scholarly journals Ontological Dependence and Grounding in Aristotle

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phil Corkum
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Dependence ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Metaphysical Explanation

The relation of ontological dependence or grounding, expressed by the terminology of separation and priority in substance, plays a central role in Aristotle’sCategories, Metaphysics, De Animaand elsewhere. The article discusses three current interpretations of this terminology. These are drawn along the lines of, respectively, modal-existential ontological dependence, essential ontological dependence, and grounding or metaphysical explanation. I provide an opinionated introduction to the topic, raising the main interpretative questions, laying out a few of the exegetical and philosophical options that influence one’s reading, and locating questions of Aristotle scholarship within the discussion of ontological dependence and grounding in contemporary metaphysics.

Symmetric Dependence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Barnes
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Dependence ◽  
Metaphysical Explanation ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Way

Metaphysical orthodoxy maintains that the relation of ontological dependence is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. The goal of this paper is to challenge that orthodoxy by arguing that ontological dependence should be understood as non-symmetric, rather than asymmetric. A series of cases across a wide range of ontological commitments are presented, and it is argued that each case should be understood as one in which the relation of dependence holds symmetrically. If these arguments work, however, they provide reasons to be skeptical of the way in which contemporary discussions typically lump dependence together with relations such as grounding and in virtue of, which arguably need to be understood as asymmetric. If the asymmetry of dependence is relinquished, interesting things follow for what can be said about metaphysical explanation—particularly for the prospects of explanatory holism.

Aristotle's Formal Identity of Intellect and Object: A Solution to the Problem of Modal Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-107
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Object A ◽  
Formal Identity ◽  
Identity Thesis ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Objects ◽  
Aristotelian Metaphysics

In De Anima Book III, Aristotle subscribed to a theory of formal identity between the human mind and the extra-mental objects of our understanding. This has been one of the most controversial features of Aristotelian metaphysics of the mind. I offer here a defense of the Formal Identity Thesis, based on specifically epistemological arguments about our knowledge of necessary or essential truths.

The Moving Cause of Artefacts: the role of techne in metaphysical explanation

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-83
Author(s):  
Margaret Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Metaphysical Explanation ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The Creation

The essence of artefacts is typically taken to be their function: they are defined in terms of the goals or aims of the artisans that make them. In this paper, an alternative theory is proposed that emphasizes, via a reconstruction of Aristotle's various comments about the nature of artefacts, the role of the moving, or efficient, cause of artefacts. This account shifts the emphasis to the role played by the investment of expertise into the creation (and subsequent being) of artefacts. It turns out that expertise is prior in being and prior in explanation to the function of artefacts, and thus plays the most fundamental role in the explanation of the ontology of artefacts.

Social Explanation: Structures, Stories, and Ontology. A Reply to Díaz León, Saul, and Sterken

Disputatio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (50) ◽  
pp. 245-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sally Haslanger
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
Critical Social Theory ◽  
Social Agency ◽  
Metaphysical Explanation ◽  
Gender And Race ◽  
Social Explanation ◽  
Critical Social

Abstract In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Ra- chel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical is- sues about realism with respect to gender and race. I aim to demon- strate that tools we develop in the context of critical social theory can change the questions we ask, what forms of explanation are called for, and how we do philosophy.

Pentingnya Forma Substansial Dalam Memahami Esensi Kehidupan

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Effendi Kusuma Sunur
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Science ◽  
Metaphysical Explanation ◽  
Substantial Form ◽  
The Earth ◽  
Living Things

Abstract: What is life? What does it mean when we say that something is alive? What makes something alive? Biology answers the questions with a lot of answers but the answers to the question “what is life?” always have its limitation because its status as an empirical science which starts from the diversity of living things on the Earth. In other words, the answers are not sufficient although they are necessary for us to know what life is. Biology needs a metaphysical explanation to understand more completely the question “what is life?” Metaphysic through the concept of “substantial form” of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought can contribute an understanding that complements biology to understand “what is life?” with its immanent cause. Keywords: Substantial form, immanent cause, formal cause. Abstrak: Apakah itu kehidupan? Apa artinya ketika kita mengatakan sesuatu sebagai “yang hidup?” Apa yang membuat sesuatu hidup? Biologi menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dengan berbagai macam jawaban namun jawaban-jawaban biologi terhadap pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” selalu memiliki keterbatasan karena statusnya sebagai ilmu empiris yang berangkat dari keanekaragaman hayati yang ada di bumi ini. Dengan kata lain, jawaban-jawaban biologi tidak mencukupi walau merupakan hal yang mutlak perlu untuk mengetahui apa yang dimaksud dengan kehidupan. Biologi memerlukan penjelasan metafisis untuk bisa mendapatkan pemahaman yang lebih lengkap akan pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” Metafisika melalui konsep “forma substansial” Aristotelian-Thomistik dapat menyumbangkan pemahaman yang melengkapi biologi untuk memahami “apakah itu kehidupan?” dengan Causa imanennya. Kata-kata Kunci: Forma substansial, causa imanen, causa formal.

La Phantasia dans le De anima d'Aristote

Pallas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-51
Author(s):  
Noël Aujoulat
Keyword(s):  
De Anima

Dos momentos en De Ánima de Juan García Ponce: Ecfrasis y apropiacionismo

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-120
Author(s):  
Mildred Castillo Cadenas
Keyword(s):  
Carl Jung ◽  
Digital Archive ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Edouard Manet ◽  
Juan Garcia Ponce

Este artículo analiza dos momentos en la novela De Ánima (1984) de Juan García Ponce, en los cuales se utiliza el recurso de la ecfrasis y el apropiacionismo. Me aproximaré a estas estrategias con el objetivo de observar su funcionamiento en la estructura narrativa, además del efecto de sentido que producen en una lectura que los considere. También pretendo detallar algunas cuestiones de la relación pintura-escritura para observar el tratamiento intermedial establecido por el autor. El primer momento revisa la relación de una obra del pintor Lucas Cranach el Viejo y el procedimiento narrativo utilizado por García Ponce para articular a Paloma, protagonista femenina. El segundo momento contempla el análisis de dos ecfrasis, cuyo origen es Le Déjeuner sur l'Herbe de Édouard Manet, desde dos perspectivas de la misma representación visual. Asimismo, prestaré atención al tratamiento apropiacionista y su efecto de sentido derivado. El artículo se apoya en la noción de ecfrasis de Luz Aurora Pimentel, Irene Artigas y James Heffernan; la estructura abismada de Helena Beristáin; el apropiacionismo de Juan Martín Prada; y el concepto ánima-animus de Carl Jung. Para las imágenes se hace referencia al Cranach Digital Archive.

Explanation, Idealism, and Design

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Greco
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Metaphysical Explanation

The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it shows how versions of physicalism, dualism, and idealism can be formulated as theses about grounding, or metaphysical explanation, rather than as more straightforwardly ontological theses concerning what exists. Second, it argues that this reformulation provides a helpful lens through which to look at arguments in the philosophy of religion. In particular, traditional versions of theism are naturally understood as versions of idealism, once idealism is understood as a thesis about grounding. The chapter goes on to argue that once theism is seen as a version of idealism, theistic arguments from design—in particular, fine-tuning arguments—can be seen to have a limitation that is otherwise easy to overlook. Such arguments can be understood as aiming to convince, not just the atheist, but the physicalist and/or dualist. And this turns out to be harder than one might have thought.

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