Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Follert ◽  
Lukas Richau ◽  
Eike Emrich ◽  
Christian Pierdzioch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Selection Of

AbstractVarious scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Public Choice and Austrian Economics

2015 ◽  
pp. 490-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall G. Holcombe
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Austrian Economics ◽  
Austrian School ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
The Subject

Austrian economics is a school of thought, while public choice is an area of inquiry, so one way to analyze the two together is to look at how the Austrian school approaches the subject matter of public choice. There are substantial and long-standing areas of commonality between Austrian ideas and the literature in public choice, but most Austrian school contributions to public choice are in the form of critiques of the ideas of public-choice theories rather than the development of an independent Austrian public-choice theory. Public choice analyzes collective decision-making processes, but Austrian economists often assume away collective decision-making issues to focus on knowledge problems that hinder government allocation of resources. For this and other reasons, an Austrian school analysis of collective decision-making processes remains underdeveloped. Austrian economics offers many insights that could be used to develop a more Austrian public-choice theory.

scholarly journals Coalitional Strategic Behaviour in Collective Decision Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (10) ◽  
pp. 13722-13723
Author(s):  
Grzegorz Lisowski
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Voting Mechanisms ◽  
Selection Of

In my PhD project I study the algorithmic aspects of strategic behaviour in collective decision making, with the special focus on voting mechanisms. I investigate two manners of manipulation: (1) strategic selection of candidates from groups of potential representatives and (2) influence on voters located in a social network.

scholarly journals Diverse Interests and International Legitimation: Public Choice Theory and the Politics of International Tax

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 265-269
Author(s):  
Lilian V. Faulhaber
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Profit Shifting ◽  
National Interests ◽  
The World ◽  
International Tax

In her article, Mason concludes that politics – or “bargaining over national interests”— “will play a starring role in determining the outcomes” of the current digital tax project. In this essay, I apply public choice theory to the politics of international tax and argue that two questions can shape our understanding of international tax negotiations and therefore help us predict the outcomes of future international tax reform projects. First, what interests are country delegates representing? Second, how are countries using their involvement in international negotiations to represent these interests? The first question highlights that country delegates are often not defending some agreed-upon “national interest” but are instead often protecting the interests of particular political parties, industries, or taxpayers, which in turn means that interests can change over time and that some voices are missing from debates. The second question highlights that country delegates can engage in international tax negotiations in a variety of ways. They can try to limit what, if anything, the negotiations achieve; they can try to push for more expansive results; and they can use the negotiations to provide international support for their own country's laws. This essay focuses on one particular version of this third type of engagement, where delegates use their country's involvement in an international project to validate and legitimate an idea or proposal that may previously have had little support. I refer to this involvement as “international legitimation,” and I argue that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project shows that delegates who took this approach may have achieved the most long-term success in that their inclusion of little-known provisions or concepts in the international outputs of the BEPS Project ended up leading to these provisions and concepts being adopted by countries around the world.

A Public Choice Perspective on the Legalization of Casino Gaming

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-45
Author(s):  
Miao He ◽  
Ricardo C. S. Siu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Public Choice Theory ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Public ◽  
Casino Gaming ◽  
Public Choice Perspective

The public choice theory is applied in this study to explore the effects of the expected economic benefits and cost of voters in the process of casino legalization. It is shown that in contrast to most voting processes, the emotional inclination of voters and the related changes have an explicit role in determining the decision made on a ballot for casino legalization. A model is therefore proposed based on the existing literature (for e.g., Morton, 1991; Olson, 1965; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) to show the interactions and decision making process of related policy makers, and beneficiary and anti-gaming groups. The arguments are elaborated and verified by using evidence from New Jersey and Taiwan, where state-wide referendums were adopted as part of the legalization process of casino gaming.

Democratic Reason

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Wisdom Of Crowds ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

Individual decision making can often be wrong due to misinformation, impulses, or biases. Collective decision making, on the other hand, can be surprisingly accurate. This book demonstrates that the very factors behind the superiority of collective decision making add up to a strong case for democracy. The book shows that the processes and procedures of democratic decision making form a cognitive system that ensures that decisions taken by the many are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few. Democracy as a form of government is therefore valuable not only because it is legitimate and just, but also because it is smart. The book considers how the argument plays out with respect to two main mechanisms of democratic politics: inclusive deliberation and majority rule. In deliberative settings, the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are enhanced more by inclusiveness than by individual competence. The book explores this idea in the contexts of representative democracy and the selection of representatives. It also discusses several models for the “wisdom of crowds” channeled by majority rule, examining the trade-offs between inclusiveness and individual competence in voting. When inclusive deliberation and majority rule are combined, they beat less inclusive methods, in which one person or a small group decides. The book thus establishes the superiority of democracy as a way of making decisions for the common good.

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