Social Cohesion and Identity

This chapter explains what social cohesion is and why it is important. The case for thinking that trust and solidarity are especially important for egalitarian redistribution is presented, and different accounts of their sources are considered. This includes a discussion of strategic, institutional, and moral models for trust and solidarity, welfare regime theory, and how perceptions of deservingness are fundamental for solidarity. Initial reflections on how immigration and diversity might impact these dimensions of social cohesion are introduced. Furthermore, the ‘identity thesis’ is explained, according to which sharing an identity tends to promote such cohesion, and different types of mechanisms that might explain it are distinguished. Finally, the concept of a ‘community conception’ is introduced, and it is explained how different such conceptions differ as regards the values that, if shared, are thought conducive to social cohesion.

The colored-brain thesis

The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality wassociated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain S, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Sw)q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Sw)q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates. Keywords: Colored-brain thesis, qualitative physicalism, mind-brain identity thesis, qualia, panprotopsychism, sensorium.

Unwarranted philosophical assumptions in research on ANS

Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widespread within research on number cognition, they are highly contentious among philosophers of mathematics. In this commentary, we isolate and critically evaluate one core assumption: the identity thesis.

Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology

A Lockean metaphysics of belief that understands outright belief as a determinable with degrees of confidence as determinates is supposed to effect a unification of traditional coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge” – knowledge in the absence of rational confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured, even without token identity, given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification.

The Unity of Composite Substance: The Scholastic Background to the Vinculum Substantiale in Leibniz’s Correspondence with Des Bosses

This paper explores the scholastic context of the discussion about the unity of the composite or corporeal substance and the nature of the vinculum substantiale or substantial bond in Leibniz’s correspondence with Des Bosses. Three prominent scholastic views are examined: Duns Scotus’s antireductionist account of the composite substance as an entity irreducible to its essential parts (i.e., matter and substantial form); Ockham’s parts-whole identity thesis, which entails a reductionist view of the composite substance; and Suárez’s explanation of the unity of composite substance through the presence of a substantial mode of union. It is then shown that Leibniz initially combines a reductionist account of the composite substance, with the vinculum playing the role of bond among the component monads. In his last letters, he moves away from this to an antireductionist account of the composite substance, with which he now identifies the vinculum.

Hegel’s Speculative Identity Thesis

This chapter explores Hegel’s speculative identity thesis, defending the importance of Schelling for Hegel’s appropriation of Kant’s purposiveness theme. It provides an interpretation of Hegel’s first published text, the Differenzschrift, and analyzes the relation between “subjective subject-objects” and “objective subject-objects” as an early presentation of Hegel’s philosophical method. In addition to defending the contribution of Schelling, this chapter provides an interpretation of Fichte’s contribution via his notion of the self-positing activity of the I. It then turns to a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, demonstrating that the notion of “negativity” can be understood along the lines of speculative identity. The chapter argues that Hegel presents life as constitutive for self-consciousness by way of a three-dimensional argument: the employment of an analogy; a transcendental argument; and a refutation of idealism argument. It concludes by briefly outlining how the speculative identity thesis is carried forward in the Science of Logic.

Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to the main arguments and themes of the book. It presents three central claims: first, that the core tenets of Hegel’s philosophy, and in particular Hegel’s “Concept,” should be understood as developing around a purposiveness theme deriving from Kant’s third Critique; second, that the speculative identity thesis is key for Hegel’s overarching philosophical method and can be understood as a relationship between life and self-conscious cognition; and third, that Hegel’s Subjective Logic can be read as his version of a critique of judgment. This chapter also provides arguments against two prominent interpretations of the trajectory from Kant to Hegel: one that revolves around a self-consciousness theme, and one that revolves around the importance of the intuitive understanding. It then provides chapter outlines for the remainder of the book.

Ethical Implications of Identity Politics for Good Governance in 21st Century Nigeria

Contemporary empirical studies on identity question and political identity reveal that numerous political challenges revolve around the questions of identity. Identity thesis engenders a landscape of tremendous diversity and variation, which poses political problems when there is too much or too little of it. It manifests itself when there is a shift towards cultural diversity, largely due to upswing in migration and globalization. Given the multi-ethnic configuration of Nigeria characterized by heightened identity politics, a scenario of acute crisis of identity is inexorable. This study, therefore, examines why societies are today increasingly characterized by ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, which creates room for various forms of identity. Drawing upon extensive contemporary research and literature on diversity and identity politics, the study adopts qualitative descriptive methodology with content analysis curvature. Findings reveal that Nigerian political behavior, socio-economic relationship, and governance are driven by identity politics and ethnic solidarity.

Anselm, the Holy Trinity, and the Relative Identity Thesis

Anselm’s On the Incarnation of the Word is presented as a letter to Pope Urban II for the purpose of exposing and correcting the theological errors of Roscelin of Compiègne, who maintained that since only the Son became incarnate, we must conclude that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are numerically distinct substances. In this paper I argue that Anselm’s rejection of this conclusion involves an account of the Holy Trinity which includes a strongly relativized conception of identity, that is, one which allows an object x and an object y to be the same F, but different Gs. I further contend that Anselm buttresses this account with two non-theological examples of relative identity. Although it may well be the case that advocates of Latin Trinitarianism are generally committed to such an account, since they affirm that the Father is the same substance as the Son but not the same person as the Son, I take Anselm’s defense of this position to be theologically significant, first, because it may well be the first explicit defense of Relative Trinitarianism, and second, because Anselm’s position as a bishop and a Doctor of the Church is (for Catholics, at least) an indication of its theological soundness.