tradition – by no means a continuous one – that over the decades has produced results casting doubt on many widely used collective decision-making procedures. The phenomenon known as the Condorcet effect or the Condorcet paradox is the well-known problem of the simple majority rule. The paradox bearing the name of Borda is less commonly known, but it also relates to a procedure that is widely used, namely the plurality principle. Either one of these paradoxes is serious enough to make these procedures suspect unless one is convinced that the situations giving rise to these paradoxical features are extremely rare. In this article we review some voting procedures that have been introduced in the literature. We aim at giving a synthesis of the assessments of procedures with respect to various criteria.


2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1789) ◽  
pp. 20141016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy M. Aplin ◽  
Damien R. Farine ◽  
Richard P. Mann ◽  
Ben C. Sheldon

There is increasing evidence that animal groups can maintain coordinated behaviour and make collective decisions based on simple interaction rules. Effective collective action may be further facilitated by individual variation within groups, particularly through leader–follower polymorphisms. Recent studies have suggested that individual-level personality traits influence the degree to which individuals use social information, are attracted to conspecifics, or act as leaders/followers. However, evidence is equivocal and largely limited to laboratory studies. We use an automated data-collection system to conduct an experiment testing the relationship between personality and collective decision-making in the wild. First, we report that foraging flocks of great tits ( Parus major ) show strikingly synchronous behaviour. A predictive model of collective decision-making replicates patterns well, suggesting simple interaction rules are sufficient to explain the observed social behaviour. Second, within groups, individuals with more reactive personalities behave more collectively, moving to within-flock areas of higher density. By contrast, proactive individuals tend to move to and feed at spatial periphery of flocks. Finally, comparing alternative simulations of flocking with empirical data, we demonstrate that variation in personality promotes within-patch movement while maintaining group cohesion. Our results illustrate the importance of incorporating individual variability in models of social behaviour.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 20160544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isobel Watts ◽  
Máté Nagy ◽  
Theresa Burt de Perera ◽  
Dora Biro

In animal groups where certain individuals have disproportionate influence over collective decisions, the whole group's performance may suffer if these individuals possess inaccurate information. Whether in such situations leaders can be replaced in their roles by better-informed group mates represents an important question in understanding the adaptive consequences of collective decision-making. Here, we use a clock-shifting procedure to predictably manipulate the directional error in navigational information possessed by established leaders within hierarchically structured flocks of homing pigeons ( Columba livia ). We demonstrate that in the majority of cases when leaders hold inaccurate information they lose their influence over the flock. In these cases, inaccurate information is filtered out through the rearrangement of hierarchical positions, preventing errors by former leaders from propagating down the hierarchy. Our study demonstrates that flexible decision-making structures can be valuable in situations where ‘bad’ information is introduced by otherwise influential individuals.


Author(s):  
Jan-Harm de Villiers

This article examines the conflict between procedure and substance. Substance should be favoured above procedure because where substance is at the heart of a legitimacy mechanism, collective decision-making can take place that makes a positive contribution and constructs an ethical society. Lawfulness and morality should be connected to give practical effect to such a model. Apartheid laws were collective decisions that were procedurally lawful, but were morally unsatisfactory. When a citizen faces a law that is immoral, and in terms of Aquinas irrational, it is not a law at all, and it should be resisted.


Author(s):  
Rob LeGrand ◽  
Timothy Roden ◽  
Ron K. Cytron

This chapter explores a new approach that may be used in game development to help human players and/or non-player characters make collective decisions. The chapter describes how previous work can be applied to allow game players to form a consensus from a simple range of possible outcomes in such a way that no player can manipulate it at the expense of the other players. Then, the text extends that result and shows how nonmanipulable consensus can be found in higher-dimensional outcome spaces. The results may be useful when developing artificial intelligence for non-player characters or constructing frameworks to aid cooperation among human players.


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