Public Choice and Austrian Economics

Author(s):  
Randall G. Holcombe

Austrian economics is a school of thought, while public choice is an area of inquiry, so one way to analyze the two together is to look at how the Austrian school approaches the subject matter of public choice. There are substantial and long-standing areas of commonality between Austrian ideas and the literature in public choice, but most Austrian school contributions to public choice are in the form of critiques of the ideas of public-choice theories rather than the development of an independent Austrian public-choice theory. Public choice analyzes collective decision-making processes, but Austrian economists often assume away collective decision-making issues to focus on knowledge problems that hinder government allocation of resources. For this and other reasons, an Austrian school analysis of collective decision-making processes remains underdeveloped. Austrian economics offers many insights that could be used to develop a more Austrian public-choice theory.

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 68-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Krakowski

The paper examines conditions under which communities threatened by armed groups amid the Colombian civil war are most likely to resist displacement. Using a game-theoretic framework and quantitative data, the paper shows that the threatened communities which expect rescue from an armed actor are more likely to resist displacement than those communities which expect no help. Community cohesion has a dual effect on displacement. The amount of peer support among community members reduces their chances to resist displacement, but the extent to which community members are involved in collective decision-making processes makes them less likely to displace. These findings reveal that both displaced communities and those that resisted displacement possess crucial social resources for their post-conflict recovery and development, such as cohesion and strong bonds of solidarity. The paper stresses the importance of local-level organisation coordinating collective decision-making to guarantee the most efficient use of these resources.


Author(s):  
Eva Thelisson

The research problem being investigated in this article is how to develop governance mechanisms and collective decision-making processes at a global level for Artificial Intelligence systems (AI) and Autonomous systems (AS), which would enhance confidence in AI and AS.


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