scholarly journals External Economies and International Trade Redux: Comment*

2013 ◽  
Vol 128 (4) ◽  
pp. 1895-1905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Lyn ◽  
Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Transport Costs ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Alternative Set

Abstract Recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (GRH; “External Economies and International Trade: Redux,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 [2010], 829–858) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis under different transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of GRH’s model. We confirm many of GRH’s results, but also find that there are circumstances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade patterns run counter to “natural” comparative advantage, and also find that there is a profitable deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for intermediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and establish that they constitute an equilibrium.

On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium

1996 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Pure Strategies

The most important analytical tool in non-cooperative game theory is the concept of a Nash equilibrium, which is a collection of possibly mixed strategies, one for each player, with the property that each player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players. If we do not go into normative game theory, which concerns itself with the recommendation of strategies, and focus instead entirely on the positive theory of prediction, two alternative interpretations of the Nash equilibrium concept are predominantly available.In the more traditional one, a Nash equilibrium is a prediction of actual play. A game may not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and a mixed strategy equilibrium may be difficult to incorporate into this interpretation if it involves the idea of actual randomization over equally good pure strategies. In another interpretation originating from Harsanyi (1973a), see also Rubinstein (1991), and Aumann and Brandenburger (1991), a Nash equilibrium is a ‘consistent’ collection of probabilistic expectations, conjectures, on the players. It is consistent in the sense that for each player each pure strategy, which has positive probability according to the conjecture about that player, is indeed a best reply to the conjectures about others.

scholarly journals The economic impact of water taxes: a computable general equilibrium analysis with an international data set

Water Policy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Berrittella ◽  
Katrin Rehdanz ◽  
Roberto Roson ◽  
Richard S. J. Tol
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Water Use ◽  
Computable General Equilibrium ◽  
Computable General Equilibrium Model ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Production Factor ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Welfare Losses

Water is scarce in many countries. One instrument for improving the allocation of a scarce resource is (efficient) pricing or taxation. However, water is implicitly traded on international markets, particularly through food and textiles, so that the impacts of water taxes cannot be studied in isolation, but require an analysis of international trade implications. We include water as a production factor in a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model (GTAP), to assess a series of water tax policies. We find that water taxes reduce water use and lead to shifts in production, consumption and international trade patterns. Countries that do not levy water taxes are nonetheless affected by other countries’ taxes. Taxes on agricultural water use drive most of the economic and welfare impacts. Reductions in water use (welfare losses) are less (more) than linear with the price of water. The results are sensitive to the assumed ability to substitute other production factors for water. A water tax on production would have different effects on water use, production and trade patterns and the size and distribution of welfare losses than would a water tax on final consumption.

Gravity Models in International Trade: An Exploration in Econo-Physics

2021 ◽  
pp. 227797872198992
Author(s):  
Iman Pal ◽  
Saibal Kar
Keyword(s):  
Pattern Recognition ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Gravity Models ◽  
Scientific Applications ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Pattern Recognition Techniques ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Jel Classifications

Several strands of the static and dynamic theoretical constructs and the empirical applications in the subject of economics owe substantially to the well-known principles of physical sciences. The present article explores as to how the development of the popular gravity models in international trade can be traced back to Newton’s law of gravitation, and to both Ohm’s Law and Kirchhoff’s Law of current electricity, as well as to the pattern recognition techniques commonly deployed in scientific applications. In addition to surveying these theoretical analogies, the article also offers numerical applications for observed trade patterns between India and a set of countries. JEL Classifications: F41, F42, C61, F47

scholarly journals Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of n≥4$$n \ge 4$$ Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Ewerhart
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Equilibrium

AbstractThe Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and strategic forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for

scholarly journals The Dynamics of International Trade Patterns

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulo Bastos ◽  
Manuel Heredia Cabral
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Patterns

Model Predictive Controller Design for Vehicle Motion Control at Handling Limits in Multiple Equilibria on Varying Road Surfaces

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (20) ◽  
pp. 6667
Author(s):  
Szilárd Czibere ◽  
Ádám Domina ◽  
Ádám Bárdos ◽  
Zsolt Szalay
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Vehicle Dynamics ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Stability Control ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Test Scenario ◽  
Sideslip Angle ◽  
Road Surfaces ◽  
Vehicle Motion

Electronic vehicle dynamics systems are expected to evolve in the future as more and more automobile manufacturers mark fully automated vehicles as their main path of development. State-of-the-art electronic stability control programs aim to limit the vehicle motion within the stable region of the vehicle dynamics, thereby preventing drifting. On the contrary, in this paper, the authors suggest its use as an optimal cornering technique in emergency situations and on certain road conditions. Achieving the automated initiation and stabilization of vehicle drift motion (also known as powerslide) on varying road surfaces means a high level of controllability over the vehicle. This article proposes a novel approach to realize automated vehicle drifting in multiple operation points on different road surfaces. A three-state nonlinear vehicle and tire model was selected for control-oriented purposes. Model predictive control (MPC) was chosen with an online updating strategy to initiate and maintain the drift even in changing conditions. Parameter identification was conducted on a test vehicle. Equilibrium analysis was a key tool to identify steady-state drift states, and successive linearization was used as an updating strategy. The authors show that the proposed controller is capable of initiating and maintaining steady-state drifting. In the first test scenario, the reaching of a single drifting equilibrium point with −27.5° sideslip angle and 10 m/s longitudinal speed is presented, which resulted in −20° roadwheel angle. In the second demonstration, the setpoints were altered across three different operating points with sideslip angles ranging from −27.5° to −35°. In the third test case, a wet to dry road transition is presented with 0.8 and 0.95 road grip values, respectively.

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