Aristotle's Formal Identity of Intellect and Object: A Solution to the Problem of Modal Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-107
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons

In De Anima Book III, Aristotle subscribed to a theory of formal identity between the human mind and the extra-mental objects of our understanding. This has been one of the most controversial features of Aristotelian metaphysics of the mind. I offer here a defense of the Formal Identity Thesis, based on specifically epistemological arguments about our knowledge of necessary or essential truths.

Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (13) ◽  
pp. 4289
Author(s):  
Daniel Martinez-Marquez ◽  
Sravan Pingali ◽  
Kriengsak Panuwatwanich ◽  
Rodney A. Stewart ◽  
Sherif Mohamed

Most accidents in the aviation, maritime, and construction industries are caused by human error, which can be traced back to impaired mental performance and attention failure. In 1596, Du Laurens, a French anatomist and medical scientist, said that the eyes are the windows of the mind. Eye tracking research dates back almost 150 years and it has been widely used in different fields for several purposes. Overall, eye tracking technologies provide the means to capture in real time a variety of eye movements that reflect different human cognitive, emotional, and physiological states, which can be used to gain a wider understanding of the human mind in different scenarios. This systematic literature review explored the different applications of eye tracking research in three high-risk industries, namely aviation, maritime, and construction. The results of this research uncovered the demographic distribution and applications of eye tracking research, as well as the different technologies that have been integrated to study the visual, cognitive, and attentional aspects of human mental performance. Moreover, different research gaps and potential future research directions were highlighted in relation to the usage of additional technologies to support, validate, and enhance eye tracking research to better understand human mental performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29
Author(s):  
Giacomo Benedetti

The action noun adhimukti derives from the verb adhi-muc, not attested in Classical Sanskrit but in P?li. It is regularly used in the passive, with the original meaning ‘to be fastened to’, and then ‘to adhere’. This meaning is not used in a concrete sense, but in a metaphorical one, referred to mind and mental objects, so that adhimukti can be used to express inclination, faith in a doctrine, and also intentional and stable representation of an image or an idea in meditative practice, sometimes with the effect of transformation of external reality. The common feature appears to be adherence or the fixing of the mind on its object.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
George F. R. Ellis

Both bottom-up and top-down causation occur in the hierarchy of structure and causation. A key feature is multiple realizability of higher level functions, and consequent existence of equivalence classes of lower level variables that correspond to the same higher level state. Five essentially different classes of top-down influence can be identified, and their existence demonstrated by many real-world examples. They are: algorithmic top-down causation; top-down causation via non-adaptive information control, top-down causation via adaptive selection, top-down causation via adaptive information control and intelligent top-down causation (the effect of the human mind on the physical world). Through the mind, abstract entities such as mathematical structures have causal power. The causal slack enabling top-down action to take place lies in the structuring of the system so as to attain higher level functions; in the way the nature of lower level elements is changed by context, and in micro-indeterminism combined with adaptive selection. Understanding top-down causation can have important effects on society. Two cases will be mentioned: medical/healthcare issues, and education—in particular, teaching reading and writing. In both cases, an ongoing battle between bottom-up and top-down approaches has important consequences for society.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joerg Fingerhut

This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media have on our mind. To grasp this impact, I propose an enactive account of media that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city) that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on the continuous re-mediation of our mind.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Young

ArgumentThroughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the “evolutionary Freud” is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the “Overview of the Transference Neurosis” (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called “Freud wars.” Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the “Overview” and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.


1996 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 73-88
Author(s):  
Werner Hüllen

Summary Concerning the methods of language teaching, Johann Joachim Becher (1635–1682), one of the encyclopedic philosophers of the 17th century, stood in opposition to Jan Amos Comenius (1592–1670), the pedagogue of Europewide influence. He published Methodus didactica (1668) and Novum organon (1672), the latter being a universal nomenclator as they were popular in the 17th century. This nomenclator is organised according to Aristotelian categories which Becher saw expressed in word-classes. It assembles groups of synonyms in Latin and German under headwords which were taken as the simple notions, i.e., the building-blocks, of the human mind. Becher demanded didactic principles to be developed out of these linguistic assumptions. Whereas Comenius shaped his teaching methods according to the situational learning abilities of the individual, Becher regarded them as being dominated by the structures of language seen as structures of the mind, thus foreshadowing Cartesian thinking.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Kelsey

Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work De Anima, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that 'the soul in a way is all beings'. This new perspective on the De Anima throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio (logos), or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed.


Author(s):  
Emanuele Castrucci

The human mind has phased out its traditional anchorage in a natural biological basis (the «reasons of the body» which even Spinoza’s Ethics could count on) – an anchorage that had determined, for at least two millennia, historically familiar forms of culture and civilisation. Increasingly emphasising its intellectual disembodiment, it has come to the point of establishing in a completely artificial way the normative conditions of social behaviour and the very ontological collocation of human beings in general. If in the past ‘God’ was the name that mythopoietic activity had assigned to the world’s overall moral order, which was reflected onto human behaviour, now the progressive freeing of the mind – by way of the intellectualisation of life and technology – from the natural normativity which was previously its basic material reference opens up unforeseen vistas of power. Freedom of the intellect demands (or so one believes) the full artificiality of the normative human order in the form of an artificial logos, and precisely qua artificial, omnipotent. The technological icon of logos (which postmodern dispersion undermines only superficially) definitively unseats the traditional normative, sovereign ‘God’ of human history as he has been known till now. Our West has been irreversibly marked by this process, whose results are as devastating as they are inevitable. The decline predicted a century ago by old Spengler is here served on a platter....


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document