Voegelin and Aristotle on Nous: What is Noetic Political Science?

2002 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
David D. Corey

The article examines Voegelin's understanding of nous as the ground for theorizing, and relates this back to Aristotle. Aristotle is shown to have understood the activities of nous in two distinct ways. On the one hand, nous is the divine activity of the soul exploring its own ground. But nous is also induction (epagôgê) of the first principles of science through sense perception, memory and experience. The two basic activities of nous are related, but they have different values when it comes to the world of particulars. The argument is that a substantive ethical and political science—one that sheds light on particulars—must include the inductive employment of nous and that the exclusion of this from Voegelin's political science results in some discernible limitations.The limitations of Eric Voegelin—s work are sometimes difficult to keep in view, particularly while he is expounding upon the totality of Being, the myriad dimensions of human consciousness, and the nature of order in personal, social, and historical existence. But in fact Voegelin's work is more limited than his magisterial tone might suggest. The argument of this article is that while Voegelin offers his readers profoundly important insights into the structure of human consciousness and into what Aristotle called first philosophy, the study of being qua being, he does not offer his readers much in the way of a substantive ethical or political science.

Author(s):  
Neal Robinson

Ibn al-‘Arabi was a mystic who drew on the writings of Sufis, Islamic theologians and philosophers in order to elaborate a complex theosophical system akin to that of Plotinus. He was born in Murcia (in southeast Spain) in AH 560/ad 1164, and died in Damascus in AH 638/ad 1240. Of several hundred works attributed to him the most famous are al-Futuhat al-makkiyya (The Meccan Illuminations) and Fusus al-hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom). The Futuhat is an encyclopedic discussion of Islamic lore viewed from the perspective of the stages of the mystic path. It exists in two editions, both completed in Damascus – one in AH 629/ad 1231 and the other in AH 636/ad 1238 – but the work was conceived in Mecca many years earlier, in the course of a vision which Ibn al-‘Arabi experienced near the Kaaba, the cube-shaped House of God which Muslims visit on pilgrimage. Because of its length, this work has been relatively neglected. The Fusus, which is much shorter, comprises twenty-seven chapters named after prophets who epitomize different spiritual types. Ibn al-‘Arabi claimed that he received it directly from Muhammad, who appeared to him in Damascus in AH 627/ad 1229. It has been the subject of over forty commentaries. Although Ibn al-‘Arabi was primarily a mystic who believed that he possessed superior divinely-bestowed knowledge, his work is of interest to the philosopher because of the way in which he used philosophical terminology in an attempt to explain his inner experience. He held that whereas the divine Essence is absolutely unknowable, the cosmos as a whole is the locus of manifestation of all God’s attributes. Moreover, since these attributes require the creation for their expression, the One is continually driven to transform itself into Many. The goal of spiritual realization is therefore to penetrate beyond the exterior multiplicity of phenomena to a consciousness of what subsequent writers have termed the ‘unity of existence’. This entails the abolition of the ego or ‘passing away from self’ (fana’) in which one becomes aware of absolute unity, followed by ‘perpetuation’ (baqa’) in which one sees the world as at once One and Many, and one is able to see God in the creature and the creature in God.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas B. Bunte

ABSTRACTWhy do students enroll in political science courses? I conducted an experiment designed to test the appeal of three possible motivations: students might hope to develop valuable skills, look for a better grasp of current events, or expect a deeper understanding of how the world works and their place within it. The experiment involved visiting several sections of Introduction to American Government courses. In each section, I advertised a political science course offered in the following semester. However, I varied the way in which the course was described and subsequently tracked whether students enrolled in it. I find that highlighting opportunities to develop skills does not have a significant effect on enrollment. In contrast, emphasizing “how the world works” is most effective at increasing enrollment. Qualitative evidence suggests that students are attracted to this type of course because it offers the opportunity for personal development and growth.


Author(s):  
Emma Gannagé

On First Philosophy is the most emblematic work of Abū Yūsuf Ya‛qūb b. Isḥāq al-Kindī’s (ca. 801–ca. 870) surviving treatises. Aiming primarily to prove the oneness of God, the surviving part of the treatise consists of four chapters that form a consistent unit. The chapter provides a close reading of and commentary on the four chapters and shows how the texts unfold by following a very tight argument leading to the thesis toward which the whole treatise seems to aim: the true One, who is the principle of unity and hence the principle of existence of all beings, on the one hand, and the absolutely transcendent God, which can be approached only through a negative theology, on the other, are one and the same principle. In the meantime, al-Kindī would have demonstrated the noneternity of the world and shown the impossibility of finding sheer unity in the sensible world.


