scholarly journals Damascius on the One's causality as 'All Things' (ta panta)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Damascius posits a split for the Neoplatonic first principle into two aspects, or entities: the Ineffable as the ‘true’ first principle, and the One as the first cause of all things, as in Proclus, but subordinated to the Ineffable. Behind this distinction is an essential shift in the One’s causality, both as a response to and critique of Proclus’ One. I look at De Principiis I, 2–4, and I, 92–94, in relation to Proclus, seeing how Damascius transforms the One as causally synonymous with 'all things' (τά πάντα). In doing so, I show that Damascius both retains Proclus' basic argument that the One does not directly pre-contain plurality, and that the One *indirectly* anticipates plurality by causing 'all things'. By holding these two stances, Damascius appears to lead a *via media* between a Plotinian and a Proclean view of the One.[Colloquium presentation (LMU Munich/MUSAPH, Jan. 17, 2017; Universität Bonn, Jan. 30, 2017; KU Leuven, Mar. 23, 2017) and conference presentation (NAAP, Edinburgh, Apr. 10, 2017) summarizing a basic argument of the final chapter of my PhD thesis. The attached PDF is from the KU Leuven presentation.]

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig

Proclus introduces the concept of the unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον) (P1) among two other terms— the participated (P2) and participant (P3)—as the first principle (ἀρχή) of any given series of entities or Forms in his metaphysical structure. For instance, the unparticipated monad (P1), Soul, generates all individual, participated souls (P2), which in turn generate the attribute of life in their respective, participating bodies (P3). Proclus looks at (P2) as an efficient cause of (P3), where (P2) must be the attribute in actuality in relation to the attribute it brings about in (P3). At the outset, this suggests that (P2) is necessary and sufficient for (P3), which then implies a problem for positing (P1): if (P2) is doing the causal legwork for (P3), what role does (P1) play? One of Proclus’ main explanations is that (P1) is responsible for ‘unifying’ the multiple participated entities (P2), so that the commonality of the participated entities (P2) must go back to a separate source (P1). However, one could easily respond that this just amounts to a reversion to a priori Platonist principles for transcendent, separate Forms without providing a real justification for the necessity of (P1) as a cause. In my talk, I wish to elaborate on how Proclus thinks about (P1)’s type of causation in relation to (P2) and (P3), particularly showing why (P2) for Proclus is ultimately insufficient as an efficient cause compared to (P1) as the absolute first cause for a given series.[Early work on a PhD thesis chapter — presentation for the University of Edinburgh, July 16, 2017. Any comments or feedback are welcome!]


Author(s):  
Cristina D'Ancona

The pseudo-Theology of Aristotle is the most important example of the exposure of the cultivated Arab readership to Neoplatonism in Aristotle’s garb. Plotinus’s doctrines are construed as the exposition genuinely made by Aristotle himself. Plotinus’s One and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover merge, and the Plotinian principles Intellect and Soul are endowed with the task of letting the power of the First Cause expand until it reaches the world of coming-to-be and passing away. The great chain of being has its beginning in the First Principle: the One, the Pure Being, and Pure Good: every degree depends on it, and its power reaches the sublunar beings through the medium of Intellect and Soul. This causal chain is dominated by the pattern of the double journey of the soul, the way down along the necessary declension of the degrees of being, and the way back toward its homeland.


Author(s):  
Ursula Coope

The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves: they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for nonbodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. This book discusses this notion of freedom, and its relation to questions about responsibility. It explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility. Part I sets out the puzzles Neoplatonist philosophers face about freedom and responsibility and explains how these puzzles arise from earlier discussions. Part II looks at the metaphysical underpinnings of the Neoplatonist notion of freedom (concentrating especially on the views of Plotinus and Proclus). In what sense (if any) is the ultimate first principle of everything (the One) free? If everything else is under this ultimate first principle, how can anything other than the One be free? What is the connection between freedom and nonbodiliness? Part III looks at questions about responsibility, arising from this perfectionist view of freedom. Why are human beings responsible for their behaviour, in a way that other animals are not? If we are enslaved when we act viciously, how can we be to blame for our vicious actions and choices?


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rochelle Lieber

A lively introduction to morphology, this textbook is intended for undergraduates with relatively little background in linguistics. It shows students how to find and analyze morphological data and presents them with basic concepts and terminology concerning the mental lexicon, inflection, derivation, morphological typology, productivity, and the interfaces between morphology and syntax on the one hand and phonology on the other. By the end of the text students are ready to understand morphological theory and how to support or refute theoretical proposals. Providing data from a wide variety of languages, the text includes hands-on activities designed to encourage students to gather and analyse their own data. The third edition has been thoroughly updated with new examples and exercises. Chapter 2 now includes an updated detailed introduction to using linguistic corpora, and there is a new final chapter covering several current theoretical frameworks.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Erman Sepniagus Saragih

