The Attributed to Aristotle

Author(s):  
Cristina D'Ancona

The pseudo-Theology of Aristotle is the most important example of the exposure of the cultivated Arab readership to Neoplatonism in Aristotle’s garb. Plotinus’s doctrines are construed as the exposition genuinely made by Aristotle himself. Plotinus’s One and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover merge, and the Plotinian principles Intellect and Soul are endowed with the task of letting the power of the First Cause expand until it reaches the world of coming-to-be and passing away. The great chain of being has its beginning in the First Principle: the One, the Pure Being, and Pure Good: every degree depends on it, and its power reaches the sublunar beings through the medium of Intellect and Soul. This causal chain is dominated by the pattern of the double journey of the soul, the way down along the necessary declension of the degrees of being, and the way back toward its homeland.

Author(s):  
Neal Robinson

Ibn al-‘Arabi was a mystic who drew on the writings of Sufis, Islamic theologians and philosophers in order to elaborate a complex theosophical system akin to that of Plotinus. He was born in Murcia (in southeast Spain) in AH 560/ad 1164, and died in Damascus in AH 638/ad 1240. Of several hundred works attributed to him the most famous are al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan Illuminations) and Fusus al-hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom). The Futuhat is an encyclopedic discussion of Islamic lore viewed from the perspective of the stages of the mystic path. It exists in two editions, both completed in Damascus – one in AH 629/ad 1231 and the other in AH 636/ad 1238 – but the work was conceived in Mecca many years earlier, in the course of a vision which Ibn al-‘Arabi experienced near the Kaaba, the cube-shaped House of God which Muslims visit on pilgrimage. Because of its length, this work has been relatively neglected. The Fusus, which is much shorter, comprises twenty-seven chapters named after prophets who epitomize different spiritual types. Ibn al-‘Arabi claimed that he received it directly from Muhammad, who appeared to him in Damascus in AH 627/ad 1229. It has been the subject of over forty commentaries. Although Ibn al-‘Arabi was primarily a mystic who believed that he possessed superior divinely-bestowed knowledge, his work is of interest to the philosopher because of the way in which he used philosophical terminology in an attempt to explain his inner experience. He held that whereas the divine Essence is absolutely unknowable, the cosmos as a whole is the locus of manifestation of all God’s attributes. Moreover, since these attributes require the creation for their expression, the One is continually driven to transform itself into Many. The goal of spiritual realization is therefore to penetrate beyond the exterior multiplicity of phenomena to a consciousness of what subsequent writers have termed the ‘unity of existence’. This entails the abolition of the ego or ‘passing away from self’ (fana’) in which one becomes aware of absolute unity, followed by ‘perpetuation’ (baqa’) in which one sees the world as at once One and Many, and one is able to see God in the creature and the creature in God.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Damascius posits a split for the Neoplatonic first principle into two aspects, or entities: the Ineffable as the ‘true’ first principle, and the One as the first cause of all things, as in Proclus, but subordinated to the Ineffable. Behind this distinction is an essential shift in the One’s causality, both as a response to and critique of Proclus’ One. I look at De Principiis I, 2–4, and I, 92–94, in relation to Proclus, seeing how Damascius transforms the One as causally synonymous with 'all things' (τά πάντα). In doing so, I show that Damascius both retains Proclus' basic argument that the One does not directly pre-contain plurality, and that the One *indirectly* anticipates plurality by causing 'all things'. By holding these two stances, Damascius appears to lead a *via media* between a Plotinian and a Proclean view of the One.[Colloquium presentation (LMU Munich/MUSAPH, Jan. 17, 2017; Universität Bonn, Jan. 30, 2017; KU Leuven, Mar. 23, 2017) and conference presentation (NAAP, Edinburgh, Apr. 10, 2017) summarizing a basic argument of the final chapter of my PhD thesis. The attached PDF is from the KU Leuven presentation.]