Author(s):  
Cristina D'Ancona

The pseudo-Theology of Aristotle is the most important example of the exposure of the cultivated Arab readership to Neoplatonism in Aristotle’s garb. Plotinus’s doctrines are construed as the exposition genuinely made by Aristotle himself. Plotinus’s One and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover merge, and the Plotinian principles Intellect and Soul are endowed with the task of letting the power of the First Cause expand until it reaches the world of coming-to-be and passing away. The great chain of being has its beginning in the First Principle: the One, the Pure Being, and Pure Good: every degree depends on it, and its power reaches the sublunar beings through the medium of Intellect and Soul. This causal chain is dominated by the pattern of the double journey of the soul, the way down along the necessary declension of the degrees of being, and the way back toward its homeland.


2000 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROXANNE LYNN DOTY

Alex Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics demonstrates perhaps more long and hard thought about social theory and its implications for international relations theory than most international relations scholars have dared to venture into. He admirably attempts to do in an explicit manner what most scholars in the discipline do only implicitly and often accidentally: suggest a social theory to serve as the foundation for theorizing about international relations. However, there are problems with his approach, a hint of which can be found in the epigraph he has chosen: ‘No science can be more secure than the unconscious metaphysics, which tacitly it presupposes’. Because metaphysics cannot ultimately be proven or disproved, it is inherently insecure. The insecurity and instability of the metaphysical presuppositions present in Social Theory are not difficult to find, and what Wendt ends up demonstrating, despite his objective not to, is the absence of any secure, stable, and unambiguous metaphysical foundation upon which IR theory could be firmly anchored. Indeed, what Social Theory does illustrate is that there is no such ultimate centre within the discipline except the powerful desire to maintain the illusion of first principles and the essential nature of things. If I may paraphrase Wendt, this is a ‘desire all the way down’ in that it permeates his relentless quest for the essence of international relations. Two goals characterize this desire: on the one hand, to take a critical stance toward more conventional international relations theory such as neorealism and neoliberalism; on the other, to maintain unity, stability, and order within the discipline. Social Theory oscillates between these two goals and in doing so deconstructs the very foundations it seeks to lay.


1964 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-402
Author(s):  
Dante Germino

Some fifty years ago, Douglas Ainslie wrote of Benedetto Croce: “I can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to have discovered a Columbus.” Eric Voegelin, today at the height of his career as a political philosopher, scarcely needs to be discovered; he is regarded as a Columbus in the realms of the spirit by many concerned with the the oretical analysis of politics. But in the political science profession he has been more often ignored or systematically misunderstood than read for what he has to teach. Among those according an indifferent or hostile reception to Voegelin are many who, bewailing the recent “decline” of political theory, might have been expected to welcome the appearance of a thinker meticulously pointing the way to the recovery of political theory as a tradition of inquiry. The basic reasons for this curious reception will be alluded to in the course of this essay. The major objective, however, is to isolate the key elements in Voegelin's political theory and to give some indication of his general position in contemporary political science. Hopefully, the result will be to further the understanding of his work and the appreciation of his achievement.


2002 ◽  
pp. 68-74
Author(s):  
K. Banek

Every year, an increasing number of scholarly and popular works on issues relating to the relationship between the fields of religion and politics appear around the world, especially in the English-speaking world. This shows, on the one hand, the growing importance and relevance of these problems, and on the other, the great interest of researchers in such issues. These works focus primarily on the connections and processes that take place in the world of Islam, in particular at the junction of the Islamic Christianity. Based on this, we can say that in our eyes a new scientific discipline is being created, which, on the model of existing religious disciplines (philosophy of religion, psychology of religion, sociology of religion and geography of religion), can be called the political science of religion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (12) ◽  
pp. 102-120
Author(s):  
Oleg A. Glebov

