Damascius on the One's causality as 'All Things' (ta panta)
Damascius posits a split for the Neoplatonic first principle into two aspects, or entities: the Ineffable as the ‘true’ first principle, and the One as the first cause of all things, as in Proclus, but subordinated to the Ineffable. Behind this distinction is an essential shift in the One’s causality, both as a response to and critique of Proclus’ One. I look at De Principiis I, 2–4, and I, 92–94, in relation to Proclus, seeing how Damascius transforms the One as causally synonymous with 'all things' (τά πάντα). In doing so, I show that Damascius both retains Proclus' basic argument that the One does not directly pre-contain plurality, and that the One *indirectly* anticipates plurality by causing 'all things'. By holding these two stances, Damascius appears to lead a *via media* between a Plotinian and a Proclean view of the One.[Colloquium presentation (LMU Munich/MUSAPH, Jan. 17, 2017; Universität Bonn, Jan. 30, 2017; KU Leuven, Mar. 23, 2017) and conference presentation (NAAP, Edinburgh, Apr. 10, 2017) summarizing a basic argument of the final chapter of my PhD thesis. The attached PDF is from the KU Leuven presentation.]