2002 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
David D. Corey

The article examines Voegelin's understanding of nous as the ground for theorizing, and relates this back to Aristotle. Aristotle is shown to have understood the activities of nous in two distinct ways. On the one hand, nous is the divine activity of the soul exploring its own ground. But nous is also induction (epagôgê) of the first principles of science through sense perception, memory and experience. The two basic activities of nous are related, but they have different values when it comes to the world of particulars. The argument is that a substantive ethical and political science—one that sheds light on particulars—must include the inductive employment of nous and that the exclusion of this from Voegelin's political science results in some discernible limitations.The limitations of Eric Voegelin—s work are sometimes difficult to keep in view, particularly while he is expounding upon the totality of Being, the myriad dimensions of human consciousness, and the nature of order in personal, social, and historical existence. But in fact Voegelin's work is more limited than his magisterial tone might suggest. The argument of this article is that while Voegelin offers his readers profoundly important insights into the structure of human consciousness and into what Aristotle called first philosophy, the study of being qua being, he does not offer his readers much in the way of a substantive ethical or political science.


Author(s):  
Robert Stern

This chapter covers Chapters 10 and 11 of The Ethical Demand, which focus on how Løgstrup sees the demand in relation to science on the one hand, and poetry on the other. In relation to science, Løgstrup argues for a form of philosophy that might be seen to challenge the ‘anti-metaphysical’ assumptions of scientific thinking, particularly in the way his account attributes a kind of normative authority to the demand as standing in judgement over our actions. Løgstrup also considers how far certain kinds of scientific determinism might pose a challenge to ethics, arguing that this challenge can be resisted. In Chapter 11, Løgstrup asks whether poetry can have implications for ethics, suggesting poetry can break through the triviality in which our lives are often lived, thus making us properly attentive to the world that surrounds us, including other people.


Perspectives ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-39
Author(s):  
Andrea Roselli

AbstractThe Verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) is traditionally considered a realist-correspondist model to explain the proximity of our best scientific theories to the way things really are in the world out there (ʻthe Truthʻ, with the capital ʻtʻ). However, VS is based on notions, such as ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ, that dilute the model in a functionalist-like theory. My thesis, then, is that VS tries to incorporate notions, such as ʻprogressʻ, in a pre-constituted metaphysical conception of the world, but fails in providing a fitting framework. The main argument that I will develop to support this claim is that the notions that they use to explain scientific progress (ʻestimated verisimilitudeʻ or ʻapproximate truthʻ) have nothing to do with ʻthe Truthʻ. After presenting Cevolani and Tamboloʻs answer (2013) to Birdʻs arguments (2007), I will claim that VS sacrifices the realist-correspondist truth in favor of an epistemic notion of truth, which can obviously be compatible with certain kinds of realism but not with the one the authors have in mind (the correspondence between our theories and the way things really are).


2020 ◽  
pp. 70-89
Author(s):  
Tomas Diez ◽  
Oscar Tomico ◽  
Mariana Quintero

While technology and design have progressed greatly, they have also produced imbalances that affect the way we live and work. Additionally, they have also contributed to the use of the planet’s resources to fill our homes with unnecessary devices and objects. We must de-objectify and de-colonise the way we design technologies to make for more inclusive and diverse futures. One way to do that is to recognise our shortcomings and experiment with them in a way that is productive and promotes a more peaceful coexistence among living systems. This research explores the concept and practice of identifying these shortcomings via the “Atlas of Weak Signals”. The Atlas is a tool for combatting future challenges by actively creating opportunities for design interventions to dissolve the troubling problems of our times. In order to support this claim, we present and analyse a series of projects developed over the course of a master’s programme. Specific emphasis is placed on how the Atlas of Weak Signals was generated between students and faculty as a methodology to better understand the view of the world in which we live today from the one in which we design from. The projects are mapped in relation to emerging trends in both local and global contexts and the interconnections between these trends as generators of design opportunities. To conclude, we present the lessons we learned in the form of a toolkit so other design practitioners, researchers, teachers, and students can generate their own methods and tools.