AbstrakIndonesia adalah bangsa yang majemuk. Keadaan ini berpeluang dan sensitif terhadap konflik sosial jika sikap toleran yang rendah, kepentingan politik dan fanatisme. Tujuan penulisan yaitu menemukan makna teologi “Ketuhanan” dalam konteks pluralisme agama. Metologi penelitian dilakukan dengan studi analisis isi. Kesimpulannya yaitu, pertama; kata ketuhanan tidak boleh difahami dari aspek agama tertentu saja dalam kemajemukan di Indonesia. Kedua; ketuhanan berarti sifat-sifat yang mengindahkan Tuhan sebagai tampilan antropomorfis oleh agama manapun. Ketiga; Ketuhanan merupakan hasil sejarah perumusan sila pertama Pancasila dengan kesadaran akan bhineka sebagai realita yang harus dirawat, dijunjung tinggi dan dihormati dalam berbagai aspek hidup melebihi agama. Kata Kunci : Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, Pluralisme Agama, Teologi AbstractA plural nation these circumstances are likely and sensitive to social conflict if low tolerance, political interests and fanaticism. The purpose of writing is to find the meaning of theology of as mentioned earlier in the context of religious pluralism. The methodology by content analysis, further interpret theologically. The concludes the theological meaning of God in the first principle of the Pancasila; is first, the meaning of divinity should not be understood from certain aspects of religion only in the context of pluralism in Indonesian. Second; divinity means the properties of God or attributes that need the God as an anthropomorphic appereance of and for any religions. Third; the sentences of “belief in the one and only God is the achierement of reconciliation of the historical resultsof the first principle of pancasila with the awareness of the difference as a reality that must be nurtured, upheld and respected in various aspects of life beyond certain religious values. Keywords: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, Pluralism, Theology


Author(s):  
Lloyd P. Gerson

This chapter investigates the centrality of the Idea of the Good for Plato's ethics. It is certainly a remarkable fact that just as the Idea of the Good has little presence in the bulk of Anglo-American scholarship on Plato's metaphysics, so it has little presence in accounts of Plato's ethics. The chapter demonstrates that any account of Platonic ethics is seriously deficient if the superordinate Idea of the Good is not the main focus and if the Good is not identified as the absolutely simple first principle of all, the One. There may be a number of reasons for the lack of interest in the Idea of the Good among students of Plato. At least one of these is that it is supposed that Aristotle's critique of the Form of the Good in his Nicomachean Ethics is decisive. The chapter then considers the knowledge of the Forms of the Virtues, and looks at goodness as integrative unity. It also studies the connection between eros and the Good, which is made explicitly by Plotinus in one of the most remarkable passages in his Enneads.


2020 ◽  
pp. 255-289
Author(s):  
Christine Walker

The final chapter probes the ambivalent and varied intimate connections between free, formerly enslaved, and enslaved people from another angle, investigating women’s manumission practices. Manumission or legal freedom has typically been portrayed as a reward offered by white men to the enslaved women whom they maintained largely coercive sexual relationships with. Focusing on women’s manumission directives tells a different story. Whereas men preferred to manumit their biological children, female slaveholders largely freed other adult women whom they perceived to be intimate companions. Women also displayed an interest in manumitting enslaved children, whom they treated as surrogate kin. Women sought to blend these children into their own families, bestowing money, education, and enslaved people on them. A notable portion of female enslavers bestowed money, property, and slaves on the people whom they manumitted. Their actions had multivalent consequences. On the one hand, women who manumitted captives aggregated the community of free people of African descent on the island. On the other, they used slaveholding to co-opt freed people into Jamaica’s slaveholding system. In a place where liberty and slavery were mutually constitutive, enslaving others became a key means of securing and protecting one’s free status.


Open Theology ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Batovici

Abstract The O.9.27 manuscript of Trinity College Cambridge is a minuscule manuscript of Hesiod’s Opera et Dies. In a 2001 PhD thesis on Greek palimpsests in Cambridge by Natalie Tchernetska, this manuscript is described to contain two distinct lower scripts, one of which identified as a New Testament text. The author read four lines and a partial fifth of the one-leaf palimpsest that contain Mark 1:44, which is remarkable considering that the washing made the lower script virtually the same colour as the page. This note re-examines the Markan lower script in O.9.27 and offers an account of the use of image processing software for the purpose to uncover more text in a difficult palimpsest, a method useful when MSI is not available.


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. 224-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
René van Woudenberg

This paper argues that Reid's first principle of design can be more widely accepted then one might suppose, due to the fact that it specifies no marks of design. Also it is explicated that the relation of the principle, on the one hand, and properly basic design beliefs on the other, is a relation of presupposition. It is furthermore suggested that Reid's discussion of what can be done in case of disagreement about first principles points to a position that is relevant to the current debates in the Epistemology of Disagreement literature and that merits further elaboration.


2004 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 43-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter E.A. van Beek

It really was a chance occasion, just before Christmas 2003. On my way to the Dogon area I had greeted my friends in Sangha, and was speaking with a Dutch friend, when a French tourist lady suddenly barged into the hall of the hotel and asked me: “There should be a cavern with a mural depicting Sirius and the position of all the planets. I saw it in a book. Where is it?”. My friend smiled wrily, amused by the irony of situation: by chance the lady had fallen upon the one who had spent decennia to disprove this kind of “information”. “In what book?” I asked, and named a few. It was none of these, and she could not tell me. Cautiously (maybe she had planned her whole trip around this Sirius “experience”) I explained to her that though there was a lot to see, this particular mural did not exist. She left immediately, probably convinced she stumbled on a real ignoramus.In retrospect I never meant to criticize Marcel Griaule, it just happened as a consequence of other choices, which eventually led me to Dogon country. After completing my PhD thesis on the Kapsiki/Higi of northern Cameroun and northeastern Nigeria, I started scouting for a second area of field research. For two reasons, I wanted a comparable setting: to allow myself to feel at home easily because I seemed to have less time, and to use in general the approach of controlled comparison. In my first field research I had made a more or less classic ethnography of a group of comparable size (150,000) in a similar environment, living in the Mandara Mountains south of Lake Chad and straddling the border between northern Cameroun and North Eastern Nigeria.


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