The paper examines the doctrine of understanding in Russian idealism from the late 19th to early 20th century. The author discusses the main ontological and epistemological concepts in the philosophy of V.S. Solovyov and his follower S.N. Trubetskoy. The paper offers a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the concept of understanding based on the analysis of V.S. Solovyov's Lectures on Divine Humanity and S.N. Trubetskoy's work On the Nature of Human Consciousness. According to Solovyov, the study of understanding is possible if we presume an unconditional principle that premises being as the One. Based on this premise, it is demonstrated that the unconditional principle allows to know everything without having knowledge of each subject separately, and this, in turn, is understanding process. Trubetskoy's theory of understanding is premised on the concept of soborny (gathered) mind, which defines mind as joint knowledge about all spheres of existence. The article shows that the main position shared by the Russian thinkers is the unconditional principle serving as the basis for life and mind without which the existence of either the universal or the particular is impossible. The author concludes that such a principle is a cognitive relation to the world, which unconditionality is the condition for understanding the reality as indivisible. Understanding, as presented by V.S. Solovyov and S.N. Trubetskoy, is the true understanding of the unity of existence in all its manifestations, that is, a synthesis of the sensual, rational, moral, and aesthetic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Irene Viparelli

Why transdisciplinary theory seems to be indifferent to political thought; focusing mainly on the domains of epistemology, ethics and education? Searching a response, we will divided the analyse into three fundamental moments: first, we will try to clarify what’s “transdisciplinarity”. Then, we will explore the relationship between transdisciplinarity and disciplinary knowledge, focusing on the specific relationship between transdisciplinarity and political science. Finally, we will advance two hypotheses: on the one hand, we’ll demonstrate that “politics” is “the removed” of transdisciplinarity, on the other hand, we’ll suggest the need of a “politicization” of transdisciplinary theory to achieve its main objective: being a theory involved in the transformation of the world Resumo O questionamento em torno das condições de possibilidade e das consequências duma abordagem transdisciplinar da política embate logo no problema da essencial indiferença da transdisciplinaridade face ao pensamento político; a reflexão transdisciplinar focando-se até agora principalmente nos domínios da epistemologia, da ética, da educação. A nossa análise dividir-se-á em três momentos fundamentais: em primeiro lugar, e de forma preliminar, cuidaremos de esclarecer o que é para intender com “transdisciplinaridade”. Em seguida, especificando a nossa investigação, levaremos a cabo uma análise da relação entre transdisciplinaridade e saberes disciplinares, focando o olhar quer na relação geral entre transdisciplinaridade e ciências humanas quer na específica entre a transdisciplinaridade e a ciência política. Por fim, avançaremos duas hipóteses fundamentais, estritamente ligadas entre elas: por um lado a de que o “político” representa o “removido” da transdisciplinaridade, por outro, e por conseguinte, a de que apenas uma “politização” do dispositivo teórico transdisciplinar lhe permitiria alcançar o seu principal objetivo: tornar-se uma teoria capaz de desempenhar um papel ativo na transformação do mundo.


Author(s):  
Brian P. McLaughlin

We learn about the world through our five senses: by seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling. Sense perception is a primary means by which we acquire knowledge of contingent matters of fact. We can also acquire such knowledge by, for instance, conscious reasoning and through the written and spoken testimony of others; but knowledge so acquired is derivative, in that it must be based, ultimately, on knowledge arrived at in more primary ways, such as by sense perception. We can perceive something without acquiring any knowledge about it; for knowledge requires belief, and we can perceive something without having any beliefs about it. Viewing any but the most simple visual scenes we see many things we form no beliefs about. However, when we perceive something, we are acquainted with it by its sensorially appearing (looking, sounding, smelling and so on) some way to us. For we see something if and only if it looks some way to us, hear something if and only if it sounds some way to us, and so on. When, based on how they appear, we form true beliefs about things we perceive, the beliefs sometimes count as knowledge. Often the way something appears is the way it is. The red, round tomato looks red and round; the sour milk tastes sour. But the senses are fallible. Sometimes the way something appears is different from the way it is. Appearances can fail to match reality, as happens to various extents in cases of illusion. There are, for instance, optical illusions (straight sticks look bent at the water line) and psychological ones (despite being exactly the same length, the Müller-Lyer arrows drawings look different in length). In such cases, looks are misleading. The ever-present logical possibility of illusion makes beliefs acquired by perception fallible: there is no absolute guarantee that they are true. But that does not prevent them from sometimes counting as knowledge – albeit fallible knowledge. Recognitional abilities enable us to obtain knowledge about things from how they perceptually appear. Sense perception thus acquaints us with things in a way that contributes to positioning us to acquire knowledge about them. The central epistemic issues about sense perception concern its role in so positioning us.


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