KronoScope ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
Frederick Turner

Abstract This summary of the fundamental insights of J.T. Fraser dwells on four main themes. The first is the way that Fraser disposes of the ancient struggle between monism and dualism, with its related problem of ontology versus epistemology. His tree-like vision of the evolution of the many out of the one is both ordered and open-ended. The second is his critique of philosophy’s (and science’s) tendency to reify simple, defined, pure, and exclusive abstractions. Subjectivity, intentionality, consciousness, freedom, mind, cause, and the experience of time are shown by him to be composite, present in different degrees and kinds in different organisms and different times, constructed and complex. The third theme is Fraser’s decisive refutation of the metaphor of time as a line, as in clocks, calendars, and the t-axis in science. We must explore other geometries. The fourth theme is Fraser’s rehabilitations of the arts, including literature, as potentially legitimate ways of understanding the world and exploring the nature of time.


Rhizomata ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Primavesi

AbstractIn a 1697 monograph, Gottfried Olearius (1672–1715) endeavours to establish Heraclitus as an important new witness for a general thesis upheld by Ralph Cudworth in 1678. According to Cudworth, Greek philosophers earlier than or independent of Leucippus combined a version of atomism with the belief that the world is ruled by God(s). Olearius tries to improve on Cudworth by showing that Heraclitus, who does not figure among Cudworth’s authorities, also upheld both atomism and theism. As to Heraclitean atomism, Olearius starts from a contra diction within the doxographical tradition: According to some authors, the first principle of Nature in Heraclitus is fire, according to others it is exhalation, i.e. air. Olearius suggests that neither “fire” nor “exhalation” can bear their ordinary meaning here, but that Heraclitus uses both terms to hint at very small, swiftly moved, indivisible particles; yet defining such particles as principles of nature must count as atomism. This result is confirmed by a metallurgical simile, apparently used by Heraclitus, which was taken by Aristotle and the doxographical tradition to imply that Heraclitus traced back everything there is to very small and indivisible fire particles prior to the One. The ascription of theism to Heraclitus, in turn, rests on two further texts which report that Heraclitus ascribed the periodical condensation and rarefaction of matter to a


1973 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 13-22
Author(s):  
A. Hilary Armstrong

Plotinus is, up to a point, a classical intellectualist in the manner of Aristotle, and, he would himself have certainly thought, of Plato. He professes, that is, to give an account of everything that is in any degree real in the universe (and even a kind of account of the unreal) which is certainly and unchangingly true and can be demonstrated to be so by rational processes. This account culminates in the description of an eternal realm of intelligible intellect which can be (and indeed really always is) our own, certainly and imperturbably possessed. This systematic account of reality, as is well known, breaks down, and we have to break out of it, in a very startling way at the top. Beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Intellect-Intelligible, the world of real being which is Νοῦς and νοητά, lies the One or Good beyond being, which is neither intelligent nor intelligible. When we have completed our understanding of reality, we have to leave it all behind in order to find what turns out to be the only thing we want, the source of all values and the goal of all desire, which alone makes it worth the effort to attain to Νοῦς on the way, as it is the only reason why Νοῦς is there at all.


Author(s):  
Anna Marmodoro

This chapter explores Gregory’s metaphysics of the Trinity, which used an innovative distinction between stuffs (e.g. gold), which cannot be counted, and individuals (e.g. rings), which can. Gregory identifies the nature of any kind with the totality of its instances: the nature of man is the totality of men; the nature of gold is the totality of gold. For Gregory, the totality is more ‘real’ than the individuals into which it is articulated, which are merely the way in which the kind is present in the world. God is then identified as the total quantity of divinity in the world, and is thus one, and real. The Persons of the Trinity into which God is articulated are the ways God is in the world, and can be comprehended by us. Thus, the problem of the Trinity is solved as a special case of the philosophical problem of the One and Many.


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